This is a decision on the renewed petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b), filed May 27, 2008, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

The application became abandoned for failure to timely pay the issue and publication fees on or before January 19, 2005, as required by the Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due, mailed October 19, 2004, which set a statutory period for reply of three (3) months. Accordingly, the application became abandoned on January 20, 2005.

STATUTE AND REGULATION

35 USC 2(b)(2) provides, in part, that:

The Office. . .may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which

(A) shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office;

Public Law 97-247, 3, 96 Stat. 317 (1982), which revised patent and trademark fees, provides for the revival of an “unintentionally” abandoned application without a showing that the delay in prosecution or in late payment of an issue fee was “unavoidable.” Specifically, 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) provides that the Director shall charge:
On filing each petition for the revival of an unintentionally abandoned application for a patent or for the unintentionally delayed payment of the fee for issuing each patent, or for an unintentionally delayed response by the patent owner in any reexamination proceeding, $1,500, unless the petition is filed under section 133 or 151 of this title, in which case the fee shall be $500.

37 CFR 1.137(b) provides:

Unintentional. Where the delay in reply was unintentional, a petition may be filed to revive an abandoned application or a lapsed patent pursuant to this paragraph. A grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph must be accompanied by:

(1) The required reply, unless previously filed. In a nonprovisional application abandoned for failure to prosecute, the required reply may be met by the filing of a continuing application. In an application or patent, abandoned or lapsed for failure to pay the issue fee or any portion thereof, the required reply must be the payment of the issue fee or any outstanding balance thereof;

(2) The petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m);

(3) A statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional; Where there is a question as to whether either the abandonment or the delay in filing a petition under 37 CFR 1.137 was unintentional, the Director may require additional information. See MPEP 711.03(c)(III)(C) and (D); and

(4) Any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required by 37 CFR 1.137(c).

**OPINION**

Petitioner has not met his burden of proof to establish to the satisfaction of the Director that the entire delay in prosecution was herein unintentional within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) and 37 CFR 1.137(b).

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35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) applies to the situation of the above-identified application (i.e., to the revival of an abandoned application), however, it precludes the Director from reviving the above-identified application. The patent statute at 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) authorizes the Director to revive an "unintentionally abandoned application." The legislative history of Public Law 97-247 reveals that the purpose of 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) is to permit the Office to have more discretion than in 35 U.S.C. 133 or 151 to revive abandoned applications in appropriate circumstances, but places a limit on this discretion, stating that "[u]nder this section a petition accompanied by either a fee of $500 or a fee of $50 would not be granted where the abandonment or the failure to pay the fee for issuing the patent was intentional as opposed to being unintentional or unavoidable." [emphasis added]. See H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 770-71. The revival of an intentionally abandoned application is antithetical to the meaning and intent of the statute and regulation.

35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) authorizes the Director to accept a petition "for the revival of an unintentionally abandoned application for a patent." As amended December 1, 1997, 37 CFR 1.137(b)(3) provides that a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by a statement that the delay was unintentional, but provides that "[t]he Director may require additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional, the petition must meet the burden of establishing that the delay was unintentional within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) and 37 CFR 1.137(b). See In re Application of G, 11 USPQ2d 1378, 1380 (Comm'r Pats. 1989). The language of both 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) and 37 CFR 1.137(b) are clear and unambiguous, and furthermore, without qualification. That is, the delay in filing the reply during prosecution, as well as in filing the petition seeking revival, must have been, without qualification, "unintentional" for the reply to now be accepted on petition. However, as noted in more detail infra, both the delay herein in filing a reply during prosecution, and in filing the petition after abandonment, are inconsistent with a filing that the entire delay herein was unintentional, such that revival is warranted.

The showing of record is that applicant deliberately withheld a reply to the Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due, mailed October 19, 2004. Thus, the applicant intended that no reply be filed, and this application became abandoned as a result of that deliberate intent.
In this case U.S. counsel, Young and Thompson, was retained by Dr. Ludwig Brann Patentbyra AB, a Swedish intellectual property law firm, for its Swedish client, Nordic Windpower AB. On January 19, 2005 Ludwig Brann Patentbyra AB instructed Young and Thompson not to pay the issue fee in response to the Notice of Allowance mailed October 19, 2004. As noted in the evidence provided, the decision to not pay the issue fee was interpreted by Ludwig Brann Patentbyra AB based on Nordic Windpower AB’s conduct after several reminders for instructions regarding payment of the issue fee. Petitioner now argues that the delay should be considered unintentional since no affirmative instruction was actually given to Ludwig Brann Patentbyra AB not to pay the issue fee.

Applicant is bound by the consequences of the actions or inactions of his duly authorized and voluntarily chosen representative. Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962); Houston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 1567, 23 USPQ2d 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 317, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (D.N. Ind. 1987). After permitting the application to become abandoned, Ludwig Brann Patentbyra AB further instructed Young and Thompson to “close the case and send us your final debit note.”

The relevant inquiry in determining whether a delay is intentional is whether the course of action resulting in the delay was, as here, deliberate. See In re Maldague, 10 USPQ2d 1477 (Comm’r Pat. 1988); In re Application of G, 11 USPQ2d 1378 (Comm’r Pat. 1989); Lawman Armor v. Simon, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10843, 74 USPQ2d 1633 (DC EMich 2005); Field Hybrids, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1159 (D. Minn Jan. 27, 2005). A deliberate decision, as here, not to pay the issue fee warrants the conclusion that the abandonment of this application was not unintentional. See, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10843, 74 USPQ2d 1633 (DC EMich 2005). Here, since the delay results from a deliberate cause of action (or inaction), it cannot be considered unintentional delay. Maldague, supra; G, supra; Lawman, supra; Field Hybrids, supra.

Moreover, an intentional course of action is not rendered unintentional when, upon reconsideration, the applicant changes his or her mind as to the course of action that should have been taken, and now seeks, on petition to remit the deliberately withheld reply. Maldague, at 1478; Lawman, 73 USPQ2d at 1637-38; Lumenyte Int’l Corp. v. Cable Lite Corp., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16400, 1996 WL 383927 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 1996) (unpublished). This is so even if the prior decision not to continue prosecution arose from a good faith error, that is subsequently discovered. Maldague, supra. Rather, the subsequent discovery of a reason(s) to continue prosecution is simply a change in circumstance that does not change
the resultant delay into unintentional delay. Id. This conclusion is reinforced in this instance by the protracted delay between the January 20, 2005, date of abandonment and the filing of the first petition and reply more than two years later. As noted in MPEP 711.03(c)II subsection (c)(1):

An intentional course of action is not rendered unintentional when, upon reconsideration, the applicant changes his or her mind as to the course of action that should have been taken. See In re Maldague, 10 USPQ2d 1477, 1478 (Comm'r Pat. 1988).

Under the unintentional delay standard, it is well-established that if the abandonment of an application is considered to be a deliberately chosen course of action, the resulting delay cannot be considered as "unintentional" within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(b), where the applicant deliberately permits the application to become abandoned. See Application of G, 11 USPQ2d at 1380. Likewise, where the applicant deliberately chooses not to seek or persist in seeking the revival of an abandoned application, or where the applicant deliberately chooses to delay seeking the revival of an abandoned application, the resulting delay in seeking revival of the abandoned application cannot be considered as "unintentional" within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(b). Moreover, an intentional delay resulting from a deliberate course of action chosen by the applicant is not affected by:

(A) the correctness of the applicant's (or applicant's representative's) decision to abandon the application or not to seek or persist in seeking revival of the application;

(B) the correctness or propriety of a rejection, or other objection, requirement, or decision by the Office; or

(C) the discovery of new information or evidence, or other change in circumstances subsequent to the abandonment or decision not to seek or persist in seeking revival.

The intentional abandonment of an application precludes revival under 37 CFR 1.137(a) or (b). In re Maldague, 10 USPQ2d 1477, 1478 (Comm'r Pat. 1988).

DECISION

For the reasons given above, petitioner has not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Director that the entire delay herein was unintentional within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 41(a)(7) and 37 CFR
1.137(b). Accordingly, this abandoned application will not be revived.

This decision may be viewed as a final agency action within the meaning of 5 USC 704 for purposes of seeking judicial review. See MPEP 1002.02. The provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(d) no longer apply to this case.

Telephone inquiries regarding this decision should be directed to Sherry Brinkley at (571) 272-3204.

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