Please join us for a seminar with guest
London School of Economics
9:30-11:00a.m. on Thursday, March 23, 2017
Berne Room in GIPA, Madison East 2nd Floor
USPTO – Alexandria Headquarters
600 Dulany St., Alexandria, VA 22314
To study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening, we develop an integrative framework incorporating the four main policy instruments -- patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that examination and pre-grant fees are complementary instruments, and that pre-grant fees screen more effectively than post-grant fees. We simulate the model, calibrated on US patent and litigation data. Results indicate that patenting is socially excessive and that the patent office does not effectively weed out low quality applications. We quantify the welfare effects of policy reforms, such as varying the examination intensity, frontloading patent fees, and capping litigation costs, and show how these effects depend on the quality of the courts.
For security purposes, please RSVP to email@example.com by Monday, March 21st.