2155 Use of Affidavits or Declarations Under 37 CFR 1.130 To Overcome Prior Art Rejections [R-07.2022]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
37 CFR 1.130 Affidavit or declaration of attribution or prior public disclosure under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.
- (a) Affidavit or declaration of attribution. When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected, the applicant or patent owner may submit an appropriate affidavit or declaration to disqualify a disclosure as prior art by establishing that the disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor, or the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.
- (b) Affidavit or declaration of prior public disclosure. When any
claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected, the applicant
or patent owner may submit an appropriate affidavit or declaration to disqualify a
disclosure as prior art by establishing that the subject matter disclosed had,
before such disclosure was made or before such subject matter was effectively
filed, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who
obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or
a joint inventor. An affidavit or declaration under this paragraph must identify
the subject matter publicly disclosed and provide the date such subject matter was
publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the
subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint
inventor.
- (1) If the subject matter publicly disclosed on that date was in a printed publication, the affidavit or declaration must be accompanied by a copy of the printed publication.
- (2) If the subject matter publicly disclosed on that date was not in a printed publication, the affidavit or declaration must describe the subject matter with sufficient detail and particularity to determine what subject matter had been publicly disclosed on that date by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.
- (c) When this section is not available. The provisions of this section are not available if the rejection is based upon a disclosure made more than one year before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. The provisions of this section may not be available if the rejection is based upon a U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication of a patented or pending application naming another inventor, the patent or pending application claims an invention that is the same or substantially the same as the applicant's or patent owner's claimed invention, and the affidavit or declaration contends that an inventor named in the U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication derived the claimed invention from the inventor or a joint inventor named in the application or patent, in which case an applicant or a patent owner may file a petition for a derivation proceeding pursuant to § 42.401et seq. of this title.
- (d) Applications and patents to which this section is applicable.
The provisions of this section apply to any application for patent, and to any
patent issuing thereon, that contains, or contained at any time:
- (1) A claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date as defined in § 1.109 that is on or after March 16, 2013; or
- (2) A specific reference under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) to any patent or application that contains, or contained at any time, a claim to a claimed invention that has an effective filing date as defined in § 1.109 that is on or after March 16, 2013.
The Office has provided a mechanism in 37 CFR 1.130 for filing an affidavit or declaration to establish that a disclosure is not prior art under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a) due to an exception in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b). Under 37 CFR 1.130(a), an affidavit or declaration of attribution may be submitted to except a disclosure as prior art because it was made by the inventor or a joint inventor, or the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. Under 37 CFR 1.130(b), an affidavit or declaration of prior public disclosure may be submitted to except an intervening disclosure as prior art if the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure was made or before such subject matter was effectively filed in a U.S. patent, U.S. patent application publication, or WIPO published application, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.
2155.01 Showing That the Disclosure Was Made by the Inventor or a Joint Inventor [R-07.2022]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) provides that a grace period disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) if the disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor. An applicant may show that a disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor by way of an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) (an affidavit or declaration of attribution). See In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 455, 215 USPQ 14, 18 (CCPA 1982) and MPEP § 717.01(a)(1) . Where the authorship of the prior art disclosure includes the inventor or a joint inventor named in the application, an unequivocal statement from the inventor or a joint inventor that the inventor or joint inventor (or some combination of named inventors) invented the subject matter of the disclosure, accompanied by a reasonable explanation of the presence of additional authors, may be acceptable in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See In re DeBaun, 687 F.2d 459, 463, 214 USPQ 933, 936 (CCPA 1982). When any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected, the applicant or patent owner may submit an appropriate affidavit or declaration to except a disclosure as prior art by establishing that the disclosure was made by the inventor or a joint inventor, or the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. However, an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) that is only a naked assertion of inventorship and that fails to provide any context, explanation or evidence to support that assertion is insufficient. See EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 123 USPQ2d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See also Ex parte Kroger, 219 USPQ 370 (Bd. App. 1982) (affirming rejection notwithstanding declarations by the alleged actual inventors as to their inventorship in view of a nonapplicant author submitting a letter declaring the nonapplicant author's inventorship). This is similar to the process for disqualifying a publication as not being by “others” discussed in MPEP § 2132.01, except that AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) requires only that the disclosure be by the inventor or a joint inventor.
The following examples are provided for illustration only:
On April 7, 2021, an attorney for AB Corp. files a U.S. nonprovisional patent application claiming subject matter X. Anwesha is the inventor named in a signed application data sheet (ADS), but there is no inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 of record. The examiner finds a journal article disclosing subject matter X with a publication date of November 1, 2020, which is within the grace period. The journal article lists Anwesha and Bob as coauthors. There is no evidence of record to indicate that Bob did not invent subject matter X disclosed in the journal article. Accordingly, the examiner rejects the claim to X as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) by the journal article. In response to the prior art rejection, AB Corp.'s attorney files a declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) signed by Anwesha averring that she is the sole inventor of the subject matter X disclosed in the article. Anwesha also explains in the declaration that Bob was a graduate student working under her direction and supervision and did not contribute to the conception of the claimed invention. In other words, Anwesha’s declaration establishes that Bob was not a joint inventor of subject matter X.
The examiner should withdraw the rejection because the declaration establishes that the journal article is not prior art. Anwesha's declaration includes a statement that Anwesha invented X, so there is no need for the examiner to require a signed inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 at this time in order to withdraw the rejection. Furthermore, the declaration properly includes a reasonable explanation of Bob's involvement with the journal article. A statement from Bob is not needed. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Bob was a joint inventor of X.
An attorney for AB Corp. files a U.S. patent application disclosing and claiming subject matter Y on June 2, 2021. Alexis is the inventor named in a signed ADS, but there is no inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 on file. The examiner finds a U.S. patent application publication (PGPub) claiming subject matter Y and Z that was published on January 14, 2021, which is within the grace period. The PGPub lists Alexis and Mehdi as joint inventors. There is no evidence of record to indicate that Mehdi did not invent subject matter Y as disclosed and claimed in the PGPub to Alexis and Mehdi. Accordingly, the examiner rejects the claim to Y as being anticipated by the PGPub under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) based on its publication date, and under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) based on its effectively filed date.
In response to the prior art rejections, AB Corp.’s attorney files a 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration signed by Alexis averring that she invented subject matter Y as disclosed and claimed in the PGPub. The examiner should maintain the rejections under both 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) because the declaration fails to establish that Mehdi is not a joint inventor of Y. Alexis' declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) does include a statement that Alexis invented Y, so there is no need for the examiner to require a signed inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 at this time in order to withdraw the rejection. However, Alexis’ declaration is ineffective because it lacks a reasonable explanation of Mehdi’s role in the PGPub. If Alexis’ declaration had stated that Mehdi was named as an inventor of the PGPub because Mehdi invented Z, the declaration would have been sufficient; a corroborating statement from Mehdi would not have been needed.
Note that in accordance with compact prosecution, it is appropriate in Example 2 for the examiner to reject under both sections of 35 U.S.C. 102(a) because the U.S. patent document reference has a public availability date (that is, either a publication date or an issue date) within the grace period. If the 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) date had been prior to the grace period, then no 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) rejection over the same disclosure would have been necessary because no exception could possibly have applied to overcome the 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) rejection. Given the facts of Example 2, however, an applicant’s response could possibly establish an exception to overcome one of the rejections while allowing the examiner to maintain the other rejection. At the time that a rejection is made, the examiner cannot foresee how the applicant will respond. Thus, in order to conclude prosecution in a timely manner and avoid the possibility of an additional non-final action, the examiner should make both a 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) rejection and a 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) rejection when the 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) date of a U.S. patent document is within the grace period year.
On March 16, 2021, an attorney for Acme Corp. files a U.S. patent application claiming subject matter X. Ali is the inventor named in a signed ADS, but there is no inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 on record. The examiner finds a September 10, 2021 U.S. patent application publication (PGPub) that names Ming as the inventor and that discloses but does not claim subject matter X. The effectively filed date of Ming’s application is January 7, 2020, which is before Acme's filing date. Therefore, Ming’s PGPub is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2). However, Ming’s PGPub is not potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) because it published after Acme's filing date. The examiner should reject the claim to X under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Ming’s PGPub. At the time of the rejection, the examiner has no information about Ali's interaction with Ming.
In the reply to the Office action, Acme's attorney files a declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) signed by Ali to show that Ming's disclosure of X is not prior art because Ming learned about X from Ali. The declaration from Ali explains the circumstances under which Ali privately told Ming about X. Ali's declaration does not state that Ali is the inventor of X.
The examiner should maintain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) because the record fails to establish that Ali invented X. Specifically, Ali's 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration does not state that Ali invented X, and there is also no inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 of record to establish that Ali invented X. Thus, although Ali told Ming about X, it is not clearly established on the record that Al invented X. In order to establish that the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(A) applies and overcome the rejection, it is necessary to establish that Ali invented X. Acme's attorney could do that by submitting either a new declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) which states that Ali invented X or an inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 signed by Ali.
Note that, in this example, determining the grace period is not needed because the grace period is only relevant to potential prior art as of a public availability date. In other words, the grace period is only relevant when there is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1). In this example, Ming's PGPub was not publicly available until after Acme Corp. filed the application claiming X. Therefore, Ming’s PGPub was not prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and no exceptions involving the grace period can possibly apply.
Similar to Example 3, on March 16, 2021, an attorney for Acme Corp. files a U.S. patent application claiming subject matter X. In contrast to Example 3, an inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 signed by Ali is with the application. The examiner finds a U.S. patent to Gopal that issued on November 10, 2020 and discloses but does not claim subject matter X. Gopal’s patent is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) because the issue date of Gopal’s patent is before Acme's filing date and falls within the grace period. Accordingly, it is possible for an exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) to apply. In addition, the effectively filed date of Gopal’s application is also before Acme's filing date, so Gopal’s patent is potential prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as well.
Similar to example 2, it is appropriate for the examiner to reject the claims to X as anticipated under both sections of 35 U.S.C. 102(a) because the reference is a U.S. patent document having a public availability date (in this case, an issue date) that is within the grace period. The examiner should be aware that it is possible for the applicant to invoke a prior art exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) and show that Gopal’s patent is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) but Gopal’s patent still remains available as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2). Therefore, the examiner should make anticipation rejections under both 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) in accordance with compact prosecution guidance. At the time of the rejection, the examiner has no information about Ali's interaction with Gopal.
In reply to the Office action, Acme's attorney files a 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration signed by Gopal averring that Ali told him about subject matter X as disclosed in Gopal’s patent. In the reply, Acme's attorney also calls the examiner's attention to the fact that an inventor's oath or declaration signed by Ali is already of record. Note that this example is similar to example 3, but here Gopal signs the 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration rather than Ali.
The examiner should withdraw the rejections under both 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) and 102(a)(2) based on the Gopal patent because the evidence of record establishes that the disclosure of X in Gopal’s patent is attributable to Ali. In other words, there is evidence of record that Ali invented X and Gopal’s disclosure originated with Ali. In view of Gopal’s 37 CFR 1.130(a) declaration, it is clear that Gopal did not invent X because the record shows that Gopal learned about it from Ali. Furthermore, there is an inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63, signed by Ali, of record in the application file. The above evidence shows that Ali is an inventor of X.
Note that, in this example, the fact that Gopal’s patent did not claim X eliminates the possibility of derivation. If Gopal’s patent did claim X, then derivation issues may be present. The PTAB will consider instituting a derivation proceeding when a patent applicant submits a petition under 37 CFR 42.402 alleging derivation by an earlier applicant or patentee.
2155.02 Showing That the Subject Matter Disclosed Had Been Previously Publicly Disclosed by the Inventor or a Joint Inventor [R-07.2022]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) provides that a grace period disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) if subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor. Similarly, AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(B) provides that a disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) if the subject matter disclosed had, before such subject matter was effectively filed under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2), been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor. An applicant may show that the subject matter disclosed had been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor before the disclosure or effective filing date of the subject matter on which the rejection was based by way of an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(b) (an affidavit or declaration of prior public disclosure). Specifically, the affidavit or declaration must identify the subject matter publicly disclosed and establish the date and content of their earlier public disclosure. If the earlier public disclosure is a printed publication, the affidavit or declaration must be accompanied by a copy of the printed publication in accordance with37 CFR 1.130(b)(1). If the earlier disclosure is not a printed publication, the affidavit or declaration must describe the earlier disclosure with sufficient detail and particularity to determine that the earlier disclosure is a public disclosure of the subject matter, as required by 37 CFR 1.130(b)(2).
The manner of disclosure of subject matter referenced in an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(b)(2) is not critical. Just as the prior art provision of AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) encompasses any disclosure that renders a claimed invention “available to the public,” any manner of disclosure may be evidenced in an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(b). That is, when using an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(b) to except an intervening disclosure as prior art based on a prior public disclosure by an inventor or a joint inventor, it is not necessary for the subject matter to have been disclosed in the same manner or using the same words. For example, the inventor or a joint inventor may have publicly disclosed the subject matter in question via a slide presentation at a scientific meeting, while the intervening disclosure of the subject matter may have been made in a journal article. This difference in the manner of disclosure or differences in the words used to describe the subject matter will not preclude the inventor from submitting an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(b) to except subject matter in the intervening disclosure (e.g., a journal article) as prior art.
The following examples are provided for illustration only:
On May 18, 2021, an attorney for Acme Corp. files a U.S. patent application claiming subject matter X. An inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 signed by Maria is also filed with the application. During the prior art search, the examiner finds a journal article authored by Keiko that published on March 16, 2021 and discloses the same subject matter X. The journal article by Keiko is publicly available before Acme's filing date. Accordingly, the examiner should reject the claims to X as being anticipated by Keiko under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1). At the time of the rejection, the examiner has no information about Maria’s prior public disclosure.
In reply to the Office action, Acme's attorney files a 37 CFR 1.130(b) declaration signed by Maria averring that she had disclosed X at a virtual conference on June 7, 2020, which is prior to the public availability date of Keiko’s disclosure of X in the journal article. The reply also includes a copy of Maria’s presentation slides at the virtual conference. In addition, the reply calls the examiner's attention to the inventor's oath or declaration signed by Maria that is already of record.
The examiner should withdraw the anticipation rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) because the evidence of record establishes that Maria had made a prior public disclosure of the same subject matter disclosed in Keiko’s journal article. It is important to note that if a prior public disclosure is made by a printed publication, 37 CFR 1.130(b)(1) requires that a copy be included with the declaration. Acme has complied with this requirement by supplying a copy of the conference presentation slides. Furthermore, the application file includes an inventor's oath or declaration under 37 CFR 1.63 signed by Maria. Therefore, the record contains sufficient evidence that Maria is the inventor of X. Finally, it is clear that Maria disclosed the same subject matter as Keiko because both disclosed X.
This example has the same facts as example 1 above, but in this example, the journal article to Keiko discloses not only X, but also Y and a genus that encompasses both X and Y. As in example 1, the examiner should make an anticipation rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) for the claims to X.
At the time of the rejection, the examiner has no information about Maria’s prior public disclosure and cannot predict how the applicant will respond. Thus, in order to conclude prosecution in a timely manner and avoid the possibility of an additional non-final action, the examiner should consider whether Acme's claim to X can be rejected as obvious over Keiko’s disclosure of Y. The disclosure of Y by Keiko is still available as prior art because Maria’s disclosure of X is not the same subject matter as Keiko’s disclosure of Y. If the applicant shows that the Keiko’s disclosure of X and the genus that encompasses X and Y is not prior art in response to the rejection, the examiner could maintain the obviousness rejection based on Keiko’s disclosure of Y and make the next Office action final, unless it is not appropriate for other reasons. Stated another way, the second Office action cannot be made final if a new obviousness rejection based on Keiko’s disclosure of Y is made in response to the filing of the 37 CFR 1.130(b) declaration, assuming Acme did not amend the claims.
Note that Maria’s prior public disclosure of X is considered to be the same subject matter as Keiko’s later‐disclosed genus that includes X, in the same sense that a species can be said to anticipate a genus. In other words, the inventor is not penalized just because a third party sees the inventor's disclosure and then re‐publicizes it in a more generalized fashion.
2155.03 Showing That the Disclosure was Made, or That Subject Matter had Been Previously Publicly Disclosed, by Another Who Obtained the Subject Matter Disclosed Directly or Indirectly From the Inventor or a Joint Inventor [R-11.2013]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A), 102(b)(1)(B), 102(b)(2)(A), and 102(b)(2)(B) each provide similar treatment for disclosures of subject matter by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. Specifically, AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(A) provides that a grace period disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) if the disclosure was made by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor, and AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(A) provides that a disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) if the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor.
In addition, AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) and 102(b)(2)(B) respectively provide that a grace period disclosure under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1), and that a disclosure under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) shall not be prior art to a claimed invention, if the subject matter disclosed had, before such grace disclosure was made or before such subject matter was effectively filed according to 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2), been publicly disclosed by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. An applicant may also show that another obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor in an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) or (b). Thus, an applicant may establish a prior public disclosure by another during the grace period if the applicant can establish that subject matter disclosed originated with the inventor or a joint inventor and that the subject matter was communicated by the inventor or a joint inventor, directly or indirectly. Any documentation which provides evidence of the communication of the subject matter by the inventor or a joint inventor to the entity that made the disclosure of the subject matter directly or indirectly, such as by an assignee of the inventor, should accompany the affidavit or declaration.
2155.04 Enablement [R-11.2013]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
An affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) or (b) need not demonstrate that the disclosure by the inventor, a joint inventor, or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from an inventor or a joint inventor was an “enabling” disclosure of the subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 112(a). Rather, an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130 must show that: (1) the disclosure in question was made by the inventor or a joint inventor, or the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor (37 CFR 1.130(a)); or (2) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure was made or before such subject matter was effectively filed, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor (37 CFR 1.130(b)).
2155.05 Who May File an Affidavit or Declaration Under 37 CFR 1.130 [R-07.2022]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
In accordance with 37 CFR 1.130, the applicant or patent owner may submit an affidavit or declaration. When an assignee, obligated assignee, or person showing sufficient proprietary interest is the applicant under 35 U.S.C. 118 rather than the inventor, the inventor may sign an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.130 to except subject matter in a disclosure of the invention as prior art, but the declaration must be filed by a party having authority to take action in the application. Authority to file papers in an application generally does not lie with the inventor if the inventor is not the applicant.
2155.06 Situations in Which an Affidavit or Declaration Is Not Available [R-10.2019]
[Editor Note: This MPEP section is only applicable to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). See MPEP § 2159 et seq. to determine whether an application is subject to examination under the FITF provisions, and MPEP § 2131-MPEP § 2138 for examination of applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102.]
The provisions of 37 CFR 1.130 are not available if the rejection is based upon a disclosure made more than one year before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. A disclosure made more than one year before the effective filing date of a claimed invention is prior art under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) that cannot be excepted as prior art under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1).
Additionally, the provisions of 37 CFR 1.130 may not be available if the rejection is based upon a U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication naming another inventor if: (1) the patent or pending application claims an invention that is the same or substantially the same as the applicant's or patent owner's claimed invention; and (2) the affidavit or declaration contends that an inventor named in the U.S. patent or U.S. patent application publication derived the claimed invention from the inventor or a joint inventor named in the application or patent. The provisions of 37 CFR 1.130 are not available if it would result in the Office issuing or confirming two patents containing patentably indistinct claims to two different parties. See In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 1451-52, 24 USPQ2d 1448, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (35 U.S.C. 102, 103, and 135 “clearly contemplate—where different inventive entities are concerned—only one patent should issue for inventions which are either identical to or not patentably distinct from each other”) (quoting Aelony v. Arni, 547 F.2d 566, 570, 192 USPQ 486, 490 (CCPA 1977)). In this situation, an applicant or patent owner may file a petition for a derivation proceeding pursuant to 37 CFR 42.401 et seq. (37 CFR 1.130(c)).