May 2, 2006

Mail Stop Comments—Patents
Attn: Robert W. Bahr and Robert A. Clarke
Commissioner for Patents
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA, 22313–1450

Comments on
“Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims” (71 Fed. Reg. 48, January 3, 2006) and

Heritage Woods, Inc. appreciates the opportunity to comment on the two proposed rule packages published in January 2006.

Heritage Woods is a small business that relies on its patents to protect its product line from larger competitors. This letter also expresses concerns of other small businesses who rely on their patents.

The two proposed rule packages noted above have been brought to our attention by patent counsel. While there are a few good ideas in the two rule packages, Heritage Woods appreciates the PTO’s effort to correct a perceived problem, the packages as a whole will cause and aggravate more problems than they solve. They will remarkably increase the cost of the patent system as a whole – the costs of obtaining a patent will go up by a large factor, and the costs of litigation will go up even more.

Ironically, both packages will have the most negative effect on the most important inventions and applications. The “Examination of Claims” rule package (71 Fed. Reg. 61) explicitly embodies a view that large applications are “bad” and should be penalized. However, from both a commercial point of view and from a patent public policy point of view, large applications are good: they are the applications that are directed to economically-important inventions, and they provide the greatest disclosure of ideas to the public – which is, after all, the main public good of the patent system. They are immensely cost-effective to the patent system – a patent that has many claims is a much more efficient dispute-resolution document than a short imprecise patent that needs to rely heavily on fuzzy notions of “equivalents.” A patent is analogous to a commercial contract – a contract this is fully negotiated, and that expressly spells...
out all the rights and obligations of the parties, is far cheaper in the long run than a brief contract that leaves most issues to be fought out later.

Other analogies to contracts demonstrate the perverse effects of these rule packages. These rule packages infect the examination/prosecution negotiation process with the factors that make any contract negotiation harder. As a general rule, a commercial contract is more easily negotiated if the parties can disclose their concerns, incentives, and positions early in the negotiation, and harder if a position is kept hidden until late, and if there are hard deadlines and hard positions that cannot be moved as new issues emerge. Both these proposals are expressly directed at putting the negotiation onto the worst possible ground for efficient resolution of issues.

The PTO solicited very little public comment before announcing these rule packages. In public comment forums, we understand that many PTO customers expressed that the issues targeted by these proposals are not the issues that matter. PTO officials conceded that the PTO had done no self-study to identify the cause of the problems targeted, let alone any study to show how the proposed rules would lead to resolution of the problems. The rule proposals seem to be narrowly focused on solving the PTO’s problems, to the near exclusion of considering the issues that matter to the PTO’s various constituencies.

The message of these rule package to inventors is clear: stop inventing complex or worthwhile inventions. The rationale for the PTO to send this message is not clear. The proposals are based on bad assumptions, bad data, and bad analysis, and should be withdrawn. The PTO should initiate a dialog with its customers. The first and most crucial step in this dialog should be to identify the criteria that matter most to applicants, and metrics to measure them. Once problems are soundly identified, then practical and efficient solutions to the problems usually emerge fairly readily, and there is no reason to believe this will not be the case here.

I. **Both Rule Packages are Based on Questionable or Faulty Data, Unsupported Assumptions, and Failure to Consider Important Aspects of the Problem**

Comment 1. “Rework” Is Overwhelmingly the Product of Errors Within the PTO, Not Applicant Behavior that these Rule Proposals Seek to Curb. Both Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, and the public statements of PTO officials announcing them, note that the proposed rules are directed to cutting down “rework.” Because the PTO has apparently made no attempt to identify the cause of the problems identified, neither Notice identifies any “rational connection” between the rules as proposed and any hoped-for causal reduction in “rework.”

Further, it appears that the PTO has neglected to consider the statistics that it has collected, that do fairly directly establish a cause of “rework,” a cause that will be aggravated by the two rule packages.

The following table combines statistics of *ex parte* appeals obtained from the PTO’s web pages, and statistics obtained via Freedom of Information Act requests.

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2 [http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/index.htm](http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/index.htm). This table reflects only utility applications – where the data permits design applications to be subtracted out, they have been.
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Examiners' Answers Rejected By The Board of Patent Appeals

| Year | Dispos | Totol Net | Total Net (Appr. Corr. Attendance) | % | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 4.2% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 6.0% |
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In-Group Appeal Conference

| Year | Dispos | Totol Net | Total Net (Appr. Corr. Attendance) | % | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 4.2% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 6.0% |
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| Total Net | Dispos | Totol Net | Total Net (Appr. Corr. Attendance) | % | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 4.2% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 6.0% |

Dispositions of Appeals - From Appeal Conference to Board Final Decision

| Year | Dispos | Totol Net | Total Net (Appr. Corr. Attendance) | % | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 4.2% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 6.0% |
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| Total Net | Dispos | Totol Net | Total Net (Appr. Corr. Attendance) | % | 1.2% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 4.2% | 4.4% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 6.0% |
It appears that the Patent Office has literally done nothing to identify the cause of the problem it’s trying to solve. Neither Notice discloses any attempt by the PTO to identify the cause of “rework.” On Friday, April 7, 2006, at the New York “Townhall meeting,” Commissioner Doll was asked if the PTO had made any attempt to identify the cause of the rework, particularly whether the PTO had made any attempt to determine whether “rework” was caused by examiner error or applicant dalliance. Mr. Doll virtuously answered forthrightly and directly: “No.” In response to several Freedom of Information Act requests for documents in which the PTO might have identified the cause of its “rework” problem, or set out any diagnosis or analysis, the PTO insisted that there are no such documents. If the PTO doesn’t know what disease is causing the symptoms, it’s premature to propose major surgery.

However, facts were available that permitted such diagnosis. The PTO’s own statistics show that, at Appeal Conference, an examiner is successful at persuading two other examiners only 40% of the time – 60% of examiners’ positions are repudiated by colleagues. Of the 40% of examiner positions that survive the Appeal Conference level, less than 40% are affirmed by the Board. In all recent years but one, the Board reverses more often than it affirms.3

Taken together, these two sets of statistics suggest that in contested applications, examiners are affirmed by colleagues or the Board only about 20% of the time.4 This suggests that the overwhelming cause of “rework” and extended continuation practice is errors by the examiner, not nefarious or dilatory applicants. Rule changes directed at applicants will have almost no effect on “rework.”

When an agency’s substantive results are this flawed, the courts conclude that the agency’s procedures are unconstitutionally flawed. When an agency’s own figures show reversal rates of one third, the agency’s procedures “cannot be defended,” and the agency is in violation of its duties to provide due process. Mattern v. Weinberger, 519 F.2d 150, 161 (3rd Cir. 1975), gvr’d on other grounds, 425 U.S. 987 (1976). A reversal rate approaching eighty percent is beyond anything that appears in any case – apparently no other agency tolerates that of itself.

These proposed rules bear no rational relationship to the PTO’s “rework” problems. The proposed rules fail to consider the single most “important aspect of the problem,”5 will do very little to relieve “rework,” and do nothing to help the Office comply with its due process duties

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3 In a recent internet news item, a law firm that has filed over 100 requests for pre-Appeal Brief review reported that over 90% of rejections are reversed during Pre-Appeal Brief Review phase.

4 This statistic does not include the number of further rejections reversed by the Federal Circuit.

No doubt, there are many methodological errors in the spreadsheet, due to unavailability of detailed statistics. For example, the cases decided by the Board in Fiscal Year X are not the same population of applications reviewed by Appeal Conferences in year X. The spreadsheet assumes that the Board’s “affirmed in part” reflects a 50-50 break between applicant and examiner, an obvious oversimplification. However, given the magnitude of the final result, there is no question that the PTO is far in violation of its due process duties to provide processes that keep the error rate below 1/3.

under the Administrative Procedure Act and Due Process clause of the Constitution. Alternative proposals that address the actual measurable problem are discussed below at § IV.

Neither rule package can be promulgated on the current record.

**Comment 2. The Benefit to Be Expected from the Two Rule Packages is Modest at Best.** By the Patent Office’s own figures, the improvement that can be expected from these two rule packages is very modest. This is the chart that the PTO has been using in its presentations.

Note that the current baseline projection – the yellow projection – and the projection for adoption of both rule packages – the blue line – are very close together. The divergence between them is probably less than the error tolerance in the projections themselves.

The red curve and the purple curve are apparently irrelevant to these two particular rule packages, and only confuse the analysis.

**Comment 3. The PTO’s Statements Regarding Hiring Are Inconsistent with the Small Amount of Information That Has Been Made Public.** In a number of public statements, PTO officials have stated the PTO can’t “hire its way out” of its backlog. Yet, the PTO’s own projection graph shows that the second-biggest reduction in pendency – the difference between the red curve and the yellow curve – is due to hiring and retention. The only larger effect, between the blue and dotted-yellow curves, is for “Patentability Reports,” a proposal that has not yet been made public, that remains entirely theoretical.
The PTO should not prematurely discount the effects of the single best concrete solution it has proposed.

Comment 4. The Two Rule Packages Fail to Show the Agency Considered Costs to be Imposed on the Public. The rule packages assume that application pendency is the criterion that trumps all others for all applicants. Simply not true. When the PTO delays an application, the statutory protections of 35 U.S.C. § 154 provide compensating extension of patent term, so extended pendency is often no net loss to the applicant. There are several things that are more important: (a) business confidence that issued patents have been well searched and are valid, (b) complete communication of an examiner’s entire view in the first communication from the Office, so that an applicant can determine what is patentable and what is not — like a negotiation where both sides put all their concerns on the table early, so that they can quickly reach agreement, and (c) total end-to-end cost, including both attorney fees and PTO fees. Both proposals are apparently directed at lowering the number of applications filed by raising total costs, violating (c). The “Examination of Claims” proposal is especially antithetical to both (a) and (b). The “Continuations” rule package weakens (a).

Further, the Notices fail to estimate the costs to be imposed on applicants. Agencies cannot propose major rule changes, without consideration of costs imposed on other stakeholders, with no cogent explanation of a connection between problem and proposed solution, and with no supporting documentation. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 55 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1983). The PTO must consider all the costs attendant its proposed rule — it may not simply consider its own costs and ignore the costs it proposes to impose on applicants.

Neither rule package can be adopted on the current record.

Comment 5. The Two Rule Packages are Logically Inconsistent With Each Other. The two rule packages are fundamentally inconsistent with each other. The “Examination of Claims” rule package (71 Fed. Reg. 61) is directed at allowing the PTO to examine less than an entire application. This will necessarily increase the need for continuation applications, for example, where the subject matter that emerges as ultimately patentable is set out in claims initially filed as dependent claims.

In direct opposition to the “Examination of Claims” package, the “Continuations” rule package (71 Fed. Reg. 48) is directed at confining the use of continuations.

The two rule packages are logically inconsistent with each other. Taken together, they are arbitrary and capricious.

II. 71 Fed Reg. 48 – Limiting Continuation Applications and Presumption of Double Patenting

This rule package would limit applicants’ ability to file continuation, continuation-in-part, divisional, or request for continued examination. The standards announced in the PTO’s public presentations are very similar to the standards for reopening a final judgment after full discovery, trial and appeal, rather than standards for an investigatory proceeding of first instance. The effects would be most draconian for the biggest innovations: where simple inventions to minor improvements would be almost unaffected, the ability to patent a family of related inventions arising out of a large research project would be sharply curtailed.

1. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(i) Exceeds the PTO’s Statutory Authority

Comment 6. The PTO has no statutory authority to promulgate this rule with respect to continuations or voluntary divisionals under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Section 120 states that a later application “shall” be given priority benefit when certain conditions are met. The statute offers no authority for the Office to further restrict the timing or depth of a chain of continuations, beyond the statutory requirement for co-pendency. Section 120 gives the Director rule-making discretion in some areas, but not the area covered by the proposed rule. The PTO lacks authority to add further conditions, or to add rules outside the scope of discretion delegated in § 120.

The “administrative convenience” of an agency may not be used to subvert a statutory right. In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 458, 198 USPQ 328, 332 (CCPA 1978) (“[I]n drawing priorities between the Commissioner as administrator and the applicant as beneficiary of his statutory rights, we conclude that the statutory rights are paramount.”); Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480, 483, 226 USPQ 985, 987 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“administrative convenience or even necessity cannot override the constitutional requirements of due process”).

2. Proposed Rule 1.78(d)(i) is Directly Contrary to the PTO’s Economic Interest, and Will Result in Further Degradations in Pendency

Comment 7. The Notice makes a “problem” out of a situation that any other business entity would turn into a profit center. The Notice complains that PTO's customers want to pay the PTO its full rate to do exactly the same work a second time. The Notice posits that many applications are filed directed to non-patentably-distinct claims, claims that can be examined at near-zero incremental effort.

There is no economically rational basis to believe that multiple, not-patentably-distinct applications are bad for the PTO. If not-patentably-distinct applications really are being filed in any significant number, then the PTO is getting “free” income – if two applications really are similar, then the PTO pockets the fee income, and has very little work to do. If this is really happening, then these applicants are subsidizing everyone else, including the PTO. Discouraging it will result in a larger proportional loss in fee income than reduction in work expended. The work-to-fee ratio will worsen. The PTO’s ability to hire in the future will be compromised. Pendency times will further degrade.

If PTO’s business operations are anomalous exceptions to the laws of economics, then crucial facts were omitted from the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The public should be provided with those facts: why are these applications costing more in PTO resources than the fee income they generate? Perhaps once these facts are disclosed, a rational rule proposal could be framed. On the facts articulated in the Notice, proposed § 1.78(d) is arbitrary and capricious.

Because the PTO proposes to increase its own average costs for processing patent applications, this cost will likely be reflected back to applicants.

Comment 8. The Rule Proposal is Based on a Double Standard. The Notice states that “The current unrestricted continued examination practice, however, does not provide adequate incentives to assure that the exchanges between an applicant and the examiner during
the examination process are efficient.” This is simply counterfactual. Prosecution costs impose
great efficiency incentives on applicants. The 1995 statutory amendments, with the 20-year-
from-filing patent term, provides significant incentives to advance prosecution as efficiently as
possible. Further, as a practical economic matter, very few applications are filed after years 7 or
so – as the remainder of the 20 year patent term winds down, the economic value of a new
application falls below the cost of filing long before 20 years. The doctrine of prosecution
laches, and the “fair warning” procedure exemplified in In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 64
USPQ2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2002) are a fair and efficient way to deal with anomalies.

On the other hand, applicants might fairly ask, what incentive does the PTO provide to
examiners to write complete office actions, to avoid doing the things that the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) says may not be done, and to avoid making up new rules as they
go along? At the April 9 New York Town Hall, a former Deputy Assistant Commissioner for
patent Examination Policy stated that examiners face no internal liability or discipline for bad
examination. No matter how bad an examiner’s work is, the examiner is compensated and
promoted based purely on quantity. Some Technology Center Directors actively incentivize
their examiners to not examine applications. For example, in a Decision on Petition of 12/8/05,
09/385,394, addressed to an independent claim had been entirely ignored (except a pro forma
statement that it was rejected), the Technology Center Director in 2183 states that “Petitioner
should be advised that there is no requirement that an element for element or limitation for
limitation identification (between the claims and reference(s) be provided to applicant in the
grounds of rejection set forth in the examination process...” in the context of three references that
total 70 columns of text. The 2183 Technology Center Director expressly blessed an examiner
that kept his position secret during regular examination, even on independent claims, and then
disclosed it in post-final advisory actions. In 2183, examiners earn full “counts” and get to force
the application into an RCE, for even more counts. In this art unit, there are no “adequate
incentives to assure that the exchanges between an applicant and the examiner during the
examination process are efficient.”

The solution to the “rework” problems identified in the Notices resides in enforcing the
PTO’s existing rules during the § 131 examination phase – for example, requiring examiners to
set forth findings on all legally-relevant issues, In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315, 65 USPQ2d
2003, 2007 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (examiners must set forth findings on the prior art relative to each
element of a claim, and motivation to combine or modify); 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 132 (Director
“shall cause an examination to be made” and shall “state reasons” for any rejection); e.g., MPEP
§§ 2112, 2143-2143.03, 2144.03 (examiner must state findings on various factors), as opposed to
the current policy of refusing to consider all requests in any forum requesting enforcement of
those rules and legal requirements, thereby allowing examiners to pick and choose which rules to
follow and which to ignore. Several mechanisms for enforcement, most of which are required
under current law, are discussed in § IV.

The PTO’s outright refusal to enforce its own rules or the Administrative Procedure Act
during § 131/132 examination phase, and its insistence that examiners have “freedom to
independently decide” whether or not to follow PTO rules, even if that means arbitrary and

Reply to Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 16 (April 23, 2004) (PTO asserts that examiners have
“free exercise of their [judgment]” in choosing whether to follow or ignore instructions of the Director in
capricious rejection, costs businesses at least $100 million per year in excess and unjustified legal costs. A fair estimate is that at least 20% of this falls on small businesses.

3. **Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(i) is Unwise and Unwarranted**

   **Comment 9.** Appeals are costly for both applicants and the PTO — this rule change will force many applications from an inexpensive forum to a more expensive one.

   A typical Response to Office Action costs $2000-$8000 to prepare. An appeal costs about 2 to 3 times that. The proposal will likely cost several tens of millions of dollars per year extra for small businesses.

B. **Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(ii) Is Unwise and Inefficient, and an Unconstitutional Denial of Due Process**

   The discussion section explains that § 1.78(d)(ii) would forbid “voluntary” divisionals. Only “involuntary divisionals,” that is divisionals filed after a unity of invention objection under PCT Rule 13, or a restriction under 35 U.S.C. § 121, would be permitted. The only claims permitted in a divisional would be the ones divided from the parent case. A divisional would only be permitted to claim priority from that single parent. “Voluntary” divisionals, where a single application is filed with a large specification describing all inventions, and applications with the claims directed to the appropriate patentably-distinct inventions described in that specification, would no longer be permitted. The opportunity currently available to applicants, to claim inventions as they become apparent in light of the prior art, would be closed off.

   **Comment 10.** At Townhall presentations, the PTO stated that it intends this rule to cut off at least ten thousand patent applications per year, perhaps more. The economic effects are difficult to estimate with any certainty, but it is safe to say that this proposal will unquestionably destroy many tens of millions of dollars of value for small businesses each year, very likely hundreds of millions, and perhaps billions.

   **Comment 11. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(ii) Requires Applications to be Presented to the PTO in a Form that is Inefficient for the PTO and for Applicants.** This proposal overlooks a key fact: by and large, applicants’ and the PTO’s interests are essentially aligned on these issues: claims that are more efficiently prosecuted together are by and large more efficiently examined together. Applicants generally make these determinations based on the same economic and practical considerations that apply to the PTO, and the law presumes that the choices are reasonable. Before an application is filed, an applicant is in a far better position to know which situation applies. The law allows the PTO to overcome the presumption if it can come forward with evidence to the contrary. Current law on this particular issue is just right. The requirement that all claims be presented together, no matter how distant they are from each other, is simply irrational.

   **Comment 12. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(ii) is Likely an Unconstitutional Denial of Due Process.** This proposal is an unconstitutional denial of due process. Even though the

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the MPEP and 37 C.F.R. § 1.104); *Boundy v. PTO*, Defendants’ Answer, ¶ 10 (PTO denies that its officials have “any responsibilities” under the Administrative Procedure Act).

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7 There are other problems with restriction practice, which were noted in various comments on the PTO’s White Papers in 2002 and 2003 – this proposal aggravates those concerns.
O is not obligated to issue patents, it is bound to give a rational explanation when it denies a patent, and may not take away patent term based on a bare "presumption" without consideration of the facts – the PTO is subject to both constitutional and administrative law notions of procedural due process. The PTO's own slides show that in many art units, it takes over four years to even get a restriction requirement. Then, after a divisional is filed, that application will wait years more for a first action on the merits, or to be divided further. Only one of these long delays is protected by § 154 term adjustment; the second is not. The denial of years of patent term, with neither evidence nor rational connection between the facts cited in the Notice and the proposed rule, and with no explanation for why the PTO is in a better position to make these determinations than applicants, is likely unconstitutional. It is also a violation of the minimal "examination of the relevant data and articulation of a satisfactory explanation" required for rule making under the Administrative Procedure Act.

C. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(2) – Presumption of Double Patenting

Proposed Rule 1.78(f)(2) proposes to substitute a "presumption" of double patenting, based solely on priority claim, overlapping inventorship, and common ownership, and to displace the fact-based showing required under current law.

1. This rule is Beyond the PTO's Statutory Authority

Comment 13. A rejection based on a mere presumption — with no consideration whatsoever of the claims themselves — is beyond the Office's authority.

The burden of establishing a prima facie rejection is always on the PTO. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445-46, 24 USPQ2d 13443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("the examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.... If examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent," emphasis added); In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461, 198 USPQ 334 (CCPA 1978) (refusal to examine is legally the same as a rejection). The PTO does "NOT have authority to issue substantive rules," 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550, 38 USPQ2d 1347, 1351.

8 A patent applicant's entitlement is essentially similar to the Constitutional right to either grant of a prospective application for a law admission or a sound explanation for denial, set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 n. 15 (1972). The "entitlement" prong of Regents is provided by statute and Federal Circuit law. "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless..." 35 U.S.C. § 102. "If the PTO fails to meet this burden, then the applicant is entitled to the patent." In re Glaug, 283 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).

9 For example, 10/427,519 was filed as a divisional application in May 2003, reasonably promptly after a restriction became final in the parent. A status report received in March 2006 indicates that it will not be examined until at least February 2008, nearly years after the effective filing date. This application has lost five years of patent term under the approach proposed in 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(ii).


11 Written accounts of the Houston Townhall "road show" report that Assistant Commissioner Focarino frankly acknowledged that the rule packages have, and were intended to have, substantive
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasis in Merck) that result in non-examination of claims, and no authority to overrule the Federal Circuit’s instructions on its burden to demonstrate unpatentability. The PTO may not substitute a “presumption” for its duty to examine a claim before it can reject it.

The PTO is forbidden from considering the specification in any double patenting issue. In re Boylan, 392 F.2d 1017, 1018 n.1, 157 USPQ 370, 371 n.1 (CCPA 1968). A double-patenting “presumption” based on the specification is beyond the PTO’s authority.

2. The Presumption Has Absurd Consequences

Comment 14. Presumptions are only created where the efficient means to rebut the presumption lies with the party against whom the presumption operates. This is manifestly not the case here – the easier showing lies with the examiner, and the showing that the Notice proposes to thrust on applicants is nearly impossible.

A rule requiring an applicant to rebut a “presumption” that “there is at least one claim that is not patentably distinct from at least one of the claims in one or more other … applications” is unreasonably onerous. For example, if there are 20 claims in each of two applications, the applicant must make 400 showings of distinctness. If there are 20 claims in each of 4 applications, the applicant must make 2400 showings. The law sharply frowns on “presumptions” that require a party to “prove a negative” – the procedural consequences of such presumptions are simply unmanageable.

The law requires an examiner to perform a simple task: pick out and analyze only one claim from one application, and one claim from a reference application/patent, and make a routine anticipation or obviousness showing. There is no rational basis to depart from this efficient procedure for identifying and resolving any bona fide double patenting issue.

The cost for small businesses of making the hundreds of showings required to rebut the proposed presumption is certainly tens of millions of dollars per year, and likely hundreds of millions.

3. The 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(2) Presumption is Unwarranted

Comment 15. Further, the presumption is simply unwarranted. For example, in the computer arts, it’s common that a major new product may have dozens of patentably distinct inventions. Often, the most efficient and best way to prepare applications to such inventions, and to ensure that there is no “best mode” problem, is to file one omnibus specification, with claims directed to the different inventions broken out in different applications. This is good from a public policy point of view – why penalize it?

Applicants are well aware of the harsh consequences of double patenting – striking of a patent. That is great incentive to avoid it. The PTO need not create a “presumption” that is overwhelmingly counterfactual.

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effect, and were intended to preempt action by Congress. If the statements are proved at litigation seeking to invalidate these rules, both rule packages are invalid.
D. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) Is Beyond the PTO’s Authority, and is an Unwise Attempt to Exert Influence Outside the Area of the PTO’s Expertise

1. “Patently Indistinct” Claims Are a Necessary and Desirable Component of U.S. Patent Law, and Should Not be Limited

Comment 16. Applicants file claims that are “barely distinct” for a variety of reasons relating to the post-issue phase of a patent’s life. These reasons are all perfectly legitimate, and are essential if claims are to serve their “notice” function. Such claims sharply reduce the costs of patent litigation, by turning unclear cases into clear ones. However, because they relate to post-issuance phase, where the PTO has no authority and very little experience, the PTO may not appreciate the effects of its Proposed Rules.12

Applicants must file parallel claims that consider the following:

- Claims directed to various phases of the life cycle or operating cycle of the invention
- Claims to deal with territoriality issues such as imports, exports, international communications systems, temporary presence of vehicles, etc. For example, in a communications system, it can be crucial to have separate claims directed to the sender, the receiver, and the switch that routes messages between them.
- Claims to deal with exhaustion, repair, replaceable or consumable parts
- Claims directed to literally cover foreseeable equivalents – thereby simplifying complex “doctrine of equivalents” cases to clear literal infringement cases
- Claims to deal with various limitations on damages
- Limitations, such as intent, on the doctrines of induced or contributory infringement

These claims are an essential part of the patent system. They profoundly reduce the cost of patent litigation, by reducing “stretch” cases of infringement to simple ones. On the Patent Office’s own version of the facts, these applications require very little incremental examining effort. The Notice reflects a misunderstanding of the net economic effect of the proposed rules.

By denying applicants the ability to prosecute claims whose infringement is easily determined, and thereby forcing the litigation of “doctrine of equivalents” issues, or other similar issues cataloged in II.D.1, under poorly-targeted claims, this proposal will likely add at least 10%, and possible 20%, to the cost of a typical patent litigation – which could easily amount to

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12 Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550, 38 USPQ2d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (The PTO does “NOT ... have authority to issue substantive rules,” 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A), emphasis in Merck); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983) (an agency may not reach beyond the “scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the statute,” may not rely on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,” and may not “offer an explanation for its decision that ... is so implausible that it could not be ... the product of agency expertise.”)
at least $400 million annually.\textsuperscript{13} About $40 million of this cost will fall on small businesses. A number of these litigations will be lost when they should have been won, because the PTO proposes to deny applicants the right to meet the obligations of substantive law listed above (an analysis that the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking pointedly ignores) destroying hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps billions, of business value annually. About 20% of this large number will fall on small businesses.

Comment 17. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) Violates Substantive Law. "[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor's product from the market, nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application." \textit{Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd v. Hollister Inc.}, 863 F.2d 867, 874, 9 USPQ2d 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Competitors have 18½ years to exploit an applicant's published specification, to appropriate the ideas while designing around the claims. The PTO’s Notice is infirm for two separate reasons: (a) it analyzes only one side of the equation, and makes no attempt to balance policy goals and harms, and (b) the one-sided policy reasons stated in the Notice are simply not within the delegation to the PTO.

2. The PTO Articulates No Grant of Authority that Authorizes Any Procedure in Addition to a Terminal Disclaimers to Cure Obviousness-Type Double Patenting

Comment 18. As part of the \textit{quid pro quo} in creating the doctrine of “obviousness type” double patenting, the CCPA instructed the PTO that it must provide adequate procedures to accept terminal disclaimers in obviousness-type double patenting situations. \textit{E.g.}, \textit{In re Jursich}, 410 F.2d 803, 161 USPQ 675 (CCPA 1969). The proposal of § 1.78(f)(3), to add any further requirement above a terminal disclaimer, is beyond the PTO’s authority.\textsuperscript{14}

Under current law, preparing a terminal disclaimer costs about $100-$200. Preparing each petition described in the proposal will cost several thousand dollars. The cost of this proposal is approximately $10 million annually, about 20% of which will fall on small businesses.

E. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(1) is Sound as Far as it Goes

Comment 19. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(1) requires that an applicant identify to the Office all applications that are related by certain criteria.

This is a sound proposal – it seeks information that is reasonably likely to save more than it costs to provide, from the party that is in the best position to provide it, and requests information that will likely be genuinely useful in efficiently handling applications.

The silence of the rule on extensions of time presumably means that extension by mere petition and payment of fees will be available. This is crucial – when prosecuting applications on behalf of foreign clients, even simple matters like obtaining signatures on declarations can

\textsuperscript{13} The total patent litigation budget for the U.S. appears to be at least $2 billion per year.

\textsuperscript{14} The rule is further infirm for reasons set forth in footnote 11.
take months, for the path from U.S. attorney to foreign attorney to foreign in-house counsel to inventors and back again.

The proposal does not specify a penalty for failure to provide this information within the four month time provided. An unreasonable penalty with any substantive consequence – such as abandonment – would be improper.

F. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) Should Not Be Adopted

Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) suggests that claims that are not “patently distinct” but not identical may be required to be cancelled. The statutory authority and rational basis for 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) is not apparent.

Requiring cancellation of claims will add tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of dollars a year in litigation costs, about 20% of which will fall on small businesses.

Comment 20. 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) is Beyond the PTO’s Legal Authority. Where two applications claim subject matter that is not “patently distinct” but not identical, the PTO must allow cure of any double patenting issue by filing a terminal disclaimer. In re Boylan, 392 F.2d 1017, 1021-22, 157 USPQ 370, 374-75 (CCPA 1968). Once a terminal disclaimer is filed, any showing of “good and sufficient reason” as proposed by Rule 78(f)(3) is legally irrelevant, and may not be required by the PTO.

Comment 21. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) is Unwise Because it Will Increase the Cost of Patent Litigation. As discussed in § II.D.1, claims that are not “patently distinct,” but that are distinct for infringement purposes, are essential for a variety of reasons. For example, it’s often essential to allow some claims to issue to exclude an infringer, and to then pursue other claims, that may be not patently distinct, in a continuation application. The Notice identifies no public policy reason for limiting an applicant’s statutory right to frame claims that simplify any litigation or licensing transaction.

Comment 22. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3) Identifies No Public Policy Problem that is Not Cured by Terminal Disclaimer. The Notice identifies no problem specific to these applications that needs to be solved. The public’s interest is fully protected by terminal disclaimer procedure. On the PTO’s own version of the facts, these applications require very little examination, and bring in full revenues for the PTO, and are a net benefit to the PTO.

G. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3), § 1.114(f): “Good and Sufficient Reasons” and “Satisfaction of the Director” Standards Are Illegal under The Administrative Procedure Act and Have Not Been Applied Fairly In the Context of Other Rules; In Addition to Discretionary Standards, Any Rules Adopted Should Specify an Objective Standard under Which Relief is Mandatory

Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(f)(3), § 1.114(f) propose to turn the right to file applications over to the whim of the Director, as exercised (in first instance) by examiners.

Comment 23. Rules that turn on the personal “satisfaction of the Director” are unconstitutional. Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 339 F.Supp.2d 78, 88 (D. D.C. 2004) (“If Due Process is to mean anything, it is a fundamental guarantee that stakeholders are provided both sufficient notice and fair procedures... [A]dmnistrators must provide a public framework

Further, the PTO has set up incentives for PTO personnel to abuse such rules. The PTO’s Annual Reports have noted for several years that under 10% of examiners (and, anaecdotaly, a similar proportion of Technology Center Directors) have the legal training – and none have the incentive, under the PTO’s compensation structure – to adjudicate procedural issues in favor of an applicant. For example, in a Decision on Petition in 09/385,394 (Nov. 8, 2005), directed to an issue arising under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116(b)(3) (entry of an amendment on a showing of certain “good and sufficient reasons”), and in a telephone interview summarized in an Interview Summary paper of 12/1/2005, the T.C. Director states that he does not consider particular facts, and he does not consider agency or Federal Circuit precedent – he denies all Rule 116(b)(3) petitions per se pursuant to a statement in the MPEP. Applicants have reason to be apprehensive of any further discretion to be given to examiners and Technology Center Directors to force applications to go abandoned.

Given the PTO management’s refusal to enforce uniform standards of examination or provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act during § 131/132 examination phase, it will be incredibly difficult and costly to determine what showing will be to “the satisfaction of” the individual deciding such petitions. These petitions will cost several tens of millions of dollars per year, about 20% of which will fall on small businesses.

Comment 24. The current rules provide that an applicant may continue to seek agreement with an examiner for so long as the applicant perceives forward progress, and is the only mechanism by which an applicant can differentiate between a “stubborn” examiner (71 Fed.Reg. at 51) and an “educable” examiner. Under the current fee structure, the PTO shifts the cost of this continued negotiation to applicants. Conventional theories of negotiation, rule making and burden allocation suggest that current law, where costs and rights reside together, is exactly right. The PTO offers no explanation for departing from this balance, and articulates no underlying facts that suggest that this rule will address the problem articulated. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. The rule cannot be promulgated on the record made thus far.

Comment 25. It appears the PTO is trying to have things both ways. In the “Townhall” slides, the PTO set out a very narrow all-but-per se standard it intends to apply. Yet, the Comments to the Notice acknowledge that the PTO has no authority to promulgate such a rule formally. The PTO may not do by informal interpretation what it may not do by formal rulemaking.

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15 See footnote 6 and §§ IV.A, IV.B and IV.C.
H. The “Good and Sufficient Reasons” Informally Proposed In Slides Require Applicants are Unworkable

Comment 26. In the slides presented at the “Townhall” road shows, the PTO has given several examples of reasons that will be considered “good and sufficient.”

The general tenor of these standards is that applicants will be forced to read examiners’ minds, to respond to positions that examiners have not yet put on paper.

For example, one standard approach to resolving an examiner’s erroneous view of a technological fact is to first provide a standard treatise that lays out the technological error in the examiner’s view. Only if the examiner maintains a technologically-wrong position, then an affidavit may be filed to fill in any gaps in the treatise, and to remove any latitude the examiner has on the technological issue. This is the cost-minimizing approach. Finding and photocopying a few pages of a treatise is relatively cheap. Affidavits are expensive - $5-10,000 for drafting and review by an independent -- and therefore paid - expert. Under the proposed rules, the opportunity to proceed in two stages would be all but lost: an applicant has to read an examiner’s mind to determine when the examiner will adhere to a position that is simply wrong, and when the examiner will disagree with a standard treatise16 -- instead, an applicant must preemptively attack such errors by affidavit before attempting less expensive approaches. These affidavits will cost several tens of millions, and perhaps $100 million, annually, about 20% of which will fall on small businesses.

Limiting continuations in the manner posed will force pulling this trigger, and a number of others, too early in a number of cases. It will turn prosecution from a mutual negotiation to a far more confrontational exercise.

I. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.114(f) – Limit of One RCE

This rule is unwise and unwarranted, for reasons discussed in § II.A.

III. 71 Fed. Reg. 61, Refusal to Examine More than 10 Claims Unless Designated in an “Examination Support Document”

The centerpiece proposal of this rule package is that the PTO will only examine 10 claims per application, unless an applicant files an Examination Support Document (ESD).

The requirements for an ESD are remarkably damaging to substantive patent rights and onerous and expensive to meet. Either there was a deliberate intent to frame the ESD as an “option” that would never be exercised, or the PTO is acting in ignorance of the consequences on patentees.

16 Such errors by “stubborn” examiners are more frequent than one would hope. For example, several such errors by the same examiner are discussed in 09/626,325, Petition and Affidavit of 12/20/2005 (examiner ignores all sources but one, even after admitting that the one he relies on requires correction); 09/385,394, Affidavit of 5/2/2003 (rebutting the examiner’s statement that a number keeps its same value when it is rewritten with its digits in reverse order). Until the PTO holds examiners accountable for the costs that bad examination and groundless rejections impose on the PTO (see remarks of former Deputy Assistant Commissioner in Comment 7), and removes the incentives for an examiner to adhere to them to earn disposal counts, the PTO should not raise costs or limit options for applicants to counter.
Comment 27. This proposal starts from a common-sense observation – all claims are not created equal, and examination of some is more important than others. However, the implementation proposed in the Notice is faulty, and will result in far higher costs for applicants. These costs will inevitably be reflected back to the PTO. If the Rules are adopted as proposed, within a few months, most practitioners will find techniques for configuring an application to overcome the new rules, but most of these will have the effect of forcing the PTO to do more work than it does today. These rules will force the PTO’s costs to rise, not fall.

As noted in § IV.E, the PTO should focus on ways to bring down total costs of prosecution, instead of simply burdening applicants with additional costs that far outstrip any savings that might accrue to the Office. Then those savings can be shared among everyone. Alternative proposals are set forth in § IV.

A. Background Observation: Large Applications Are Good, and Are Filed Only for Reasons that Advance the PTO’s Mission – The PTO’s Efforts to Discourage and Burden Them Lack Rational Basis

Comment 28. Some insight into the business and economic motives that determine applicant behavior may be useful to the PTO.

The high cost of a complex application makes economic sense in only one circumstance: an economically-important invention that needs the greatest possible protection, including “fall back” contingencies to account for: (a) the likelihood that the examiner did not find all the relevant prior art, and (b) the Federal Circuit’s gauntlet of limitations on claim scope relating to imports, exports, repair, replaceable or consumable parts, foreseeable equivalents, intent of inducing or contributory infringers, means-plus-function, limitations on damages (see Comment 16), (c) other contingencies.

For example, some inventions require a large number of claims directed to the same conceptual “invention,” as cataloged above in § II.D.1. These claims – though not patentably distinct – are crucially different for infringement purposes. 17

The PTO should favor applications that completely disclose the invention, and present claims to all aspects that the applicant considers as possible infringements. These are the applications that reflect the biggest benefit to the public from the patent system. These applications mature into patents that ease resolution of any infringement or licensing dispute, without the expense of litigation.

Large, complex applications are also the applications that should be examined most thoroughly – they’re the ones that protect economically-important markets, and are most likely to see litigation. They are also the ones that generate big filing fees for the PTO. The additional claim fees come at a much lower-than-average incremental cost, because the claims in a large application are much more closely related and easier to examine than claims in two randomly-selected applications.

Remarkably, both rule packages would encourage applicants to present applications that are at odds with the public policy goals of the patent system.

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17 Because the PTO has no authority to regulate in any post-issuance area, it lacks agency expertise to evaluate the effects of its proposed rules.
The Notices do not identify any dilatory or nefarious motives for an applicant to file complicated applications. The reason is simple – there are none. Almost all patent applications are drafted in response to real world business needs and economic value.

If the PTO believes that complex inventions, interrelated inventions arising out of a single R&D effort, detailed patent disclosures, and claims that foster easy dispute resolution are problems, not virtues, then the PTO’s metrics are wrong. The metrics need to change, not the inventions or applicants’ efforts to meet the demands of substantive law. The primary metrics by which the PTO measures itself – pendency, and “3 counts per application,” no matter how large, were designed in the 1960’s, when most applications were directed to relatively simple inventions, and were of much more uniform size than they are today. The PTO’s metrics bear little relationship to today’s workflow – when applications are far more variable in size and complexity than they were four decades ago. Possible revisions of these metrics are suggested in § IV.G, below.

Many of the factual suppositions in the two Notices, for example, that many applications are filed with “patentably indistinct claims,” and that these applications are responsible for the PTO’s cost burdens, are internally inconsistent. Applicants have little or no incentive to do so. Applications are rarely split more finely than they should be split. Indeed, an applicant’s incentives are almost always to combine more inventions into fewer applications. And as noted above, to the degree these applications exist, they are “free money” for the PTO, not costs.

B. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) is Contrary to Law, and Will Limit the PTO’s Ability to Finally Dispose of Applications

Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) would permit the PTO to examine only 10 claims out of all claims filed in all related applications.

Comment 29. The PTO lacks statutory authority to promulgate 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b) as proposed. 35 U.S.C. § 131 requires “The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the application.” The PTO cites no authority for the notion that the Director may cause on examination to be made of only part of the application. The law is clear that the PTO’s “administrative convenience” – the only reason cited in the Notice – cannot be a basis for denying examination, or for rejecting parts that have not been examined. In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 458, 198 USPQ 328, 331-32 (CCPA 1978) (“As a general proposition, an applicant has a right to have each claim examined on the merits. ...in drawing priorities between the Commissioner as administrator and the applicant as beneficiary of his statutory rights, we conclude that the statutory rights are paramount.” emphasis in original)

Comment 30. The proposed rule package is incomplete, because it makes no mention of how final rejection practice would apply to claims that have not been examined. The Notice contains no mention of how proposed Rule 1.75(b) interacts with final rejection practice – it’s apparent that no one has thought this through. Rule 1.75(b) simply cannot work.

Under current statute – which the PTO has no authority to change by rule – the PTO lacks authority to finally reject portions of the application that have not been examined. 35 U.S.C. § 131, § 132; In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445-46, 24 USPQ2d 13443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“the examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. ... If examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability, then without more the applicant is entitled to grant
of the patent.”); Weber, 580 at 458, 198 USPQ at 331-32 (“[A]n applicant has a right to have each claim examined on the merits.”). Under proposed § 1.75(b) in its current form, if the PTO only examines 10 claims of a 60-claim application, an applicant will have a statutory right to demand examination of another 10 claims, and another, and another – all on the original filing fee – before the PTO can finally reject the application as a whole. At each stage, the applicant can amend all claims, both those designated and those not designated, and demand examination. Until the PTO examines and rejects an entire application, an applicant has a statutory right to redesignate claims and request further examination until all claims have been examined at least twice.

**Comment 31.** Proposed § 1.75(b) will turn appeals into fiasco proceedings. An appellant will be entitled to designate all claims as standing separately. In the absence of any statement of a rejection, all an applicant need to is state the text of the claim, and that the examiner stated no prima facie rejection. The Board will then have to consider every single claim separately. Because the proposed rule fails to consider the effect on the efficiency of the overall process, it will generate inefficient results.

**C. “Representative Claims” Practice Becomes More Appropriate as a Proceeding Progresses, but Is a Total Mismatch for Examination of First Instance**

**Comment 32.** In the U.S. legal system, no legal proceeding forces a party to bind himself to a position when most of the important facts are unknown. Most procedural rules take a balanced approach to requiring parties to gradually narrow issues, and take binding positions only when the relevant facts are in. Binding a party to a position too early is unfair and results in bad justice in every other context; it’s unfair and bad justice in the Patent Office.

At 71 Fed. Reg. 62 col. 2, the Office compares the proposed designation of claims to the “representative claim” practice common before the Board and in the courts. The analogy is inapt. “Representative claims” are useful at late stages of a proceeding, when all the facts have been developed. For example, by definition, an appeal only occurs after a “clear issue has been developed for appeal.” MPEP § 706.07. Similarly, in a litigation, “representative claims” are designated after extensive discovery, exchange of expert reports, and the accused infringer’s designation of prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 282. Solicitor Whealan will confirm that a patentee almost never makes a binding commitment to “representative claims” immediately on filing a civil complaint – exceptions arise only when the patentee has been able to thoroughly research both the accused product and prior art before filing suit.

Proceedings of first instance, such as examination, are designed to develop facts, and to identify and narrow issues. The current prima facie “burden of coming forward” rules of examination parallel the burdens in every other legal context – the examiner must come forward with evidence and provide enough information to guide the applicant’s next step. It is entirely possible that there is some useful way to focus examination before the first prior art is identified, but the “Examination of Claims” package is neither logical, meaningful, or legal as a hard-edged rule.

By de facto deferring examination of claims that will likely be the patentable claims, and allowing examiners to keep their bargaining positions hidden, this proposal will easily add tens of millions of dollars to annual prosecution costs, and destroy tens, or perhaps hundreds of
millions of dollars of business value per year by either delaying issuance of claims needed to protect a market, or forcing cancellation of claims that should be patentable. About 20% of these costs will fall on small businesses.

D. 71 FR 61, Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b)(2) – Independent Claim Fees for Dependent Claims

Comment 33. The first sentence of proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(b)(2) notes that a claim that incorporates less than all of a prior claim is an independent claim, and will be charged the relevant fee. This is merely a statement of current law. A claim that does not include an entire claim by reference is not a § 112 ¶ 4 dependent claim, and therefore is subject to the fee for independent claims.

Comment 34. The second sentence, regarding proposing to charge the higher independent claim fee for certain dependent claims, is beyond the PTO’s statutory authority. The terms “independent claim” and “dependent claim,” and the respective associated fees, are set by statute. The PTO lacks authority to redefine them by rule.

E. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.105(a)(1)(ix), Requiring Applicant to Identify Related Applications

Comment 35. Requiring identification of related or overlapping applications is perfectly reasonable. Indeed, from an applicant’s point of view, it’s crucial. Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1367-68, 66 USPQ2d 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (suggesting that failing to bring an application to the attention of an examiner of a related application might be inequitable conduct, MPEP 2001.06(b) notwithstanding).

F. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261(a) is Unwise – It Imposes Burdens Far Beyond Any Conceivable Savings

Comment 36. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261 would permit the Office to withhold examination of most of an application unless an applicant to “[identifies] all the limitations of the independent claims and designated dependent claims that are disclosed by each reference provided on the reference” and provides “a detailed explanation of how each of the independent claims and designated dependent claims are patentable over the references cited with the particularity required by § 1.111(b) and (c).”

A simple consideration of the practical numbers shows that this proposal is simply ridiculous.

The commercial practical reality is that applicants generally commission prior art searches for their most commercially important inventions. Such a search generally turns up 10 to 30 references. There will also likely be several applications filed to interrelated features, and the examiners of these applications may well turn up 10 or 15 references in each of these. Thus, for reasons that are entirely good proper in light of the public policy underlying the patent system, there may well be 100 references cited in an important patent application.

For reasons set out in §§ II.D.1 and Background Observation: Large Applications Are Good, and Are Filed Only for Reasons that Advance the PTO’s Mission – The PTO’s Efforts to
Discourage and Burden Them Lack Rational Basis

III.A, an important patent application may well have 100 claims – not out of any nefarious motive, but simply because the law demands many claims in order to adequately protect the invention in light of various legal doctrines and uncertainties.

Thus, applications directed an important inventions reasonably commonly include 100 claims and 100 references supplied by IDS. The proposal selectively burdens the most commercially important patent applications, and could easily require 10,000 showings.

The costs do not end there. Each of these showings must be written very carefully, much more carefully than the typical Office Action. In many cases, each would take between an hour and three hours of attorney time - $200 to $1800.

Thus, the proposal would raise costs by hundreds of thousands of dollars selectively imposed on the most commercially important patent applications, the ones that most strengthen the U.S. economy.

In its 2001-02 fee request to Congress, the PTO stated that its adjusted fee schedule matched up to the costs of such applications. If this is not true, then the PTO should readjust its fee schedule, and give examiners examination time corresponding to the increased fees, so that important applications are given the examination they deserve.

Comment 37. The proposal expressly requires an applicant to irrelevant issues: in an ESD, the ways in which a reference matches a claim are irrelevant; the relevant facts are how the reference differs. The proposal could easily add hundreds of millions of dollars to annual prosecution costs nationally, of minimally-productive “busy work.”

Comment 38. 20% of the costs mentioned above would likely fall on small businesses.

G. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261(a) is Unwise – A Number of the Proposals Here Have Been Tried in the Past, and Found to be Failures

Comment 39. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261 replows ground known to be sewn with failure.

For example, proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261(a)(2), (3) and (4) resurrects provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.92 and 1.93 that were amended out of these rules in 1992 when they were found to be unworkable. Rule 261 should not repeat mistakes of the past.

The Festo line of cases puts great incentives on applicants to do prior art searches. The PTO may be able to come up with reasonable ways to increase these incentives, working with members of the patent bar. However, unilaterally removing the requirement that the PTO follow principles of “compact prosecution” – while maintaining the full burden of compact prosecution on applicants – is inefficient and unfair.

The Notice articulates no underlying facts that suggest that this rule will address the problem articulated, and no “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs, 463 U.S. at 43. The rule cannot be promulgated on the record made thus far.
H. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261(b) and (c), to the Degree it Requires Applicants to Withhold References, is Unwise

37 C.F.R. § 1.261(b) and (c) make it difficult or impossible to submit references in certain circumstances, for example, references relating to dependent claims.

Comment 40. Inequitable conduct is a big practical problem for the patent bar – clients’ substantive patent rights, and practitioners’ licenses to practice, depend on giving the PTO every reference that could conceivably be considered material. Proposed § 1.261(b) and (c) appear to be designed to aggravate the problem, not reduce its impact. The appropriate solution lies in appropriate fee levels, appropriate adjustments of the “counts” awarded to examiners for considering IDS’s, and various incentives relating to timing of examination. The PTO should not propose penalties that it lacks authority to impose, and should not propose procedures that will simply raise costs for everyone – including the PTO.

Comment 41. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.261(b) requires applicants to withhold certain material references from the PTO, for example, documents relating to dependent claims that are not among those designated. This is unwise.

Comment 42. The PTO has no authority to abandon an application that meets all statutory requirements for examination, unless and until the application has been twice examined fully. § 1.261(c) exceeds the PTO’s authority.

Comment 43. The ESD of Rule 261 will almost never be used: it requires too many admissions against interest, and will render any patent issuing on such an application all but unenforceable. Instead, applicants will reconfigure their applications in ways that still force the PTO to examine the entire application, but at higher cost.

Comment 44. By increasing the number of “inequitable conduct” issues litigated, this proposal will increase annual patent litigation costs by several tens of millions of dollars per year. About 20% of this cost will fall on small entities.

I. Proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c)(11), Reduction in Patent Term, is Contrary to Statute

Comment 45. Patent term adjustment is specified by statute. 35 U.S.C. § 154. 37 C.F.R. § 1.703 attempts to redefine patent term, for example, by attenuating patent term for not filing an ESD within 1 month. § 154(b)(2)(C)(ii) guarantees a minimum of three months to respond before patent term adjustment is lost.

It appears that the entire rule package received insufficient legal consideration before being proposed.

Comment 46. Currently, some patents have values of $1 million per day, and these patents often have hundreds of days of term extension. The proposed reductions in patent term will easily destroy hundreds of millions of dollars in business value annually, and likely billions. Such patents are often owned by universities and small biotech companies. The cost of this proposal on small businesses is easily $100 million per year.
J. Suggested Refinements to the Proposal If it Is Adopted

Comment 47. The rules should be amended to permit a designation of claims, without an examination support document, that varies with the filing fee paid.

For example, the number of claims to be examined without an examination support document could be 30% of all claims, or 10, whichever is greater.

The proposal might work reasonably well in situations where claims are allowed on first examination. In most art units, this is a rarity. The rule should make clarified that no originally-filed claim may be finally rejected until it has been twice examined.

K. These Proposed Rules Put the PTO at Substantial Financial Risk

Comment 48. A great many of the proposals in the two rule packages are either beyond the PTO's legal authority, or arbitrary and capricious. The proposals will lead to substantial Administrative Procedure Act litigation. The PTO will bear perhaps $1 million dollars of annual litigation costs for many years. Very likely, the PTO will be forced to reimburse attorney fees of several million dollars per year under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572 (1988) (where patent expertise is required, the PTO will be ineligible for EAJA fee caps).

IV. Alternative Proposals.

The problems addressed in the two Notices have well-grounded, and in some cases, legally-mandated solutions. Some are proposed here.

A. The PTO Should Cut Down "Rework" By Enforcing Its Existing Rules Relating to "Compact Prosecution" and that Office Actions be "Complete," During § 131/132 Examination Phase

As noted above in Comment 1 above, the overwhelming cause of the PTO's "rework" problem is rejections that should have gotten into a second Office Action - and often lacked colorable basis to be raised in a first. How can the PTO get the "junk rejections" out of its pipeline?

The PTO can cut its "rework" by 10-20% almost instantly by reminding the examining corps that the burden always lies on the PTO to support any factual finding or legal reasoning adverse to an applicant. The PTO lacks the authority to decide against an applicant without substantial evidence, lacks the authority to create new substantive law, lacks the authority to unilaterally abrogate published rules that protect applicants.

Reminding examiners of, and enforcing, the following rules - which already exist - will reduce the number of "junk rejections" by far more than the 5% attributed to these rule packages.

- At least the independent claims should be examined completely. Until a few years ago, most § 102/103 rejections were reasonably complete: phrase-by-phrase, the examiner would both designate portions of the reference relied on, and designate the particular object of the reference thought to correspond to the claim, by giving a reference number or name. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (for most rejections, requiring both a designation of portions relied on, and an explanation of pertinence). This changed remarkably in about 2001. Now 80% of Office Actions treat claims in large phrases, without precise
consideration of individual words, and commonly designate a large chunk of a reference — sometimes over an entire column — without explaining the pertinence to individual claim components. Many examiners consistently address only a few keywords of claims, treating them as free-standing components, and ignoring the interconnections. \(^{18}\) The consequence is that claim limitations are often simply ignored. The practice of carefully addressing every claim limitation should be restored.

- Perhaps 10% of § 103 rejections state “No prior art discloses or suggests claim limitation \(x\), but it would have been obvious to create \(x\) out of thin air because…” This is simply not permitted. *Motorola v. Interdigital Technology Corp.*, 121 F.3d 1461, 1466-67, 43 USPQ2d 1490, 1490-91 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (every element must be met by prior art, even elements that are “well known” standing alone).

- About half of all assertions of “inherency” or “official notice” lack the explanation of “fact or technical reasoning” required by MPEP § 2112 and 2144.03 — examiners frequently and freely create facts out of thin air. See, e.g., 09/611,548, Action of 11/3/03 — over 60 assertions of official notice, after such notice was properly traversed.

- The words “as best understood” should be banned. If an examiner does not understand the subject matter, the examiner should phone for clarification, rather than waste a day writing an Office Action directed to the wrong subject matter. This is particularly acute in the “business methods” art units, where most examiners lack formal training or practical experience to understand the basic vocabulary of finance and business.

- The word “deemed” should be banned. When a PTO employee “deems” something, it is usually an explicit confession that the examiner (or Technology Center Director deciding a petition) lacks any evidence or legal authority. Overwhelmingly, the reason that no evidence or authority can be cited is that the proposition is simply wrong. PTO employees should be instructed that if they cannot identify evidence or legal authority, they cannot rely on bald assertion.

Applicants are understandably reluctant to sacrifice important patent rights when an examiner exceeds his/her adjudicatory authority by refusing to meet the minima required by PTO rules. The PTO should not be surprised at the resultant “rework” — any work done poorly the first time has to be redone.

As noted in Comment 1, a former Deputy Assistant Commissioner noted at the New York Townhall that examiners are not accountable for the costs that their bad work imposes on the PTO. \(^{19}\) Bad work should affect examiners’ performance appraisals, promotions, retention and award eligibility.

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\(^{18}\) See, e.g., 09/239,194, Office Action of 4/3/2006 (Examiner complains that considering every limitation as required by 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)92) is too “burdensome”)

B. The PTO Should Remind Its Employees that Procedure Matters

Too many PTO personnel regard procedure as something that simply doesn’t matter — when asked to follow the rules, far too many PTO employees simply shrug them off, or make up new ones on the spot. The Supreme Court disagrees. The Supreme Court has often commented that an agency cannot possibly make sound decision on the merits if it ignores procedure — no one can get the right answers if they don’t ask the right questions:

Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. … As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: 'The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.' But, in addition, the procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data. Procedure is to law what scientific method is to science.


When PTO employees believe they can ignore the written rules, there is no framework for dispute resolution, and resolution of disputes drags out prosecution.

As noted above in Comment 1, the error rate in the examining operation is so high that constitutional due process is likely being violated. Though the PTO has published fairly extensive procedural guidance that would, if followed, result in a much lower error rate, the PTO actively refuses to enforce its procedural rules — examiners are given absolute discretion to make up the rules and the law as they go along, and to ignore instructions from the Director or the Federal Circuit.

Very simply, the PTO should make clear to its employees that procedure matters, and that individuals do not have the authority to grant themselves “on the spot” waivers or make up exceptions that do not exist in writing. If the MPEP says that an examiner must make showings A, B and C to reject under section X, the examiner has not done his/her job if A, B or C is omitted. Examiners should not be compensated for work not done, and applicants’ patent rights should not be attenuated.

C. The PTO Should Provide Formal Enforcement of its Procedural Rules Relating to Examination of Claims

More formally, the problems identified in the Notices may be directly remedied by something already required by the administrative law: a procedure analogous to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a civil complaint may be dismissed if the complaint omits pleading of an essential element of a prima facie case. At the 12(b)(6) stage, a court makes no attempt to evaluate the merits of a pleading; rather, it merely evaluates completeness. If the complaint is silent where it must speak, the court dismisses procedurally — that is, there is no

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20 See, e.g., 09/239,194, IFW “Miscellaneous Incoming letter” of 7/24/05 (Summary of Interview with Supervisory Examiner: she states that she does not enforce procedural rules, and would not grant procedural relief); 09/385,394, Interview Summary 12/1/2005 (in a part of the interview not memorialized, Technology Center Director asks “What difference does [a procedural rule] make?”)

determination on the merits, no res judicata effect, and the plaintiff is usually free to replead the case. Rule 12(b)(6) enforces the “notice” function of a pleading.

Similarly, administrative law principles obligate the PTO to provide an analogous procedure: where either a 37 C.F.R. rule or the MPEP requires an examiner to address an issue (either a claim limitation, or a legal element of prima facie unpatentability), an applicant is entitled to, and must have a procedural venue to obtain, an Office Action that provides “notice” of the examiner’s view on every such issue. There is no procedural right to correct examination, but there is a procedural right to complete examination, and examination consistent with the PTO’s own rules

At this procedural stage, the truth or falsity of the examiner’s findings need not be tested – but the Office is required to ensure that all prima facie findings appear on paper.

This is directly required by well-established administrative law principles. First, a long and unbroken string of Supreme Court cases establish that where an agency has a manual, such as the MPEP, and renders a decision omitting considerations that are specified in that manual, the agency’s decision is “illegal and of no effect”

This is an entirely different legal analysis than any consideration of the merits: for example, in Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 374-76 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1957), the Supreme Court vacated an agency decision because the agency had failed to set forth the reasons required by the agency’s manual, but gave the agency leave to remake exactly the same decision on the merits, so long as it did so setting forth the reasons required by the manual.

The Service Court also makes clear that review for an agency’s procedural compliance with its manual creates a right and supports a cause of action totally distinct from any direct review on the merits.

The Federal Circuit has regularly noted that these principles apply to the PTO just as they apply to every other agency of the federal government. For example:

… The examiner cannot sit mum, leaving the applicant to shoot arrows into the dark hoping to somehow hit a secret objection harbored by the examiner. The ‘prima facie case’ notion … seemingly was intended to leave no doubt among examiners that they must state clearly and specifically any objections (the prima facie case) to patentability, and give the applicant fair opportunity to meet those objections with evidence and argument. To that

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22 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (constitutional due process property rights may arise under agency “rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”)

23 It is well established that when an agency acts contrary to its own manual, the resulting action is “illegal and of no effect.” Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959) (emphasis added); Certain Former CSA Employees v. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 762 F.2d 978, 984 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (action in violation of agency’s own regulation is “illegal and of no effect,” emphasis added). The Supreme Court has decided essentially the same issue at least eight times, and has always recognized the distinction between the procedural obligation of an agency to follow its own procedural rules form making certain showings and the obligation of an agency to act correctly on the merits.

24 See also D&F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (setting aside agency decision because the agency’s reasoning differed from the reasoning set out in the agency’s handbook, even though the handbook had never been published in the Federal Register); New England Tank Industries of New Hampshire v. U.S., 861 F.2d 685, 688, 694, 694 n. 17 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a manual may be binding on the government even though it has not been published with the requisite formalities necessary to give it “force of law” to bind the public).
extent the concept serves to level the playing field and reduces the likelihood of administrative arbitrariness.

*In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concurring, citations omitted).

The Commissioner has an obligation to ensure that all parts of the agency ... conform to official policy of the agency, including official interpretations of the agency’s organic legislation.25 Otherwise the citizenry would be subject to the whims of individual agency officials of whatever rank or level, and the Rule of Law would lose all meaning ...

*In re Alappat*, 33 F.3d 1527, 1580, 31 USPQ2d 1545, 1588 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (*en banc*) (Plager, J., concurring). *In re Pliasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471-73, 223 USPQ 785, 787-88 (Fed. Cir. 1988) teaches that the initial “burden to come forward” is totally separate from the burden of “persuasion,” and the burden to come forward is “purely procedural:”

... the Board evinced misunderstanding of the proper roles of the examiner's *prima facie* case and an applicant's rebuttal evidence. These are purely procedural devices. The concept of *prima facie* obviousness in *ex parte* patent examination is but a procedural mechanism to allocate in an orderly way the burdens of going forward and of persuasion as between the examiner and the applicant.

Both the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have noted that a party may not simply introduce a reference in evidence and ask the other party and the court to figure out the relevance. The party has a burden to make an element-by-element showing, else the issue fails on procedural grounds. *Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp.*, 475 U.S. 809, 811, 229 USPQ 478, 479 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1986) (Supreme Court holds that obviousness has separate procedural and substantive components, notes that the Federal Circuit’s silence on issues that were procedurally required makes substantive review impossible, and remands after expressly declining to opine on substantive issues); *Koito Mfg. Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech LLC*, 381 F.3d 1142, 1151, 72 USPQ2d 1190, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (merely placing a reference in evidence but providing no “demonstrate[jon] … how that reference met the limitations of the claims” fell below minimal procedural requirements for preserving an anticipation issue). The same reasoning applies to examiners.

Contrary to widely accepted misunderstandings by PTO personnel, the obligation to put something on paper clearly and timely is legally distinct from the question of whether the examiner’s findings are right or not. The duty to come forward is procedural, not substantive,26 and the duty to enforce that procedural obligation lies with the Director, enforceable by Rule 181

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25 The Federal Circuit has noted that “The MPEP … is entitled to judicial notice as the agency’s official interpretation of statutes and regulations.” *Refac Int’l Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp.*, 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The parallelism between *Alappat* and *Refac* clarifies that the Federal Circuit considers the MPEP as binding on the agency, and that it is the Director’s duty to enforce it.

26 *See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Shell Oil*, 466 U.S. 54, 74-75 (1984) interprets the EEOC statute, which is strikingly similar to 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) and § 1.113(b), as a “notice” requirement, and specifically states that it is not a “substantive” requirement.
petition. Failure of an examiner to meet that procedural obligation is not appealable\textsuperscript{27}, and indeed, and examiner’s silence often makes meaningful appeal impossible.\textsuperscript{28}

35 U.S.C. § 131 requires that the “Director shall cause an examination to be made.” An Office Action that is silent on required factors, or otherwise fails to comply with 37 C.F.R. or the MPEP is “illegal and of no effect” under the administrative law, and no examination at all under the patent law. When a claim limitation is totally omitted (in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2), MPEP § 2143.03, and Federal Circuit precedent), or the examiner asserts that prior art is “well known” but cites no evidence and gives no explanation in support (in violation of 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(d)(2) and MPEP § 2144.03(B) and (C)), the examiner is silent on the required showing on “reasonable expectation of success” for obviousness (in violation of MPEP § 2142 and 2143.02), etc. an applicant should be able to request that the Office Action be withdrawn and reissued in completed form.\textsuperscript{29}

Requiring that Office Actions be complete will immediately cut back immensely on the amount of “rework.” Until the PTO ensures that its work product meets the minimum standards required by law, and that every Office Action that goes out is complete, the PTO should not cut back on the few mechanisms applicants have to counter an examiner’s failures.

D. Petitions that Present Significant Legal Issues Should Be Decided by Legally-Trained Ombudsmen, not Technology Center Directors

The PTO should implement an “ombudsman” role somewhat analogous to the “practice specialists” formerly in T.C. 1600, to decide legal issues, including most petitions. Legal decisions should be made by lawyers, not managers.

Currently, the Petitions process is the only mechanism available by rule to compel an examiner to disclose his views, for example, a petition on premature final rejection when an examiner has kept his cards hidden until final or post-final papers. However, with few exceptions, the officials that decide petitions have neither the legal skills nor the incentives to enforce the rules. For example, only a few Technology Center Directors have law degrees, and their compensation structure only provides incentives to deny petitions.

\textsuperscript{27} See Ex parte Haas, 175 USPQ 217, 220 (Bd. Pat. App. 1972) (“If the examiner fails to follow the Commissioner’s directions in the M.P.E.P., appellant’s remedy is by way of petition to the Commissioner since this Board has no jurisdiction over the examiner’s action.”) (Lidoff, examiner-in-chief, concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 486 F.2d 1053, 179 USPQ 623 (CCPA 1973); Ex parte Johnson, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd000873.pdf at 5 (BPAI 2001) (unpublished) (“We exercise no general supervisory power over the examining corps.”); Ex parte Gambogi, 62 USPQ2d 1209, 1212 (BPAI 2001) (unpublished) (Board “declines to tell an examiner how to write a rejection.”).

\textsuperscript{28} Ex parte Rozzi, 63 USPQ2d 1196, 1200 (BPAI 2002) (unpublished) (Board refuses to adjudicate where examiner’s work is incomplete); Ex parte Braeken, 54 USPQ2d 1110, 1113 (BPAI 1999) (same). The Board’s statistics web pages suggest that nearly 10% of appeals cannot be adjudicated.

\textsuperscript{29} E.g., Star Fruits v. PTO, 393 F.3d 1277, 1285, 73 USPQ2d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (recognizing the jurisdictional difference between “test[ing] the examiner’s theory of the case or the examiner’s findings of fact,” which are appealable, vs. “guard[ing] against the possibility of arbitrary or capricious behavior by examiners” when no findings appear on paper – which are petitionable).
In a substantial fraction of Decisions on Petition, both those rendered in Technology Centers and in the Petitions Office, the key legal proposition (or definition of key legal terms such as “moot” or “appealable”) is based on an unsupported assertion of fact or law, or a recharacterization of the issue presented.\(^{30}\) In many decisions, the paragraph stating the “legal” principles to be applied cites no authority, makes no attempt to distinguish the precedent cited in the Petition, and creates a new legal principle that is directly contrary to precedent.\(^{31}\)

Petitions relating to incomplete examination (and other procedural aspects of the examination of claims) should be adjudicated by an ombudsman outside the chain of command of the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Operations. The Office of Ombudsman should be staffed with lawyers, preferably with real-world experience in the practice of law, not senior examiners who have no legal experience. Petitions adjudicators should be accountable for quality of PTO work product instead of production. For example, perhaps the ombudsman should report to the Commissioner for Patents (perhaps Office of GC?)

E. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b) Should be Restored to an “Unduly Interferes” Standard

The need to amend arises for reasons and at times that are beyond applicants’ control: prior art comes to light, further R&D reveals that the feature that must be most carefully protected has changed, infringers are detected in the market, the Federal Circuit changes the law, etc. For many years, the rules recognized this reality, and drew a fair deadline for filing amendments: supplemental amendments would be entered unless they “unduly interfere[] with an Office action being prepared” \(E.g., 37\) C.F.R. § 1.111(a)(2) (version of 2000). In 2004, Rule 111 was amended to provide that essentially no amendments – or even purely argumentative replies – would be entered after the lapse of the six month statutory period. New Rule 111(b) expressly disregards factors of the PTO’s administrative convenience. At the time, the PTO offered no rationale from moving from an “unduly interferes” standard to an arbitrary date cutoff.

The difference between old Rule 111 and new Rule 11 is stark: new Rule 111 commits the PTO to \textit{wasted work}, to \textit{examining claims that applicants no longer care about}. When amendments must be made after the expiration of the 6-month period, an applicant must wait for a next Office Action – an Action that is known to be a waste – then file the necessary

\(^{30}\) In \textit{Ramaprakash v. Federal Aviation Administration}, 346 F.3d 1121, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2003), now-Chief Justice Roberts noted “Learned Hand once remarked that agencies tend to ‘fall into grooves, ... and when they get into grooves, then God save you to get them out.’” \textit{Ramaprakash} struck down an FAA decision that was based on agency “habit,” without consideration for the agency’s own precedent. Similarly, in the PTO, all too often, decisions on Rule 181 Petitions are based on “folklore” rules handed down from one ill-trained non-lawyer to another, without legal research. \textit{See, e.g.,} 09/385,394, Decision of 11/8/05 (cites not a single precedent that has “force of law” in support of any proposition – precedent is only mentioned in statements that it will not be applied, based on an exception made up out of thin air by the T.C. Director); 09/385,394, Decision on Petition 12/30/2003 (makes up a new definition of “moot,” with no citation to authority; subsequent decision of 5/4/2004 expressly refuses to defer to Supreme Court precedent on the issue).

\(^{31}\) 09/385,394, Interview Summary 12/1/2005 (T.C. Director states that he refuses to even consider Federal Circuit or PTO precedent – it is not “helpful.” “I am going to leave that to the petitions office.”)
amendment, and then await examination of the desired claims. Needless to say, sometimes a
continuation must be filed to obtain this further examination. The PTO cannot now complain
about that too many continuations are filed.

The PTO should “make every effort to become more efficient” by designing its rules so
that the total of costs borne by applicants and by the PTO are minimized. If the PTO attempts to
simply reduce its own costs, without considering total costs, it will find that its cost cutting
attempts are thwarted by operation of the elementary laws of economics.

F. Alternative Proposals Relating to Fee Structures, Searches of Biotech
Inventions, Etc. Have Been Offered In The Past But Are Not Considered in
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

A number of proposals have been offered by AIPLA, IPO, Phrma, and similar
organizations to deal with some of the issues identified in the Notices of Proposed Rulemaking.
The proposals relate to fee levels for large biotech genera, methods by which applicants can
provide searches of large genera meeting the PTO’s standards, etc.

These alternative proposals are not addressed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, let
alone does the Notice explain why the agency proposes to choose as it does. This is a failure of
the Agency’s duties under the Administrative Procedure Act. The PTO cannot promulgate such
rules without the assistance of the public — alternative proposals must be considered. The PTO
must address the alternatives offered, and give adequate reasons for whatever rule it eventually
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1983). The PTO must consider all the monetary costs
attendant its proposed rule — it may not simply consider its own costs and ignore the costs it
imposes on applicants. 463 U.S. at 55. Any rulemaking must address the root causes of
problems that are apparent in the PTO’s own statistics, discussed in § Comment 1. 463 U.S. at
34. The PTO must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” 463 U.S.
at 43. The PTO must “consider[] the relevant factors” and avoid “clear error[s] of judgment.”
463 U.S. at 43. The PTO may not “offer[] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference
in view or the product of agency expertise.” 463 U.S. at 43.

G. Examiner “Counts” Should be Calibrated to Work Per Application, Not
“Flat Fee”

The “count” system should be retailed so that counts correlate to the time or work
needed to examine an application. One obvious basis for recalibration would be to award
“counts” based on the filing fee paid for the claims examined (not including the claims
withdrawn by restriction). The current “flat rate” count system introduces all kinds of pernicious
incentives — it is not fair to examiners, and it is not fair to applicants. It results in bad work
product from the PTO.

In preparing its request to restructure fee levels in 2001-02, the PTO’s published
documents stated that the PTO did an extensive study of its marginal costs with respect to
additional claims, additional pages of specification, and the like. Thus, the PTO’s own data
gives good reliable instruction on how to fairly apportion the number of counts to examination
work.
This will kill many birds with one stone. Restriction requirements will be applied more fairly, with the examiner now having an incentive to keep related claims together where they can be examined efficiently, instead of divided into applications that will be handled less efficiently. Large applications will be given more examination time, so that they can be examined thoroughly, and properly move to allowance, abandonment, amendment or appeal, without the need for several continuations to force a reticent examiner to speak. It will be more fair to examiners. It will be more fair to applicants. It will result in a more efficient allocation of PTO examination resources. Applications that are most likely to be litigated will be the applications that are most thoroughly examined.

The underlying assumption of both Notices of Proposed Rulemaking is that large applications are bad and expensive for the Office. This is misguided and directly harmful to the overall health of the patent system, as explained in § III.A. The assumption appears to be largely an artifact of the “flat rate” allocation of counts for all applications, large or small. Reapportioning counts to application size will properly balance the economic incentives on applicants, examiners, and the Office.

H. Alternative Proposals for Allowing Applicants to Assist an Examiner in Focusing on the Relevant Issues

Patent attorneys recognize how immensely difficult it is to pick up a new application written by someone else, to get up to speed quickly, and to identify the key issues. Because it is so difficult, attorneys have developed a number of techniques for doing so. The PTO should view the Patent Bar as a valuable resource for ideas to improve efficiency. A few techniques may be shared here.

1. This Area is Far More Amenable to “Soft” Incentive-Based Approaches than to Rule

Some problems are best addressed by rules with mandatory edges and consequences, some are better addressed by assuming that both parties (the examiner and applicant) have goals that are largely aligned, and allowing them to work together to reach that common goal, using whatever techniques work best for those two people, and providing “soft” incentives, for example, accelerated examination.

The Examination Support Document proposal is too rigid. It is ill suited to many cases, and will simply increase costs. As noted in § IV.E, above, when the PTO raises the total net cost of patent prosecution by imposing excessive costs for applicants, the natural laws of economics guarantee that applicants will adapt, and in doing so, will force a substantial fraction of those costs back to the PTO.

As a general rule, when examination begins, both parties are covered in ignorance — neither knows what prior art will develop. Any proposals must address this simple fact — patent examination and prosecution is a process of discovering information, sharing it, and amending to that new information as it arises. The more opportunities the PTO can create for applicants and examiners to communicate, inexpensively and on a best-current-guess, non-binding basis, the better. Like any other research project or negotiation, the parties must be given as much freedom as possible to determine the most efficient way to find the information that they jointly need to make a good decision.
2. Pre-examination Interviews

The pre-examination interview pilot program is an extraordinarily hopeful first step. This program should be expanded. Most applicants and attorneys want valid patents, and will happily assist the examiner in whatever way possible in doing a thorough examination. Because applicants are strongly motivated to obtain valid patents, and avoid inequitable conduct, a practice of documenting any focusing suggestions offered by applicants, should be sufficient to keep such processes on the up and up.

Examiners should be encouraged to phone applicants early and often – before first examination, before maintaining a rejection on the same art, etc. In several applications where a new examiner was assigned, and the new examiner was freed from the “no interviews before first Action” policy, he/she was able to interview the attorney as he/she started the case, and the attorney was happy to focus him/her down on the core issues. Things moved along nicely.

3. The PTO Can Offer Incentives Within its Power to Grant

The penalties proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – refusal to examine claims, etc. are outside the power of the PTO to impose.

However, other incentives are available. The PTO could promise earlier examination for applications that include certain examiner assistance features (though this might give some applicants an improper way to manipulate patent term).

In 2001-02, the PTO stated that the new fee levels were calibrated to the PTO’s costs. Further experience may show that that calibration was not accurate. If the PTO now believes that fee levels do not correlate to costs, it should propose a further adjustment.

The patent system is one of the things that has made the United States economy robust. Many of these proposed rules are directly contrary to the public policy underpinnings of the patent system. With few exceptions, they should not be adopted.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

HERITAGE WOODS INC.