

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

ROUNDTABLE ON GENETIC DIAGNOSTIC TESTING

Alexandria, Virginia

Thursday, January 10, 2013

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (1:15 p.m.)

3 MS. REA: Thank you so much. To those
4 of you who are in attendance, I am so pleased that
5 everybody here is talking to each other, engaged,
6 and energetic, because we've got a lot of work to
7 do this afternoon and we're eager to hear from
8 each and every one of you.

9 So, I want to welcome everybody and say
10 thank you for being here. I also want to say,
11 Happy New Year, it's not too late, still
12 relatively new in the year even though I know all
13 of us have already accomplished a great deal and
14 perhaps more than we imagined with everything
15 going on right now.

16 But I wanted to tell you that as we
17 continue to implement the provisions of the
18 historic America Invents Act, we value more than
19 ever the dialogue that we have with our user
20 community, both for the sake of our commitment to
21 transparency and also for the expert insights that
22 each one of you provide.

1 So, many thanks to those of you who have
2 come to offer guidance and to explore how we can
3 balance the interests of accessing information
4 about our health with the interests of patents and
5 licensing rights, and thanks also to those
6 watching these proceedings via webcast. Your
7 participation is also vital to the success of the
8 America Invents Act and our agency.

9 And I'd also like to commend our chief
10 economist, Stu Graham, who was unable to be here
11 today, and our AIA coordinator Janet Gongola, who
12 sits two seats to my right. Hello, Janet. And I
13 want to thank both Stu and Janet for their support
14 in hosting today's roundtable. Great work as
15 always.

16 And, of course, we're also incredibly
17 grateful to our roundtable participants and I
18 don't want to name each one of you because I'm
19 bound to forget somebody and then to regret it,
20 but you will all be identified, obviously, before
21 you go up to the podium, and thank you once again
22 for being here today.

1 I would like to say also, though, that
2 U.S. Ingenuity and innovation development depend
3 on a fundamentally American social contract, which
4 holds that hard work, innovation, and creativity
5 must be rewarded in the marketplace, and as a
6 society, we acknowledge, encourage, and reward
7 innovation and we do so in large part by our
8 patent system.

9 Now, patents spur the discoveries and
10 breakthroughs we share with the world, and in the
11 process, change the world for the better. Every
12 advance gives us new tools to shape our lives and
13 nowhere is this more important or more true than
14 in the fields of medicine and medical care.

15 To those of you in this room who know me
16 you know that I've spent a considerable amount of
17 my career delving into life science issues and I
18 have been amazed time and again at the
19 awe-inspiring power of medical advances to give a
20 new lease on life to countless patients who
21 desperately needed it.

22 The issues that we are wrestling with

1 here today sit at a vital intersection of
2 scientific research and law that puts much on the
3 line. There's a lot at stake here. Our
4 conversation has, and will, provoke strong
5 emotions, but it is a conversation that we must
6 have.

7 It is our responsibility to ensure that
8 the patent system keeps pace with our
9 capabilities, and this is especially important in
10 matters pertaining to the human genome because as
11 medical treatments become increasingly
12 personalized and tailored to our genetic makeup,
13 it is critical that patients be able to consider
14 as much information as possible to arrive at
15 robustly informed treatment decisions.

16 The American Invents Act was an explicit
17 acknowledgment that the innovations of tomorrow
18 cannot take root in the patent infrastructure of
19 the past. With this in mind, we are committed to
20 modernizing our IP system while ensuring that
21 regulations do not establish a false dichotomy
22 between incentives to innovate, on one hand, and

1 adequate access to healthcare on the other.

2 As you know, Congress directed the U.S.
3 Patent and Trademark Office to study effective
4 ways to provide independent, confirming genetic
5 diagnostic test activity where gene patents and
6 exclusive licensing for primary genetic diagnostic
7 tests exist.

8 We are to examine the impact that
9 independent, second opinion testing has on
10 providing medical care to patients, the effect
11 that providing independent, second opinion,
12 genetic diagnostic testing would have on the
13 existing patent and license holders of an
14 exclusive genetic test, the impact of current
15 practices on testing results and performance, as
16 well as the role of insurance coverage on the
17 provision of genetic diagnostic tests.

18 Now, originally, the report on this
19 study was scheduled for release on June 16, 2012.
20 However, given the far-reaching impact of the
21 issues under consideration, we believed that
22 further review, discussion, and analysis were

1 required in order to produce the best study
2 possible.

3 Now, this subject is too important to
4 leave out any useful input, so for this report, as
5 with the six other mandated by Congress under the
6 America Invents Act, we have focused intently on
7 your concerns, experiences, and expectations. And
8 these will give us the guidance we need to measure
9 the implications of exclusive licensing and
10 patents in genetic testing in the practice of
11 medicine.

12 Today's roundtable actually gives us a
13 real opportunity to kick off a new era in the
14 intersection of intellectual property rights and
15 patients' rights. Your contributing insights will
16 not only shape one of the critical public health
17 considerations of our time, but it will also help
18 affect change that reaches beyond the health and
19 wellness of our patent system and into the health
20 and wellness of our healthcare system.

21 As previous testimony has made clear,
22 life-altering decisions about surgery and medical

1 treatments can be immensely difficult when only
2 one test on the market exists for identifying a
3 specific genetic mutation.

4 Now, given the scope of gene patents,
5 the current inability to ascertain a second
6 opinion that verifies the presence of a genetic
7 predisposition to cancer or other ailments hinders
8 both the ability of patients to seek the optional
9 care and the market's ability to encourage and
10 incentivize genetic testing.

11 By addressing key questions about how
12 the status quo is affecting patient outcomes, we
13 hope to learn how best to provide independent and
14 confirmatory tests and ultimately remove barriers
15 for patient access. And the evidence we collect
16 today will help us develop the recommendations
17 that Congress has mandated us to provide in our
18 report.

19 Now, certainly, there will be a variety
20 of factors to consider and different perspectives
21 to iron out, but a thoughtful discussion today can
22 assist us in doing just that.

1 Now, we have an important challenge
2 ahead of us in guiding the implementation of the
3 America Invents Act, and while we are making
4 excellent headway, sharing your experiences and
5 thoughts on second opinion genetic diagnostic
6 testing will enable the USPTO to continue
7 preparing the most accurate and well-informed
8 report and it will empower us to continue building
9 the most innovation-friendly patent architecture
10 the world has ever seen. So, please be honest,
11 don't hold anything back, and let's engage in a
12 very active dialogue.

13 Thank you again, and now let me turn the
14 program over to George Elliott, the deputy
15 administrator for our Policy and External Affairs
16 here at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
17 George, take it away.

18 DR. ELLIOTT: Thank you, Terry. Prior
19 to hearing from today's speakers, I'd like to just
20 offer a little background in history on Section 27
21 and briefly outline what Section 27 requires us to
22 do.

1 During the legislative process that led
2 to the enactment of AIA, the America Invents Act,
3 an amendment was offered by Congresswoman Debbie
4 Wasserman Schultz provisionally titled "Permitting
5 Second Opinions in Certain Genetic Diagnostic
6 Testing." This amendment would have created a
7 safe harbor for confirmatory genetic testing
8 exempting such activity from remedies for
9 infringement.

10 Prior to passage of the Act, the
11 Congresswoman withdrew the amendment and
12 substituted Section 27, which provides a mechanism
13 for collecting evidence and recommendations to aid
14 legislators in their efforts to address this area
15 of public concern.

16 Section 27 mandates that the USPTO
17 report to Congress answers to four specific
18 questions which address the following issues.
19 One, the impact that the current lack of
20 independent second opinion testing has had on the
21 ability to provide the highest level of medical
22 care to patients and recipients of genetic

1 diagnostic tests and on inhibiting innovation to
2 existing tests and diagnoses.

3 Two, the effect that providing
4 independent, second opinion genetic diagnostic
5 testing would have on the existing patent and
6 license holders of an exclusive genetic test.

7 Three, the impact that current exclusive
8 licensing and patents on genetic testing activity
9 has on the practice of medicine including, but not
10 limited to, the interpretation of testing results
11 and performance of testing procedures.

12 And, four, the role that the cost and
13 insurance coverage have on access to provision of
14 genetic diagnostic tests.

15 Importantly, the legislation further
16 directs the USPTO to provide recommendations for
17 establishing the availability of such independent
18 confirming genetic testing. In ongoing and useful
19 conversations with Congress, it is clear to us
20 that such recommendations include possible
21 legislative responses.

22 Prior to today's roundtable,

1 considerable information on some of the issues has
2 been gathered from two public hearings, one here
3 and one in San Diego, California. Much has also
4 been provided relating to the patent eligibility
5 of genetic material and ongoing high profile
6 litigation. The intent of this roundtable is to
7 fill gaps in our information, particularly
8 regarding insurance coverage and reimbursement,
9 licensing practices, and the value of carrying out
10 a confirmatory genetic test in different
11 situations.

12 Therefore, we have encouraged each of
13 the speakers today to focus their comments on
14 these questions and have asked them to propose or
15 otherwise comment on recommendations that would be
16 useful to Congress. We have a very full agenda,
17 so let's now move on to live comments from several
18 members of the public and representatives of
19 organizations who have expressed interest in these
20 issues and a willingness to give testimony. And
21 for that, I hand the program over to Janet
22 Gongola, the USPTO's coordinator for AIA

1 implementation. Janet.

2 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Mr. Elliott,
3 and as Deputy Director Rea indicated and Mr.
4 Elliott indicated, thank you to all of you in our
5 live and our webinar audiences for joining us
6 today to discuss the important legal and
7 scientific issues surrounding second opinion,
8 genetic diagnostic testing.

9 Now, as you can see from the agenda that
10 you received upon arrival, we have 19 guests who
11 have pre- scheduled to give commentary. Our
12 agenda is very full. When I call your name, I ask
13 that you please proceed to the podium to share
14 your remarks. And for those of you who will be
15 providing commentary by telephone, when I call
16 your name, please begin to speak.

17 And at this point, I'd like to check to
18 see if our guests who will be speaking by
19 telephone have joined us yet. Those guests are
20 Charis Eng and Linda Bruzzone. Are either or both
21 of you on the line at this time? Doesn't quite
22 sound like they've joined us yet, so by the time

1 they are up on the agenda, they hopefully will be
2 here.

3 Now, because our timeline is tight, each
4 guest has been allotted either five or ten minutes
5 to speak. When you approach the one-minute mark
6 during your commentary, I'm going to raise this
7 red card to indicate to you to please begin to
8 wrap up your remarks so that we can stay on
9 schedule as much as possible.

10 And then lastly, after our prescheduled
11 testimony is complete, we will be opening the
12 floor for those of you in our live audience or on
13 our webinar audience who might like to share
14 commentary. We will also have a discussion time,
15 mindful though that we are approaching the end of
16 the day.

17 Let's begin now with Mr. Henry Wixon on
18 behalf of the National Institute of Standards and
19 Technology. Please proceed to the podium.

20 MR. WIXON: Thank you very much, Janet.
21 And on behalf of myself and the National Institute
22 of Standards and Technology, I want to thank

1 Deputy Undersecretary Rea and our sister agency,
2 the Department of Commerce, the United States
3 Patent and Trademark Office, for providing this
4 opportunity to comment on issues presented by
5 Section 27 of the America Invents Act, as George
6 has outlined for us.

7 I am particularly pleased that the PTO
8 has encouraged speakers at today's roundtable to
9 focus their remarks on proposals or comments on
10 recommendations that might be useful to our
11 Congressional leaders. As everyone in the room
12 here today and those who are with us through the
13 webcast will recognize, there are no easy answers
14 to the questions presented by Section 27 regarding
15 confirmatory genetic diagnostic testing.

16 There are many interrelated factors in
17 play that are affected by and that affect any
18 legislative approach that Congress might consider.
19 So, I think it is important to keep in mind that
20 we're not likely to fix on a silver bullet
21 solution here. We need to step back and look at
22 the broader picture. For diagnostics testing and

1 for medical diagnostics generally, that picture
2 includes foundational research, which, while the
3 United States government has been and continues to
4 be a significant source of funding, is
5 increasingly supported by non-federal funding and
6 increasingly involves collaborative efforts that
7 bring together the federal government, state and
8 local governments, industry, and non-governmental
9 entities.

10 An important practical consequence of
11 these increasingly collaborative efforts is that
12 the federal government alone is less often in a
13 position to dictate the outcome of any particular
14 course of research and its commercialization.

15 President Obama has recognized the
16 importance of encouraging this kind of
17 crosscutting collaboration issuing last fall a
18 Presidential Memorandum on accelerating technology
19 transfer and commercialization of federal research
20 in support of high growth businesses. In that
21 Presidential Memorandum, the President challenged
22 agencies across the federal research enterprise to

1 take actions to establish goals and measure
2 performance, streamline administrative processes,
3 and facilitate local and regional partnerships in
4 order to accelerate technology transfer and
5 support private sector commercialization.

6 The President's Memorandum tasked the
7 Inter Agency Workgroup on Technology Transfer,
8 which is chaired by the National Institute of
9 Standards and Technology, or NIST, to make
10 recommendations on opportunities for improving
11 technology transfer from federal laboratories.
12 NIST and the Workgroup have been working hard with
13 federal R&D agencies to develop plans for
14 improvement and those plans will shortly be
15 published.

16 One of the major challenges we've
17 recognized in looking for ways to improve
18 technology transfer is how to successfully
19 translate promising scientific discoveries from
20 the lab bench into practical application through
21 commercial products.

22 Today federal agencies have precious few

1 tools available to help facilitate this critical
2 transition. The cost of such transition is
3 typically borne by start up companies that may
4 not, in today's very challenging economic
5 environment, have the financial resources to
6 survive the so- called valley of death and get a
7 product to market. This, then, is an area worth
8 serious thought when we consider new initiatives.

9 The valley of death challenge is even
10 more acute where the commercialization of a
11 product is subject to federal regulation, and of
12 course, clinical diagnostic tests fall within that
13 category. The cost of gaining regulatory approval
14 can be a significant hurdle to commercialization,
15 particularly in the context of products such as a
16 second opinion test where the potential market for
17 such a test may not justify the private sector
18 investment needed to get through the approval
19 process.

20 It is almost impossible for government
21 to create a market where none exists and equally
22 fruitless to attempt to force the private sector,

1 through legislative fiat, to invest in
2 commercializing a technology for which there is no
3 or too little return on that investment. One
4 needs, rather, to look for incentives.

5 For example, in other contexts, notably
6 for orphan drugs, this problem of a lack of a
7 market substantial enough to encourage private
8 sector investment has been addressed, at least in
9 part, through incentives that have successfully
10 encouraged private sector investments necessary to
11 develop and gain regulatory approval for drugs
12 needed by a relatively small number of individual
13 patients.

14 Similar incentive structures, if applied
15 to second opinion diagnostic testing, could form
16 the basis for a win-win outcome.

17 Now, on the topic of the inability of
18 government to create a market by fiat where none
19 exists, I want to briefly address the so-called
20 march in right, which federal funding agencies
21 have had for over three decades under the
22 Bayh-Dole Act. NIST, through delegation from the

1 Secretary of Commerce, has responsibility for
2 issuing regulations and establishing standard
3 funding agreement provisions applicable to federal
4 agencies implementing Bayh-Dole.

5 Those funding agreement provisions
6 provide that the funding agency may march in on a
7 patentee whose patent resulted from agency
8 funding, and may compel licenses to third parties
9 if the patentee is not taking effective steps to
10 achieve practical application of the subject
11 invention or if action is necessary to alleviate
12 health or safety needs.

13 Now, no federal agency has ever marched
14 in on a performing small business firm or
15 nonprofit organization despite having the right to
16 march in for over 30 years over the Bayh-Dole Act.
17 Why is that? Well, a 2009 GAO study on the
18 government's use of march in rights, found that
19 the use of the march in authority could have a
20 "chilling effect on federal research. If a march
21 in occurred, investors would be less likely to
22 provide the funds to commercialize federal

1 inventions for fear of losing their investments."

2 Agencies know that the counterproductive
3 chilling effect that marching in would have across
4 the entire federal research enterprise and on the
5 willingness of investors to fund the
6 commercialization of inventions arising through
7 it.

8 More importantly, I think, for the
9 purpose of today's roundtable, the act of marching
10 in does not create a market where none exists, so
11 at the end of the day, it would not solve a key
12 element of the problem, which is how to encourage
13 the necessary private sector investment. Rather,
14 incentives should be considered, possibly
15 including incentives along the lines mentioned.

16 Such incentives can do far more to fill
17 the gaps in our technology transfer and
18 translational ecosystem and to promote, long-term,
19 our nation's health and safety objectives.

20 That concludes my remarks and I want to
21 thank you and, again, Deputy Undersecretary Rea
22 and the Department of Commerce's Patent and

1 Trademark Office, for the opportunity to speak to
2 you today and I look forward to hearing the
3 comments of my fellow speakers.

4 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Mr. Wixon. Our
5 next speaker will be Mark Rohrbaugh of the
6 National Institutes of Health.

7 MR. ROHRBAUGH: Thank you. On behalf of
8 the Department of Health and Human Services and
9 the National Institutes of Health, I want to thank
10 you and the Patent and Trademark Office for the
11 opportunity to discuss NIH practices and policies
12 with regard to licensing its patent portfolio,
13 particularly in the area of diagnostics.

14 The mission of the Office of Technology
15 Transfer at the NIH is to manage inventions made
16 by both NIH and FDA scientists, scientists who
17 work in the intramural program, to provide
18 incentives for private sector commercial
19 development such that these new technologies lead
20 to improvements in public health.

21 At the same time, we provide broad
22 access to technologies, including research tools,

1 for internal research purposes to for-profit and
2 nonprofit institutions.

3 We are also the lead office within the
4 Department of Health and Human Services on
5 technology transfer policies such as our own
6 internal policies for intramural NIH and FDA
7 patenting and licensing that I will describe in a
8 moment, as well as general policies that apply
9 both to internal and external extramural research
10 like the Research Tools Policy and the Best
11 Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions.

12 We have been in this business for more
13 than 20 years and in doing so have developed the
14 largest public sector biomedical patenting and
15 licensing portfolio with more than 3,000 pending
16 and issued patents, royalties from 500 companies
17 under 800 licenses last year, and to date,
18 26 FDA approved products and hundreds of others
19 not requiring FDA approval.

20 We have, between the years 1984 and 2010,
21 executed about 56 licenses that resulted in
22 identifiable commercial in vitro diagnostic

1 products or services, and I'll talk in more detail
2 about that. We are also the agency with the most
3 experience in considering formal use of march in.

4 We recently conducted a study of NIH
5 managed patents that include at least one nucleic
6 acid claim. We found 56 licenses executed between
7 the years 1984 and 2010 that resulted in a
8 commercial in vitro diagnostic product or service
9 that we could identify. I say "identify" because
10 some of the early records are not
11 complete. Of these, 34 licenses resulted in 94
12 protein based tests, products, and services,
13 mostly immunodiagnosics, and 22 licenses
14 resulted in 23 nucleic acid test products and
15 services. These tests cover six gene mutations,
16 five infectious diseases, one autoimmune disease,
17 and one cancer associated antigen.

18 Only three of these licenses from the
19 1990s were at least in part exclusive.
20 Two of these licenses remain active with products
21 on the market. One patent family is exclusive to
22 Myriad for the BRCA test. The final agreement was

1 not a negotiated license, but a legal settlement
2 in 1995 of a dispute over NIH co-inventorship
3 after the University of Utah had already filed the
4 patent and licensed it exclusively to Myriad. A second
5 license executed in 1991 is for an infectious
6 disease test kit.

7 Many licenses to these patents did not result in
8 products or had a field of use that only included
9 internal research, vaccines, therapeutics, drug
10 screening, or reagent sales. In contrast, we have
11 patents without nucleic acid claims that have been
12 licensed for many uses including diagnostics that are based on
14 cellular, biochemical, or chromosomal assays or
15 associated with a traditional device.

16 By law and policy, we limit the use of
17 exclusive licensing to the scope needed as a
18 reasonable incentive for commercializing a
19 product. Exclusive licensing is based on the
20 request of the applicant, its justification, the
21 existing market, and the time and expense required
22 to enter the market. Rarely is there more than

1 one party interested in licensing a technology, and
2 many technologies remain unlicensed due to their
3 early stage of development and the risk
4 associated with developing them.

5 Depending on the scope of the patent and
6 the public health needs, we reserve exclusive
7 licenses for those technologies requiring greater
8 risk and high levels of investment to develop them
9 and therefore would not be developed under a
10 non-exclusive license. Our policies and practices
11 for licensing patents are key to ensuring that
12 technologies are developed in a manner that best
13 serves the public in providing market access to
14 treatments and medicines.

15 NIH does not grant fully exclusive
16 licenses in the traditional manner. We always
17 reserve the right to grant research use licenses,
18 and the license limits the commercial use to a
19 particular field. For example, the same patent
20 family might be licensed under separate exclusive
21 licenses for FDA approved therapeutics, vaccines,
22 or drugs, and non-exclusively for internal

1 research and reagent sales.

2 Even for a drug or a therapeutic, the
3 license may be further limited to applications of
4 the technology to a particular disease condition
5 such as a chemotherapeutic for lung and liver
6 cancers, but not for blood and pancreatic cancers.

7 Like our colleagues in university
8 technology transfer offices, our practices have
9 evolved over time as we have learned from our
10 collective experience, the experience of patients,
11 including the need for secondary testing, and the
12 challenging commercial business models needed to develop
13 early stage technology into products and services
14 that will benefit everyone.

15 For example, beginning in the early
16 1990s, we started requiring specific due diligence
17 commensurate with the company's business
18 development plan rather than relying on general
19 due diligence requirements that made it difficult
20 to manage a licensee who might not be making
21 reasonable progress or adequately addressing
22 public health and safety needs. It has been

1 standard practice for many years to include
2 aggressive performance milestones in licenses. As the
3 licensor, we can then terminate a license or
4 renegotiate the diligence terms if reasonable
5 progress is not being met to develop the various
6 applications.

7 In considering how to license diagnostic
8 technologies, whether protein/antibody based or
9 nucleic acid based, our strategy is informed by
10 our Research Tools Policy, Best Practices for
11 the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, public health
12 concerns raised by patients, physicians, and
13 professional organizations, and our years of
14 experience. We reserve exclusive licensing to
15 products such as Class III FDA devices and
16 diagnostics, and Class II where clinical trials are
17 necessary to obtain marketing approval.

18 In these cases, the exclusive field of use is
19 limited to the FDA approved kit. Under our licenses, we have
20 always reserved the right to grant nonexclusive research
21 use licenses. We have licensed in vitro
22 diagnostics on a nonexclusive basis for CLIA

1 regulated laboratory developed tests and reserve
2 this right in our exclusive licenses for FDA approved kits.

3 In the last few years, we have begun to
4 add language to exclusive diagnostic kit licenses
5 requiring independent, third party
6 confirmatory testing to be available to patients.
7 These terms ensure that parties will be able to
8 find alternative sourcing of testing if needed by
9 using laboratory developed tests or having
10 alternative parties run the test kit.

11 This approach still provides incentives
12 for companies to invest in the development of more
13 expensive FDA approved kits. Yet this is not
14 without a cost, because a few companies have
15 refused licenses under these terms, and those tests
16 remain undeveloped and unavailable to the public.

17 Henry talked about the march in
18 authority under the Bayh-Dole Act, and I would note
19 that this authority applies to inventions that
20 were developed in part with U.S. grant or contract funding.
21 It does not apply to federal agency patenting and
22 licensing where the agency can act unilaterally

1 and more directly.

2 March in is an administrative process
3 that includes due process protections for the
4 licensee or patent owner and may result in the
5 agency forcing the grant of a license or
6 granting a license itself to third parties to move
7 the technology to practical application or to
8 address unmet health and safety needs.

9 Based on over 30 years of experience, we
10 find this march in authority to be most useful as a
11 deterrent. Agencies may use this authority when
12 the agency determines that it has sufficient
13 information to invoke a march in procedure. The
14 fact that it exists is an incentive for owners and
15 licensees of federally owned technologies not to
16 act in a matter that would lead an agency to invoke its use.
17 I've been told by companies that they
18 take this into account when licensing federally
19 funded technologies.

20 In addition, the rare circumstance where
21 there may be some resistance to develop a
22 technology or meet health and safety needs,

1 discussions with the parties about the possibility
2 of marching in often leads to compliance and avoids
3 the need to use it.

4 NIH has considered more formally the use
5 of march in on four occasions. When thinking
6 about the theoretical possibility of marching in
7 to address public health concerns involving
8 diagnostics, one needs to consider whether one of
9 the prongs of the march in statute can be invoked,
10 and secondly, whether marching in would address
11 that particular matter.

12 In the context of diagnostics, one
13 needs to consider the scope of patents
14 required to practice the diagnostic test and
15 whether the public health concern could be solved
16 through the use of the march in. For example, it
17 is not unusual for in vitro diagnostic products to
18 utilize patents funded by the U.S. government and
19 those not funded by the government.

20 Key to the decision making process would
21 then be whether the public health need could be
22 addressed by granting a license to a third party

1 for only the U.S. government funded technologies,
2 that is, would a license to other patented
3 technologies be required in order to practice that
4 technology?

5 I thank you for the opportunity to speak
6 today about the way NIH manages its patenting and
7 licensing portfolio with regard to diagnostic
8 technologies to provide incentives for
9 private sector development and use while ensuring
10 that public health needs are met. Thank you.

11 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Mr. Rohrbaugh.
12 Our next participant is Arti Rai on behalf of Duke
13 University School of Law.

14 MS. RAI: Thank you very much to the
15 USPTO and to Deputy Director Rea for inviting me.
16 I should say at the outset that I do not speak on
17 behalf of Duke University or its law school, I am
18 speaking only on behalf of myself and I also don't
19 speak on behalf of any of the agencies that fund
20 my research.

21 So, in my brief time I want to focus on
22 just two issues. Both of these issues, I think,

1 are relevant to the question on which we have been
2 asked to focus, and that is what, if anything,
3 Congress should do.

4 So, one issue I will not address is the
5 complex question of whether gene patents are
6 likely to create a patent thicket, for example,
7 for whole genome sequencing. Obviously, that
8 issue is centrally in play in the ACLU v. Myriad
9 case and is affected, as well, by the ruling in
10 Prometheus v. Mayo. That, I take it, is not
11 within the remit of our discussions today.

12 What do I want to talk about? Well,
13 first, I do want to talk about the policy
14 relevance of the background federal involvement in
15 a very significant percentage of the research that
16 has led to patents on genetic diagnostic testing.
17 Second, I want to comment briefly on possible
18 legislation enunciating exemptions from
19 infringement liability for certain types of
20 diagnostic testing such as second opinion
21 diagnostic testing.

22 So, first, and primarily I will focus on

1 the policy significance of background federal
2 funding.

3 As many of you know, my colleague,
4 Robert Cook-Deegan, who is here today as well, has
5 led an analysis of a suite of very important case
6 studies on patenting and licensing with respect to
7 particular genetic diagnostic tests. I want to
8 draw upon some of these case studies to identify
9 with particularity the very important federal
10 role.

11 We can, of course, start with the Myriad
12 case itself. Here, NIH, as Mark Rohrbaugh has
13 mentioned, is actually a co-owner of several
14 relevant BRCA I patents. Now, ironically the
15 government's leverage as co-owner in this case may
16 not be as great as it is in some other cases that
17 are of relevance for us today. For example, NIH
18 appears to be a co-owner in only one of the
19 patents that's remaining in the ACLU v. Myriad
20 lawsuit, i.e. the 282 Patent.

21 Even so, the government use license in
22 that patent may represent some leverage. I think

1 the background federal funding is perhaps even
2 more significant for some of the other patents
3 that Professor Cook-Deegan has studied. These
4 include colon cancer, Alzheimer's, spinocerebellar
5 ataxia, and long QT syndrome. There the
6 government clearly funded at least part of the
7 research that led to the relevant patents.

8 In general, as Professor Cook-Deegan and
9 his co-author Shubha Chandrasekharan have shown,
10 of 93 patents associated with tests done at Athena
11 Diagnostics as of February 2010, government
12 funding was specifically declared in 40 of those
13 patents, 40 of the 93. This is, obviously, almost
14 half and it represents two-thirds of all patents
15 with a U.S. Assignee.

16 These are cases, I should note, where
17 the federal funding was properly reported, as it
18 should be under the Bayh- Dole statute, on the
19 face of the patent. Unfortunately, as recent
20 research I've done with Bhaven Sampat has
21 confirmed, universities are not always as
22 conscientious as they should be about reporting

1 the federal funding role in the patents that they
2 seek. So there are additional patents that are
3 used by Athena Diagnostics and owned by universities
4 where one might imagine there might have been some
5 federal funding role.

6 So, what does this funding role mean for
7 the government? Well, we've already heard some
8 mention of march in and Bayh-Dole. The reason
9 that this even comes up as a question, I'm sorry
10 to say as a professor at an academic
11 institution, is because academic institutions,
12 unlike NIH, have not engaged in best practices
13 with respect to their licensing of gene patents.

14 The sorts of best practices that Mark
15 Rohrbaugh has mentioned are exemplary.
16 Universities have not always engaged in those
17 practices. Those sorts of best practices where
18 one does field of use licensing exclusively where
19 there's a need for additional investment, and
20 non-exclusively where there is not, are the best
21 practices that universities claim they should
22 engage in. Most universities have signed on to

1 principles that would essentially implement those
2 practices.

3 However, the cases in which we're seeing
4 problems are cases where universities have not
5 followed those practices.

6 So, the question of whether the federal
7 government has a role to play is before us in
8 those cases. Obviously, as the speakers before me
9 have mentioned, march in is a very controversial
10 provision and in many cases, even cases involving
11 genetic diagnostic testing, the U.S. government
12 may not own all of the relevant patents.

13 Nonetheless, I don't believe this should
14 be a showstopper with respect to thinking about
15 march in in certain cases where additional
16 investment is not necessary to attract interest in
17 diagnostic testing. Presumably these are cases
18 where physicians would be willing to do such
19 diagnostic testing on their own in CLIA approved
20 laboratories, for example, and therefore we would
21 not need the additional investment that kits
22 require.

1 March in can be, as Mark Rohrbaugh has
2 indicated, a deterrent, but it could also be,
3 perhaps, a nudge, a nudge to help universities and
4 their licensees think better about what they
5 should do, think, in other words, along the lines
6 that NIH has thought for a while now.

7 I should also note, and this is based
8 upon some work that Professor Rebecca Eisenberg
9 and I have done, that some of the very cumbersome
10 due process protections that are currently in
11 Bayh-Dole regulations are, I don't think, required
12 by the Bayh-Dole statutory language itself and so
13 the delay that many have feared with respect to
14 march in, I don't think is required by the
15 language of the statute.

16 I think march-in could be a more expeditious
17 procedure than the current regulations set it out
18 to be.

19 March in has the virtue, when used as a
20 nudge, to be surgically calibrated to the
21 specifics of a particular situation. In that way
22 it is different from anything Congress could do.

1 Congress can only legislate in relatively broad
2 strokes whereas march in, at least as a nudge,
3 even if not as an actual procedure, can be
4 calibrated to what is necessary in a particular
5 context.

6 So, if the valley of death is a problem
7 in a particular context, obviously one would not
8 use march in. If it were not a problem because
9 you had physicians who were begging to do the
10 tests, presumably march in would be a relevant
11 nudge.

12 Now, just briefly with respect to
13 potential Congressional legislation, I do
14 think that given the federal government's
15 reluctance to use march in even as a
16 nudge, there is probably some reason to think
17 about legislation, exempting infringement, what
18 would otherwise be infringement in certain
19 circumstances.

20 I think this legislation should be
21 relatively narrow, although perhaps not as narrow
22 as that originally proposed by Representative

1 Wasserman Schultz in 2011. That language was
3 criticized as perhaps being overly narrow with
4 respect to research uses.

5 I do think that if Congress were to
6 draft legislation codifying an exemption from
7 infringement, it would be prudent to have
8 additional language urging, even in a hortatory
9 way, federal agencies to use their nudging power
10 under march in and perhaps also to revise the
11 currently very cumbersome march in regulations
12 that I don't believe are required by the language
13 of Bayh-Dole.

14 I very much appreciate the opportunity
15 to speak here today and I am happy to answer any
16 questions in subsequent discussion. Thank you.

17 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Rai. Our
18 next participant is Hathaway Russell on behalf of
19 the Coalition for 21st Century Medicine.

20 MS. RUSSELL: Thanks to our hosts for
21 the opportunity to continue this important
22 discussion regarding the role and impact of patent

1 protection in the field of personalized medicine.
2 My name is Hathaway Russell and I'm a partner in
3 the IP Group at Foley Hoag in Boston,
4 Massachusetts. I represent universities and
5 companies in obtaining patent protection primarily
6 in the areas of diagnostics, therapeutics, and
7 personalized medicine technologies.

8 I also work with the Coalition for 21st
9 Century Medicine, which is composed of 25
10 companies committed to improving the quality of
11 healthcare by encouraging research, development,
12 and commercialization of innovative diagnostic
13 technologies. Our members include Genomic Health,
14 Kleiner Perkins, XDX, Veracyte, Genetic Alliance,
15 and many others doing important work in this
16 space.

17 In addition, I'm a cofounder of
18 Diagnostics Insights, a nonprofit organization
19 whose mission is to educate healthcare
20 stakeholders on the power and value of diagnostics
21 and their impact on improving patient outcomes and
22 reducing costs.

1 My comments today represent my views on
2 this issue, which are not necessarily those of any
3 of the foregoing organizations and clients, but I
4 mention them because working with these groups has
5 helped shape my own opinions.

6 It is my believe that a legislative
7 mandate requiring companies to license their

8 patented technology to other commercial interests
9 for the purpose of allowing confirmatory tests,
10 will seriously weaken the patent system, a key
11 driver of innovation in the United States, and
12 thereby harm the prospects for personalized
13 medicine to reach its potential with negative
14 consequences for the health of the American people
15 and our economy. Weakening patent protection will
16 cripple the field of advanced diagnostics and
17 personalized medicine before it can really hit its
18 stride.

19 The vision for advanced diagnostics is
20 that they will guide and optimize every phase of a
21 patient's interaction with the healthcare system.
22 Their utility begins, even before disease is

1 present, to assess which individuals are at risk
2 for a disease, so that resources can be
3 appropriately focused for effective prevention.

4 Increasingly, advanced diagnostics are
5 used to make the diagnosis of disease, to stage
6 the disease, as in cancer, to find identifiable
7 subtypes of disease that may have different
8 responses to treatment, to identify which therapy,
9 among several options, is the best for the
10 particular subtype of disease, and to provide
11 prognostic information.

12 Once the therapy has begun, advanced
13 diagnostics can be used to dose more effectively,
14 monitor effectiveness of treatment, and determine
15 when a change in strategy is warranted. Finally,
16 they can be used for surveillance and in early
17 diagnostics and early diagnosis of relapse.

18 The point is, diagnostics are absolutely
19 at the core of medicine, critical to every stage
20 of the prevention, diagnosis, and management of
21 disease. Consequently, improvements in
22 diagnostics have just as much potential as new

1 treatments to revolutionize healthcare. In
2 addition to the improvements in outcome, each of
3 those contributions of diagnostics has the
4 potential to save money by focusing resources on
5 individuals at risk, allowing appropriate
6 surveillance, and earlier diagnosis, which may
7 reduce morbidity, targeting therapy more
8 precisely, avoiding the use of expensive therapies
9 that are unlikely to work, and getting patients
10 back to health more quickly.

11 This potential for cost savings is
12 especially important as rising healthcare costs
13 have become a fundamental threat to our fiscal
14 solvency as a nation. But it's still early days
15 for advanced diagnostics and personalized
16 medicine, and many of these potential benefits
17 will not be realized if companies are not able to
18 obtain the capital they need for research and
19 development and can't have a reasonable
20 expectation for a return on investment.

21 Patents exist to promote the progress in
22 the sciences and useful arts. Inventors are given

1 a period of exclusivity precisely to allow them to
2 recoup their investment in research and
3 development with the goal of encouraging them to
4 continue to innovate and bring their innovations
5 to market. That's what our Constitution provides.
6 And the system has worked, making the United
7 States of America a global driver of innovation in
8 medical science.

9 However, if we weaken the protection
10 that patents provide and force companies to give
11 up their exclusive rights to practice the
12 invention, the risk associated with investing in
13 the development of a new test will be greatly
14 increased. Over the past decades we've witnessed
15 enormous developments in the biotechnology
16 industry, which occurred because of the support of
17 the patent system and our patent office.

18 There are a few points I'd like to
19 emphasize. First, technology transfer for
20 universities under the Bayh- Dole Act is a hugely
21 important driver of innovation and economic
22 activity in the biotechnology sector. Without a

1 doubt, most diagnostics tests would not have been
2 developed without basic research performed in
3 academic settings that sets the stage for the
4 development of new diagnostics.

5 However, without the potential for
6 exclusivity that patents provide, the risk to
7 companies in developing these diagnostics and
8 therapies would be prohibitively increased. The
9 need for patent protection to realize a return of
10 the investment that our country makes in federally
11 funded research was explicitly recognized by the
12 Bayh-Dole Act. Limiting patent protection would
13 hobble the technology transfer process, allowing
14 many discoveries to fall into a widening chasm
15 between academia and commercialization, and
16 crippling one of the great drivers of innovation
17 in this country.

18 Second, there is investment in the
19 products of academic research once they've been
20 licensed by industry and in basic research
21 developed within industry because of the
22 availability of patent protection. A great deal

1 of research and development goes into these tests
2 after the initial discoveries make them possible,
3 work that is absolutely necessary, not only for
4 regulatory approval, but also for adoption by
5 physicians and successful insurance coverage
6 determinations. The patentee and licensee must
7 take on significant financial risk to develop and
8 validate a test as reliably detecting a genetic
9 marker of clinical significance for a diagnosis.

10 If Congress were to change the ability
11 to protect these sorts of inventions, you would
12 most certainly see a significant change in
13 investment behavior.

14 Third, duplication of tests is not cost
15 effective. More than one laboratory performing
16 the exact same tests is not cost effective and
17 does not address the uncertainty of an
18 inconclusive measurement, as well as performing a
19 fundamentally different test. Patents and
20 competitive pressure give companies incentive to
21 design different tests, to design around patents.
22 This is actually beneficial for patients because

1 the more dissimilar a second test is, the less
2 likely a false result is to be repeated by the
3 confirmatory test.

4 It would be far more beneficial for
5 patients for companies to invest their time and
6 resources in developing new, non-infringing tests
7 for the same condition. Forcing companies to
8 license their tests would encourage competitors to
9 produce "me too" tests, but not to innovate and
10 produce novel and potentially superior results in
11 tests.

12 Finally, the devaluing of diagnostics
13 runs counter to an important thrust of healthcare
14 reform. It is widely acknowledged that one of the
15 weaknesses of our healthcare system is the
16 undervaluing of diagnostic and cognitive work and
17 the overvaluing of procedures. Reimbursements are
18 not very good for the work of figuring out what
19 patients have by talking through history,
20 performing a careful exam, or for optimizing a
21 care plan to prevent the development of disease,
22 but are much better for performing a surgery or

1 administering a treatment once the disease has
2 developed and has been diagnosed.

3 The economic incentives in this system
4 have led to a great deal of wasted healthcare
5 spending that doesn't improve the health of our
6 citizens. Healthcare reform has tried to address
7 this by increasing the funding for primary and
8 preventative care and supporting comparative
9 effectiveness research. The proposal to weaken
10 patent protection on diagnostics but not on
11 therapeutics, which can be protected by
12 composition of matter claims, runs counter to the
13 direction of healthcare reform by undervaluing
14 diagnostics versus therapy in a new way.

15 Investment in finding out what the
16 patient really has and which treatment are really
17 best for them is being shortchanged while there's
18 an assault on the patent protection for therapies,
19 which may be wastefully misapplied without the new
20 information that novel diagnostic tests could
21 supply.

22 I'm concerned that the push to force

1 licensing for confirmatory tests, which singles
2 out diagnostics as an area, would result in
3 weakening our patent system in an effort to
4 resolve issues that are not caused by the patent
5 system.

6 Patients may doubt the accuracy of a
7 specific genetic test, the performance of the test
8 by the test lab, or the doctor's opinion about how
9 to manage care in light of the result, but that's
10 not the fault of the patent system, nor will it be
11 solved by changing the patent system.

12 Limiting IP rights to address those
13 concerns does not make sense and has the potential
14 to dramatically reduce the development of new
15 tests. If we want the field to grow, to develop
16 new tests and better tests, then we can't cut it
17 off at the knees. We need to incentivize
18 universities and companies to make truly new
19 discoveries and develop new technologies.

20 We need to encourage universities to
21 license the technologies to entities who have the
22 resources to invest in the research and

1 development that's required to bring an accurate
2 and reliable test to market. We need to make
3 companies that develop and bring these tests to
4 market attractive to investors so that patients
5 will have access to them.

6 The current level of protection that
7 patents provide has accomplished and is continuing
8 to accomplish these goals. As the flowering of
9 advanced diagnostics in the last decade has shown,
10 if patent protection is weakened and companies
11 stop developing tests, there will be fewer tests
12 available. The entire issue of second genetic
13 testing will be moot. And proponents of weakening
14 patent protection by forcing licensing for second
15 tests will have won the battle, but lost the war.

16 Thank you.

17 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Russell.
18 Our next participant is Sapna Kumar from the
19 University of Houston Law Center.

20 MS. KUMAR: Hello. I'd first like to
21 thank the PTO for inviting me here today. I'd
22 also like to note that I am talking on behalf of

1 myself and that my views do not reflect those of
2 the University of Houston.

3 Our previous speaker discussed the
4 Constitution's protection for innovators and how
5 to promote that. I'm here to discuss the
6 Constitution's protection for individuals under
7 the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, and in
8 particular, why the PTO's issuance of gene patents currently
9 violate the Fifth Amendment's protection of fundamental
10 liberty interests.

11 There are two fundamental rights that
12 are important with regard to gene patents:
13 the right to knowledge and the right to make
14 healthcare decisions. With respect to knowledge,
15 three courts of appeals have found a fundamental
16 right to medical information with regard to being
17 able to refuse medical treatment. Also the
18 Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged a right to
19 information in the context of medical
20 decision-making.

21 Second, there exists a fundamental right of
22 bodily integrity and physical autonomy, so

1 individuals have the right to make healthcare
2 decisions so long as there is no moral type of
3 conflict.

4 You may be asking yourself
5 what this has to do with gene patents
6 and the issues on the agenda today? Well, genetic
7 information is knowledge and genetic information
8 is an intrinsic part of our bodies.
9 It is the key to being able to make an
10 informed healthcare decision, and without that
11 information we're essentially lost. Without
12 knowing if we are a gene carrier for a particular
13 disease, our doctors cannot make informed
14 decisions on how to best treat us.

15 Thus, when the PTO issues gene patents
16 that have the capability of blocking or limiting
17 individual access to genetic information, this is
18 an as-applied violation of the due process clause by
19 compromising the autonomy of patients. Bob
20 Cook-Deegan will give some examples, and Arti
21 already has, with regard to Long QT
22 syndrome where for a few years there was no

1 test available for the syndrome because the
2 patent holder chose to not make one available.

3 Likewise, even for tests that currently
4 have some availability, such as BRCA, there are
5 limitations on that. For example, Asian women
6 cannot get highly accurate testing done because of
7 information that's currently missing.

8 So, what are the solutions to these
9 problems? I see three of them. The first is to
10 narrow the scope of Section 101, which would
11 perhaps be the most difficult route to go, but
12 there could be clarification that
13 purified isolated genes are outside the subject
14 material of 101.

15 The second is compulsory licensing to
16 prevent gene tests from being withheld. Right now
17 patent holders can hold our genes hostage. Any
18 patent holder who owns the patent on a gene can
19 choose to not offer the test at all and we are
20 at their mercy. Compulsory licensing would provide a
21 solution to this, and make up for the fact
22 that march in rights have not been historically

1 exercised.

2 Third, having a research
3 exemption formally placed into the Patent Act
4 would allow researchers in nonprofit areas to
5 continue to engage in important testing
6 while the patent holder still receives protection.

7 Thank you very much for your time.

8 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Kumar. Our
9 next participant is Robert Cook-Deegan for Duke
10 Institute for Genomic Sciences and Policy.

11 DR. COOK-DEEGAN: So, thank you, and the
12 first thing I can say is thank you for having us
13 here and what I'm going to be talking about --
14 when we learned that this hearing was going to be
15 held, this roundtable was going to be held, I and
16 a bunch of other staff at Duke went kind of into
17 scramble mode and just the most important thing I
18 can do, probably, today is to indicate that we do
19 have a website. If you do a search on Google for
20 Section 27 + Duke, it will take you to there as
21 the first click, and there's a written statement
22 that's much longer than I'm going to go into in my

1 oral remarks, blessed to you, and also a bunch of
2 background documents that are available and
3 downloadable. And that's probably the most
4 important thing that I can do today.

5 Second thing is to alert you to some
6 other activities that are not yet out. There is
7 an effort underway to actually look at the degree
8 to which patent claims might get in the way of
9 whole genome sequencing. This is a hot question
10 that's looming over the debate right now, and
11 we're actually going to try to do some empirical
12 analysis of whether that's true, because there's a
13 lot of debate about the degree to which it's true
14 and even whether it's true. So, we're doing that
15 as an empirical thing and there are a couple of
16 other articles that are underway that are
17 mentioned in our written statement.

18 But now turning to substance, a couple
19 of points. I'm going to do two things. Basically
20 I'm going to focus on two points of policymaking
21 where there might be an opening for some progress
22 -- not necessarily statutory, but I'll go into

1 that in a minute -- those are research use and
2 diagnostic use.

3 The policy options that are on the
4 table, of course, were elaborated in the
5 Secretary's Advisory Committee report that came
6 out in April of 2010. That analysis has already
7 been done, those recommendations are
8 controversial, but they do address creating safe
9 harbors or research exemptions or diagnostic use
10 exemptions under the statute that would address
11 those two domains of use.

12 And if those two domains of use had been
13 dealt with in policy terms, in fact, a lot of the
14 controversy would disappear. Now, of course, the
15 argument that you just heard from Hathaway is, so
16 does the incentive value of patents, and that's
17 the debate that we find ourselves in.

18 And I think a couple of things to say
19 about policy options short of trying to create a
20 statutory exemption, two things about the writing,
21 I'm really glad that I don't have to write the
22 report that you guys are trying to write because I

1 don't know what I would say that would command
2 consensus. I'm not sure that it exists, so better
3 you than me.

4 I do despair that any of the policy
5 options listed in the Secretary's Advisory
6 Committee report have enough consensus behind them
7 to be turned into statutory language. So, is
8 there anything we can do short of that? And I
9 think there is and I think there are points of
10 intervention at two levels that are quite
11 possible, one is at the level of individual
12 companies. If individual companies have stated
13 explicit policies about verification use or
14 research use and people can act on those policies,
15 then that solves the problem one company at a
16 time.

17 Now, the problem for trying to solve it
18 at that level is each company then has to interact
19 with competitors and they have business interests.
20 That's not going to solve all the problems.

21 Are there collective options? Yes,
22 there are. We could establish collective norms

1 and practices that set this is how we should do it
2 as an industry, and when you deviate from that you
3 need to answer for it. It's weak accountability.
4 The enforcement mechanism is shaming mechanisms.
5 But they work sometimes. And the very process of
6 pulling the stakeholders together around a table
7 can sometimes make progress when people realize,
8 oh, my gosh, yes, you do have some interests here
9 that I wasn't thinking about.

10 So, I think there is some possibility
11 for collective action. I think the missing
12 element on both verification testing and research
13 use has been the lack of a process for trying to
14 see if there's some common ground. Maybe there
15 isn't, but maybe there is. And if there is, there
16 are ways to get there. I don't think necessarily
17 USPTO and this study is the way to get there
18 directly, but this study could be a way of
19 pointing the way to invoking something like a
20 National Academy study. This is what they do,
21 pull stakeholders around a table and say, can we
22 find common ground, can we find consensus, can we

1 establish some norms and practices.

2 I'm going to now shift gears and make an
3 observation about the verification part of your
4 task, very specifically, because in my reading of
5 the literature that's been surrounding this
6 Section 27 study, I think there's been a tendency
7 to narrow the question too much.

8 There are at least three levels of what
9 has to happen in the real world of testing in
10 order to do verification or second opinion or
11 whatever. One is, have you got the diagnostic
12 test right? Have you accurately assessed the
13 mutation or lack of a mutation in a particular
14 sample? That's actually the easiest problem to
15 solve and almost all of the discussion has focused
16 on that.

17 There are issues there and you'll see
18 two examples of where patent rights have
19 interacted with and people have asserted that
20 because of patents even that verification process
21 has not completely worked itself out. One example
22 was from a diagnostic where a -- the way the lab,

1 Athena Diagnostics, was doing a particular test,
2 happened to land right on top of a mutation so
3 they didn't know that they were missing it. And
4 this can happen. And no matter which protocol
5 you're using, you're going to make errors if
6 you're doing genetic testing.

7 So, it required other labs to say, hey,
8 we've done this test, we got a different result,
9 we found a mutation that you missed, going back to
10 Athena. Athena then realized what was going on.
11 And then the other one that's very famous that
12 everybody in this room knows about was the 2006
13 controversy over rearrangement testing for BRCA.
14 Myriad was aware of that, was already developing a
15 test, but nonetheless, it's clear that nobody does
16 a perfect test.

17 But that's the easy part. There are two
18 other layers of verification where we haven't had
19 very much discussion at all and where the patents
20 are still mattering a lot. One is, and I'm going
21 to give you an example of a case that came to our
22 attention, this is a woman who was tested for a

1 BRCA mutation. She was tested at Myriad and was
2 given the diagnostic that, yes, you have a
3 high-risk deleterious mutation.

4 This was in 2008, the testing was done.
5 In 2009, she got both breasts and both ovaries
6 removed. Six months later she got a letter -- her
7 physician got a letter from Myriad saying, oh,
8 we've reclassified your mutation from deleterious
9 to unknown significance. Now, that's really good
10 that that notification went out. She had already
11 made her fateful choice. We were contacted about
12 a year and a half later by her lawyer saying, what
13 should we do, who should we go to, and here's
14 where the verification and the complex interaction
15 between the intellectual property and the system
16 of interpreting a particular result -- there is no
17 disagreement about the mutation. This has been
18 tested multiple times. Everybody agrees, this is
19 the mutation that is there.

20 But what we have is the lab that has
21 done a million tests, has reclassified from
22 high-risk to intermediate-risk, but all of the

1 public documents -- and I went to those data bases
2 and I fanned out through our network of people,
3 they looked at the databases, everything says this
4 is a deleterious mutation in the public
5 literature. Myriad's saying it isn't. And, look,
6 Myriad has probably hit this mutation 50 or 60
7 times since 2004, the period when they stopped
8 sharing data with the Breast Cancer Information
9 Corps.

10 So, where are we in the real world? We
11 have a bunch of labs who have actually gone ahead
12 and done testing. They know they are incurring
13 risk of infringement liability, which is why I'm
14 not mentioning their names, and it's why we do all
15 of our research under a certificate of
16 confidentiality, so they can contact us freely,
17 and if somebody subpoenas us, we show them the
18 certificate and we presumably quash the subpoena.

19 So, we know that testing went on.
20 There's no disagreement about mutation, but we
21 actually do not have the data in the public
22 databases to be able to interpret this. It's

1 quite possible that Myriad is right. It's also
2 quite possible that it's a deleterious mutation.
3 How do we solve that problem? We solve that
4 problem by sharing data. Why can't we share those
5 data? Because the labs that did the testing and
6 the clinicians who know about that stuff can't
7 possibly notify Myriad because they would then be
8 laying down the trail for infringement liability
9 absent an explicit policy that we won't do that.

10 So, there's a solution there, I actually
11 think there is a solution there, where the parties
12 can get together and say, here, here's a rule set
13 that allows us to share data when we need to share
14 data at the clinical level.

15 There is a third level of verification
16 that can sometimes, not always, be needed, and
17 that's when you have a mutation like this what you
18 can do is you take the mutation, you either put it
19 into model animals or fish or yeast or whatever,
20 or you put it into knock out -- you knock out the
21 BRCA gene and you put that mutation in and see if
22 the function is rescued, which tells you it's not

1 a deleterious mutation. Now, that costs \$3,000,
2 takes six months, nobody does that in all the
3 model organisms, you don't know which organism's
4 going to work. You need a network of scientists
5 who are going to do that kind of work. They are
6 all doing work that under U.S. Law, not
7 necessarily European law, but under U.S. law,
8 infringes patent rights.

9 That's a research use that's quite clear
10 and it's in everybody's best interest, including
11 the patent holders, to have a system that allows
12 that kind of information to be shared.

13 So, let me finish by saying, what are
14 the action items? One is, I actually -- I think
15 it's great that Congress is interested, but I
16 think the main reason that I think it's great that
17 Congress is interested is because of the power of
18 oversight and holding the USPTO's feet to the
19 fire. We've heard from NIH, from NIST and from
20 USPTO that you all are already engaged in this.
21 And, look, we've had controversies over ESTs, over
22 utility and written description examination

1 guidelines, now verification testing. There have
2 been controversies dating back 20 years. Hey,
3 guys, this is going to happen over and over again.
4 Let's have a system for thinking about that.

5 Executive Branch can do something to
6 interact with the Legislative Branch and the
7 Judicial Branch. You also had to do a process of
8 deciding whether the Solicitor General was going
9 to weigh in on AMP v. Myriad. That was not a
10 love-fest. It didn't reach consensus, but it did
11 reach a decision.

12 So, this is a domain where there's going
13 to be activity going on for the foreseeable
14 future. Maybe systematize that.

15 And at the level of concrete actions, I
16 think it would be really nice for Congress to
17 mandate a process for trying to move forward on
18 verification testing and research use, the places
19 where I think there is some promise for actual
20 things to happen in the real world that wouldn't
21 be statutory, wouldn't be inflexible, but would
22 involve all the stakeholders having to get

1 together and setting up norms that can then be
2 used as soft enforcement of practices.

3 So, thank you.

4 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr.
5 Cook-Deegan. Our next participant is Debra
6 Leonard on behalf of the College of American
7 Pathologists.

8 DR. LEONARD: Good afternoon. I'm a
9 board certified and practicing molecular genetic
10 pathologist and currently vice-chair for
11 laboratory medicine in the Department of Pathology
12 at Weill Cornell Medical College. I am here today
13 representing the College of American Pathologists,
14 or CAP, the nation's largest association of board
15 certified pathologist physicians.

16 The CAP is the world's largest
17 association composed exclusively of board
18 certified pathologist physicians and is the
19 worldwide leader in laboratory quality assurance.
20 The mission of the College is to represent the
21 interests of patients, the public, and
22 pathologists, by fostering excellence in the

1 practice of pathology and laboratory medicine
2 worldwide.

3 Pathologists play an integral role in
4 healthcare as physicians who obtain and interpret
5 test results from assessments of tissues, blood,
6 and other human specimens for patient care.
7 Pathologists and the College have a keen interest
8 in ensuring that gene patents that claim gene
9 sequences and not testing methods, do not restrict
10 the ability of physicians to provide high-quality
11 genetic testing services for their patients.

12 Most discoveries of human or pathogen
13 genes related to disease can be effectively
14 translated into gene-based clinical tests without
15 the incentives provided by patents, but instead
16 driven by the goal of providing the best care for
17 patients.

18 Gene patents pose a serious threat to
19 medical advancement, medical education, and
20 patient care. Gene patents, unlike patents on
21 clinical testing methods, claim the very analyte,
22 which is the target of a clinical genetic test.

1 Gene patents cannot be invented around,
2 as Ms. Russell suggested, because use of the
3 claimed and protected gene sequences is required
4 for any genetic testing method, limiting a
5 pathologist's ability to perform testing for the
6 gene or the related disease.

7 Therefore, a gene patent, when
8 exclusively enforced or licensed, does not produce
9 the desired effect of promoting innovation and
10 broad availability of testing. As a consequence,
11 patient access to care is limited to one or a few
12 laboratories, the quality of patient care is
13 jeopardized by limiting inter-laboratory
14 proficiency testing comparisons, broad clinical
15 observations correlating test results with disease
16 characteristics are compromised and new
17 discoveries of limited, and training of healthcare
18 providers across the United States is restricted.

19 The research, development, and practice
20 of genetic testing in academic and other medical
21 centers is essential to assure the high quality of
22 personalized healthcare, the continued improvement

1 of medical care, and the training of physicians
2 and other healthcare professionals.

3 The College believes patients should be
4 empowered and able to obtain information about
5 pathology results, including second opinions on
6 genetic or other clinical tests and
7 interpretations. Exclusive or restrictive patent
8 enforcement or license agreements on
9 disease-related gene sequences, have prevented
10 broad and local performance of genetic tests.
11 Patients suffer because genetic tests limited by
12 patent or exclusive license enforcement are less
13 affordable and accessible as reported by the
14 Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics,
15 Health, and Society in their April 2010 report
16 entitled "Gene Patents and Licensing Practices,
17 and Patient Access to Genetic Tests".

18 Unlike most independent second opinions
19 for diagnostic tests that are rendered today,
20 patients would have a difficult time obtaining an
21 independent second opinion on a genetic test
22 protected by a gene patent even if the law is

1 changed to allow second opinion testing. No
2 laboratory can routinely develop and perform a
3 genetic test solely for confirmatory testing
4 purposes because the test volume would be too low
5 to maintain test performance proficiency and
6 quality and would be very costly.

7 The quality of clinical laboratory
8 testing depends on the ability of laboratories to
9 replicate each other's measurements and
10 interpretations on a national basis, formally,
11 through proficiency testing and accreditation
12 programs, such as available through the College,
13 and informally for individual patients through
14 second opinions.

15 The quality of clinical laboratory
16 testing also depends on maintaining the competency
17 of the technical staff to perform a test and the
18 pathologist's ability to properly interpret test
19 results, which is difficult to maintain with a
20 very low volume of testing.

21 In addition, as Bob Cook-Deegan pointed
22 out, databases of observed mutations are essential

1 for proper interpretation of genetic results, but
2 patent protected proprietary databases are not
3 available for the second opinion test, making
4 proper interpretation difficult, at best, or just
5 wrong, at worst.

6 Finally, the cost of only performing the
7 limited second opinion testing would be very high
8 because pathologists and laboratories spend
9 significant time and resources to develop and
10 validate genetic tests, FDA approved or laboratory
11 developed, which would not be warranted for the
12 low volume of a second opinion test requests.
13 Therefore, second opinion genetic testing will not
14 be provided by clinical laboratories if routine
15 primary testing also is not possible because of
16 gene patents.

17 The trend of using patents to monopolize
18 genetic testing services is a radical departure
19 from historical precedent in pathology practice
20 and works against the goal of making genetic tests
21 widely accessible and affordable for the public.
22 Especially troubling is the fact that under patent

1 protection, knowledge about the utility of a
2 genetic test, as well as the underlying disease
3 mechanisms driven by gene variations, also becomes
4 proprietary thereby imposing a profound change in
5 how the medical profession and the public acquire
6 knowledge about this rapidly evolving area of
7 genetic testing, the diseases diagnosed by these
8 tests, and their clinical usefulness.

9 Beginning to sum up, the College
10 believes that gene patents pose a serious threat
11 to medical advancement, medical education, the
12 quality of genetic testing services, and patient
13 care. Peer-reviewed evidence is the basis for
14 information that pathologists use to render
15 primary diagnoses as well as second opinions.

16 Patent restrictions on the broad
17 practice of genetic testing limit the generation
18 of medically important, peer- reviewed evidence,
19 which will diminish the quality of medical care.

20 To restrict a patient's ability to
21 evaluate and understand their own genetic makeup
22 is the ultimate de- personalization of medicine.

1 The CAP has had a policy opposing gene
2 patents for over a decade. In response to the
3 request for recommendations, the College has
4 advocated in the past for extension to pathologist
5 physicians the protection provided to
6 non-pathologist physicians by the Frist Ganske
7 Amendment, 35 USC, Section 287, which basically
8 protects non-pathologist physicians from patent
9 infringement lawsuits for use of patented medical
10 information.

11 Extension of Ganske Frist to
12 pathologists would ensure that genetic testing
13 services, which are part of medical practice, can
14 be performed for the benefit of patient care,
15 medical training, and medical research without
16 fear of patent or exclusive license enforcement.

17 The CAP encourages consideration of this
18 protection option to allow broad access and
19 affordability of genetic testing, both for primary
20 diagnosis and for confirmatory purposes. Thank
21 you for allowing the College to make comments
22 today.

1 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Leonard.
2 Our next participant is Charis Eng on behalf of
3 the Cleveland Clinic Genomic Medicine Institute.
4 And I believe that Charis has joined us on the
5 telephone.

6 DR. ENG: Hi. Good afternoon. Thanks
7 for inviting me. So, I'm Charis Eng and I'm
8 chairwoman of the Cleveland Clinic Genomic
9 Medicine Institute and also its clinical
10 component, the Center for Personalized Genetic
11 Healthcare. As well, I am the vice-chair of the
12 Department of Genetics and Genome Sciences at Case
13 Western Reserve University. I am formally trained
14 in clinical cancer genetics.

15 So, I represent the clinical viewpoint
16 today and you might not hear the word patent apart
17 from what I just said.

18 To me, what is most important thing
19 about genetic testing is, in fact, who has the
20 proprietary oversight for ordering tests, and I
21 believe -- I joined you rather late, just a few
22 minutes ago, where you have rightly, because of

1 your represented expertise, focused on the testing
2 and patent -- I said it once again -- and how it
3 affects patient care and research in that setting.

4 So, I'm going to focus on the oversight
5 and I would like to posit, and I know my clinical
6 colleagues would agree that the oversight should
7 be by individuals who understand the evidence
8 base, as mentioned by two previous speakers, and
9 the clinical genetics as well as the nuances of
10 genes and mutations, and these are genetics
11 professionals in the broader sense. They could be
12 MD geneticists, and they definitely should be
13 genetic counselors. I'll just give you an
14 example. So, before 2010, our institution, we
15 have a very -- comprehensive from prenatal to old
16 age, but our institution did not restrict testing
17 (inaudible) what institution did, and in a medical
18 operations research we found that non-genetics
19 professionals who are ordering tests willy-nilly,
20 the wrong diagnosis was made, therefore the wrong
21 test was ordered, and a mutation negative did not
22 serve the patient well. Huge panels from Athena

1 were checked off wasting lots of money and getting
2 the wrong diagnosis whereupon patients finally
3 wound up, after a couple years, in genetics.

4 This was not uncommon. This is why
5 healthcare money is being wasted.

6 After that came in the Cleveland Clinic,
7 had a pilot of restricting certain tests, so, a
8 cadre of testing was chosen and because we use an
9 electronic medical record, it was quite easy to
10 block the testing with the alert that says, please
11 refer your patients to genetics and genetic
12 counseling.

13 And in the short period, about a year
14 and a bit, almost two, of this pilot, we found
15 that, of course, the patients are better served,
16 the right diagnoses were made very quickly, and
17 healthcare dollars were saved.

18 Now, I'll move on a little bit to what I
19 also heard briefly two speakers ago about
20 interpretation and I have to say that
21 interpretation based on evidence is of the utmost
22 importance, and with the interpretation again

1 comes the plug that geneticists and genetic
2 counselors are here to help the patient and in
3 fact (inaudible) doctors interpret the test.

4 We also heard about do we need second
5 opinions clinically and does research need to be
6 done, and I think the answer is, yes and yes. We
7 do, in fact, today -- I am in clinic today and
8 before clinic we always have family review. And
9 in our family review alone today, we had three
10 cases where we questioned whether the -- there was
11 an administrative error. So, in one case there
12 were two different mutations in the family. Well,
13 that could happen, one wonders, and so this is
14 when one would want a rerun. Sometimes it's at
15 the same lab, and because it's an administrative
16 error, but because of (inaudible), for example,
17 the PCR primer on a mutation, that's one example,
18 or certain companies like Emery, who only use one
19 method for the (inaudible) analysis, MLPA, where
20 the single company MRC Holland changes their
21 probes without telling anyone is not very good, so
22 in that situation you would want to go to a

1 different company who would at least run a second
2 test to validate the results obtained by the
3 single test from a company that continues to keep
4 changing probes without telling anybody.

5 So, finally, I was also asked whether
6 there are concerns of false positives and
7 negatives, and I think what I mentioned covers
8 that, unless you have specific questions, and
9 insurance reimbursement, I will also comment a
10 bit. These days, many insurance companies, third
11 party payers, do cover for the gene testing, but
12 many do not cover for genetic counseling, which
13 actually has a CPT code, 96040, which is new since
14 2007.

15 Without referring -- without covering
16 for genetic counselors, many non-genetic
17 professionals feel it's their duty to just perform
18 the gene test requested by the patient, whether
19 rightly or wrongly, and most common is BRCA1 and 2,
20 because a patient had breast cancer. I will tell
21 you that there are 10 high (inaudible) genes
22 predisposing to breast cancer, and so I would

1 posit that proper insurance coverage for the CPT
2 96040 code or similar genetic counseling code
3 would right the wrong of ordering the right test
4 or ordering any genetic testing at all for our
5 patients.

6 Thank you.

7 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Eng. Our
8 next participant is Bruce Quinn for the Coalition
9 for 21st Century Medicine.

10 DR. QUINN: Thank you. My name is Bruce
11 Quinn and I'm here on behalf of the Coalition for
12 21st Century Medicine, which is a client of the
13 firm I work for, Foley Hoag. My goal is to
14 discuss typical insurer policies on second opinion
15 testing using the general published rules of the
16 Medicare program as an example.

17 The U.S. healthcare system is in a
18 fairly rapid state of transition with new
19 entities, new contractual arrangements between
20 doctors, between doctors and hospitals, between
21 providers and insurance plans, but my presentation
22 will focus on the basic published rules of the

1 traditional Medicare program, which is complicated
2 enough.

3 I had the chance to review documentation
4 on the PTO website from the February and March
5 meetings last year. Section 27 of the Act
6 provides four questions for the PTO to answer, and
7 the 2012 agenda included a much more complex set
8 of 14 questions, some with multiple parts.

9 Speaking as a professional
10 writer/thinker/consultant, I would have found it
11 very hard to organize all the data in the 14
12 questions into one report.

13 The agenda for today's meeting returns
14 to the original four Section 27 questions, and my
15 contribution fits within those boundaries.

16 Public statements last year which
17 addressed insurance policies include Hans Sawyer
18 of Bio, Kevin Noonan, and others. Prometheus
19 Labs, a member of our coalition, presented data
20 last year that it's apparent incidents of repeat
21 measurements for genetic tests were 0.2 to 0.3
22 percent.

1 By way of background, I'm an MD PhD, I'm
2 a board certified pathologist, and I was on the
3 full time faculties of NYU and Northwestern in my
4 first career. Since 2001, I've worked as a
5 physician executive at a global consulting firm in
6 biotechnology, as a regional Medicare medical
7 examiner, and now as a policy expert inside of a
8 law firm, Foley Hoag. I'm not an attorney.

9 Therefore, I have nine years, or about
10 18,000 hours of full time experience with Medicare
11 policies, which you can now benefit from.

12 Medicare's published policies generally
13 do not provide coverage for repeat testing of
14 diagnostic tests. As some commenters stated last
15 year and even today, health insurance
16 distinguishes between a second opinion of a
17 physician and a repeated test.

18 So let me give you some background and
19 I'll provide citations. I'm also going to provide
20 a written transcript within a short time.

21 Medicare is a defined benefit health
22 plan and many of the benefits are very broad, like

1 hospital care or physician care or ambulance
2 transport. One category is called X-rays and
3 other diagnostic tests, Social Security Act 1883
4 S3. This category for X-rays and other diagnostic
5 tests is 50 years old, but it's broad enough to
6 include genetic tests.

7 The tests must be reasonable and
8 necessary to diagnose disease, so historically
9 screening tests like pap smears or mammography in
10 healthy people were excluded from Medicare unless
11 Congress specifically provided for such a test, as
12 it did.

13 Now, Medicare has a benefit policy
14 manual, which, in Chapter 15, Section 30,
15 Paragraph D, says that you allow second opinions
16 before major surgeries or procedures. Second
17 opinions are defined as a second opinion of a
18 physician. They even go on to say if those two
19 opinions diverge, you can get a third opinion as a
20 tiebreaker, and that's the A-to-Z of the second
21 opinion of a physician.

22 All diagnostic tests fall under

1 Regulation 42 CFR 410.32 stating that each
2 diagnostic test must be ordered by a treating
3 physician and used in patient care. That doesn't
4 necessarily allow or exclude that second test, but
5 other policies do.

6 Medicare also has a published policy
7 manual about the way it pays for clinical
8 chemistry and other lab tests. This is found in
9 the correct coding section of the Medicare
10 website. Here you get to Chapter 10 of the
11 National Correct Coding Initiative Policy Manual
12 for Medicare Services, where it states in several
13 different places that Medicare can only pay once
14 for a given analyte.

15 For example, it says, "Even if an
16 analyte can be measured by two different methods,
17 it will pay for only one of them." Verbatim it
18 says, in several places, here's one, "Medicare
19 does not pay for duplicate testing. Multiple
20 tests on the same analyte marker or infectious
21 agents cannot be reported separately. For
22 example, it would not be appropriate to report

1 both a direct probe and an amplified probe for the
2 same agent."

3 There is an exception for measuring the
4 same analyte in two materially different tissues,
5 so you could have skin cancer on the left arm and
6 skin cancer on the right arm and you might test
7 both of them for something, but that would not
8 apply to hereditary tests.

9 Then the correct coding website has
10 something called MUE Edits, MUE. These are
11 called, at various times, medically unbelievable
12 or medically unlikely edits, and they block
13 payment for a second test under the same CPT code.
14 HIPAA law requires that providers communicate with
15 insurers using a uniform national code set, that's
16 been referred to today, called CPT codes, and
17 Medicare national policy blocks those germline
18 genetic codes from being paid more than once.

19 Another policy, called the data service
20 rule, 42 CFR 414.510, sets the date of service as
21 the date of specimen collection, so even if three
22 labs ran the same test on day five then day ten

1 then day fifteen, Medicare would review it as
2 being the same -- performed on the same day
3 administratively.

4 So, in short, this Medicare policy says
5 that ordering the same genetic test twice is
6 "medically unbelievable" so it's not payable.

7 One final barrier, and some of your
8 speakers last year referred to this -- I'm, I
9 guess, providing footnotes to what they said --
10 one final barrier would a typical statement in
11 insurance policies such as Medicare, Noridian
12 Policy L24308 "a specific genetic test may only be
13 performed once in the lifetime per beneficiary for
14 inherited conditions."

15 You've heard that verbally, that's a
16 quote from insurance.

17 Similarly, the largest U.S. private
18 payer, AETNA, has a genetic testing policy, policy
19 01040, that states, "Genetic testing for inherited
20 disease need only be conducted once per lifetime
21 of the member." I found similar language in the
22 insurer WellCare, Capital, BlueCross, BlueCross

1 Alabama, Humana, and so on, and this was also
2 stated in a 1997 NIH report on genetic testing,
3 they're only performed once in the lifetime of a
4 beneficiary.

5 So, these citations support statements
6 made last year that in general insurance companies
7 state that they will cover germline genetic tests
8 only once in their published policies on paper or
9 on the web.

10 So, those were my prepared statements.
11 I had a short comment based on some of the
12 discussions of judging beforehand when licenses
13 should be exclusive for commercial practical
14 reasons. Working as a policy consultant part-time
15 in the diagnostics industry, there are some very
16 severe incentive gaps that can occur in developing
17 diagnostic tests. Insurers frequently complain
18 about the lack of enough evidence for diagnostic
19 tests. There are now well over 100 codes for
20 genetic tests, many of them generic genes, and I
21 heard a Medicare medical director said we wouldn't
22 pay for 90 percent of these because there's not

1 enough evidence.

2 So, that's a significant issue, getting
3 enough evidence to be paid for.

4 I've written on this publicly in book
5 chapters and some peer reviewed publications, and
6 excellent papers by Richard Frank in "Journal of
7 the American College of Radiology" 8:124 in 2011,
8 and a paper a month ago in January by Eric
9 Faulkner for the International Society for
10 Pharmaco-Economics and Outcome Research in Value &
11 Health, 15:1162 in 2012.

12 So, imagine a generic drug and generic
13 genes that are regulated with metabolism. There's
14 potentially huge value in knowing more about how
15 to give generic drugs better, having more data on
16 how to use the generic metabolic genes, and yet
17 it's extremely difficult to have that data.

18 I've been on calls with investors and
19 talked at board meetings of companies that are
20 trying to do this, and it is very, very difficult.
21 That would be an example where you have no FDA
22 protection, no patent protection, no obvious other

1 IP protection, and it's very hard to dig your
2 spade in the ground and put in \$50 million and do
3 it.

4 I'll give you another example from a
5 different area just to be sure we've made the
6 point clear. Another diagnostic test would be PET
7 scans. There are three -- basically three brands
8 of PET scanners, Siemens, Phillips, and GE. Any
9 one of those companies could spend \$100 million
10 showing how accurate its PET scanner was in breast
11 cancer, but once they'd invested that and
12 published it, everybody would know that all the
13 PET scanners would be exactly that accurate in
14 breast cancer, because they all have the same
15 performance characteristics.

16 So, it's an example, it's a little bit
17 -- it's a valley of death problem. It's not so
18 much the free rider problem after the fact, but
19 the fact that you foresee that ex ante, as
20 economists would know.

21 The other thing is, as alluded to it, is
22 whether you're a sole company or a multi-source

1 test, it's hard to work on a national basis with
2 insurers. There's one Medicare program, but there
3 are dozens of sub-plans called Medicare Advantage
4 Plans that are about 25 percent of patients.
5 There are 50 Medicaid programs and in many states
6 there are several HMOs inside of the Medicaid
7 program that process their own claims.

8 BlueCross has 38 different plans, each
9 of which processes lab claims separately now,
10 that's been a new barrier to entry, and then there
11 are dozens of large and small private insurers, so
12 you literally potentially could get claims in from
13 whether you're one big lab or whether you're St.
14 Mary's Hospital in Evanston, you could potentially
15 get claims in from hundreds of different insurers
16 with their own policies, their own barriers to
17 payment, and so on.

18 So, if you're looking administratively
19 at what the potential barriers are, I think it
20 would be easy to underestimate them without
21 working in the industry. Thank you.

22 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Quinn. Our

1 next participant is Beth Peshkin from the National
2 Society of Genetic Counselors.

3 MS. PESHKIN: Thank you very much for
4 the opportunity to speak with you today. I am a
5 board certified genetic counselor at Georgetown
6 Lombardi Comprehensive Cancer Center and the
7 Fisher Center for Familial Cancer Research.

8 Today, I am also privileged to represent
9 the National Society of Genetic Counselors, NSGC,
10 an organization consisting of over 2,700
11 professionals who are committed to integrating
12 genetics and genomics to improve health for all
13 individuals.

14 The timing of this roundtable is apropos
15 as our nation examines our healthcare goals and
16 strategies for the future. Without question, a
17 key feature of the Affordable Care Act is access
18 to healthcare, which is also a central theme in
19 the dissemination of genetic medicine.

20 As the roundtable participants consider
21 the current landscape of genetic testing, how it
22 has been impacted by patents, and how it may be

1 leveraged to improve the health and well-being of
2 individuals, I want to take a moment to underscore
3 that it is genetic counselors who have been in the
4 trenches for decades helping people to understand
5 and adapt both medically and psychologically to,
6 first, the risk of disease or diagnosis of a
7 genetic condition, two, the need to make informed
8 decisions about managing disease risks, and three,
9 the challenges of navigating and assessing
10 resources for clinical, research, community, and
11 support services.

12 Genetic tests are clinically available
13 for over 2,500 diseases. Within my area of
14 expertise, hereditary breast and ovarian cancer,
15 genetic testing for mutations in the two most
16 commonly implicated genes, BRCA 1 and 2, it's
17 probably the most frequently ordered test for an
18 adult onset condition. In fact, a recent paper
19 estimated that there are about 940,000 BRCA 1 or
20 BRCA 2 mutation carriers in the United States and
21 that only about 5 percent have been identified to
22 date.

1 Even in this small 5 percent cohort we
2 have witnessed in ways we could have never
3 imagined how the granting and enforcement of
4 patents for these two genes by Myriad Genetic
5 Laboratories, have impeded access to these
6 lifesaving tests.

7 What we have learned is that patents,
8 when enforced to the letter of the law, can result
9 in genetic tests that are cost prohibitive and
10 incomplete. Patients can become unwitting donors
11 of DNA and data to proprietary bio banks and a
12 continuum of research from basic science to
13 translational medicine can be stalled. Thus,
14 these pitfalls have hampered, and in some cases,
15 compromised, the delivery of high quality medical
16 care.

17 However, the days of single gene testing
18 are numbered. As the cost of analyzing dozens of
19 genes simultaneously and eventually all of our
20 genes at once with whole genome sequencing becomes
21 more affordable, we are standing on the cusp of a
22 major paradigm shift in medicine.

1 The scientific community is immersed in
2 complexities and conundrums related to how to
3 interpret and disclose the vast amounts of
4 information that will be forthcoming from whole
5 genome testing, what bio-informatics tools will be
6 needed to analyze these data, and how to store and
7 transmit the information.

8 In my field, the essence of our work is
9 to tackle these new challenges by building on our
10 past experiences. Make no mistake about it,
11 although much attention has been paid to consumer
12 genomics, the so-called spit and click model where
13 individuals obtain genetic test results from their
14 saliva samples over the Internet, genetic
15 counselors will be at the forefront of determining
16 appropriate test ordering, preparing clinicians to
17 assimilate genomic information, and in translating
18 results to consumers.

19 What is at stake with genetic testing?
20 To name just a few possibilities, the life of a
21 fetus, the health of a newborn baby, the avoidance
22 of devastating side effects from a drug in an

1 adolescent cancer patient, the decision of a
2 healthy woman to remove her breasts, the well
3 being of a young man at risk for a fatal
4 neurologic disease. The incentives for obtaining
5 correct and complete genetic information are
6 innumerable, but in order for the benefits of
7 genetic information to be realized, access to
8 genetic testing is critical.

9 Individuals must be able to have options
10 for affordable, state-of-the-art testing and have
11 confidence that the potentially life altering
12 decisions they make based on that information is
13 accurate and complete. Patenting creates a
14 barrier to access that should not exist.

15 With a bright future for genomic
16 medicine on the horizon, fears about the slippery
17 slope of gene patenting have led NSGC to take the
18 position that nucleic acid sequences should not be
19 patented and do not meet the novelty criterion for
20 patenting. This stance is, in essence, the basis
21 for the federal court's 2010 ruling under Judge
22 Sweet, in which the patents for BRCA 1 and 2 were

1 invalidated.

2 As you know, a final ruling about this
3 issue has not been made yet. However, within the
4 current system there is still an opportunity to
5 learn from our experiences with BRCA patenting to
6 improve access to research and clinical care to
7 patients.

8 I encourage the USPTO to encourage what
9 20/20 hindsight has taught us and to move forward
10 as we brace for new challenges in the delivery of
11 genomic medicine. We now have the unprecedented
12 opportunity to avoid these barriers as we prepare
13 to implement the next generation of genetic
14 testing.

15 Today I will share four goals that can
16 guide policy around gene patenting as next
17 generation genetic testing becomes today's
18 reality.

19 First, individuals who pursue genetic
20 tests should have access to the most comprehensive
21 testing possible. Would anybody find it
22 acceptable for a doctor to look at only 90 percent

1 of breast tissue on a mammogram because 10 percent
2 of tissue was patented and couldn't legally be
3 examined? It sounds absurd, but in fact for many
4 years, the comprehensive testing that Myriad
5 performed on the BRCA genes was comprehensive in
6 name only. Entire sections of the genes were not
7 analyzed, but tested individuals could not get a
8 second opinion, could not get their DNA analyzed
9 by a different lab using a different method to
10 possibly detect a mutation.

11 Invariably, individuals with mutations
12 were missed, cancers often ensued, women who would
13 have pursued life saving measures to reduce their
14 risk of breast and ovarian cancer were denied the
15 tools they needed to make informed decisions. And
16 like we always say about genetics, it's not just
17 about the individual, it's about the family.

18 Unlike other medical errors, missing a
19 critical mutation in a patient can affect the
20 health of several other relatives and several
21 generations.

22 When whole genome sequencing becomes

1 widely available, will we have to discard the term
2 as a misnomer because certain sequences are off
3 limits due to the fact that they are patented?
4 Rather than undergo a single test using genomic
5 sequencing through one laboratory, will consumers
6 have to undergo multiple tests through multiple
7 testing companies which will be expensive in terms
8 of both time and money, resulting in increased
9 healthcare costs?

10 If we have learned our lesson, the
11 answer to these questions will be no.

12 Second, financial barriers associated
13 with genetic testing need to be dismantled. The
14 most important way to do this is to open up the
15 market to competition. Put simply, exclusive
16 licenses on genetic tests need to be prohibited.

17 Cost concerns extend to the clinic most
18 often manifesting as patient refusal to undergo
19 potentially lifesaving testing when insurance
20 coverage is not available. This means entire
21 segments of the population, the uninsured, and the
22 underinsured go without important medical

1 information. A type of monopoly, genetic
2 patenting allows us to continue as the patent
3 holder sets their price and forces the market to
4 comply.

5 In this scenario, serious concerns about
6 access to healthcare arise and merit our full
7 attention.

8 Third, researchers need to be able to
9 perform genetic testing without prohibitive
10 restrictions imposed by patents. Research will
11 further the development of improved methods of
12 mutation analysis and interpretation as well as
13 clinical care, but the playing field has to be
14 level. For clinically valid tests, such as BRCA 1
15 and 2, research participants must be able to have
16 access to their results and to the authoritative
17 interpretation of those results.

18 And, finally, information from genetic
19 testing needs to be in the public domain.

20 Successful interpretation of the thousands of
21 variants identified from whole genome sequencing
22 will depend on pulling data about functional

1 implications of various mutations as well as
2 correlation with clinical outcomes.

3 A grassroots effort is underway to
4 solicit the classification of BRCA 1 and 2
5 mutations from ordering providers, pursuant to
6 Myriad's decision to stop reporting such
7 information to a public database. Will dozens,
8 perhaps hundreds, of mutations, some of which
9 could potentially be disease causing, remain
10 un-interpretable because the data needed to
11 understand their significance are re-posited in a
12 proprietary database held by a patent holder?

13 Again, if we avoid this consequence of
14 patent law, collaborative science will proceed at
15 a rapid and efficient pace.

16 I hope that I have made the case that
17 genetics is a critical part of the future of
18 medicine and genetic testing is obviously its
19 lynchpin. Patenting genes may confer certain
20 benefits to certain segments of society, however
21 the net effect of genetic patenting is to stop the
22 free flow of information. It loosens the lynchpin

1 and it puts progress itself at risk.

2 NSGC looks for a future in which the
3 expertise of all who have labored in the field of
4 genetic discovery will be leveraged and utilized,
5 in which all the possible benefits of genetic
6 medicine can be realized, and will accrue to
7 society as a whole. Gene patenting is a tax on
8 the future of health writ large, and one we, as a
9 society, can ill afford. Thank you very much.

10 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Peshkin.
11 Our next participant before our break is Linda
12 Bruzzone on behalf of Lynch Syndrome
13 International. She's joining us by telephone.
14 Linda, are you there?

15 It does not appear that she has joined
16 us by telephone at this point, so let's take our
17 break and return in 15 minutes. We'll take a
18 15-minute break and in the meantime, we'll work to
19 get Ms. Bruzzone on the telephone. So, please
20 return to your seat in 15 minutes at 3:15 p.m.
21 Thank you.

22 (Recess)

1 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, everyone.
2 Before we took our break, we were looking forward
3 to the testimony from Linda Bruzzone on behalf of
4 the Lynch Syndrome International. She's joining
5 us by telephone. Linda, are you on the telephone?

6 MS. BRUZZONE: Yes, I am.

7 MS. GONGOLA: Very good. Please proceed
8 with your remarks.

9 MS. BRUZZONE: Thank you. I can't begin
10 to tell you how grateful we are to the USPTO for
11 the opportunity of being able to share our
12 experiences. My comments represent experiences
13 with confirmatory tests and insurance policies
14 with genetic testing from the perspective of the
15 end user. I'm here speaking in respect to
16 experiences with Lynch Syndrome International, our
17 interaction with over 4,000 families within an all
18 volunteer, global education and advocacy
19 organization, which also provides support for
20 families at high risk for Lynch Syndrome cancers
21 as well as supports research endeavors.

22 As volunteers, our primary motivation is

1 endometrial, 19 percent gastric tract, 11 percent
2 ovarian, and a higher than average risk for all
3 organs below the belt -- the skin, the brain, the
4 thyroid, as well as sarcomas.

5 Certain subsets of breast cancer have
6 recently been found presenting an approximate
7 fourfold the risk above that of the average woman.
8 It affects primarily the young, can metastasize in
9 two to three years in compared to eight to ten
10 years for sporadic cancers. And our kids have a
11 50 percent risk of contracting the defective gene.

12 Each year we have an accumulated 3
13 percent risk of acquiring another cancer. So, for
14 us, it's not an issue of whether we get cancer,
15 it's more of an issue of when we get cancer, where
16 it occurs, and how early it can be detected.

17 In the U.S. alone, there are 600,000 to
18 a million people projected to have Lynch Syndrome,
19 of which less than 5 percent are currently
20 diagnosed through genetic testing. This is
21 amazing, despite the fact it has been openly
22 available through many different companies for us since

1 1993.

2 Over the past 20 years, multiple patents
3 exist. There is no "ownership" of the testing of
4 the mutation. As a result, our families are not
5 getting diagnosed and are dying. We don't
6 have the luxuries afforded those with hereditary
7 breast cancer of diagnosis, public health
8 assistance, public awareness, legislative
9 intervention, and medical education to help
10 professionals, including gateway diagnostic
11 specialists such as OB/GYNs, gastro docs,
12 pathologists, dermatologists, general and family
13 practitioners, and oncologists.

14 Due to the small base, there's a
15 misconception LS is a "rare disease." Being "rare,"
16 public health departments often don't focus upon
17 it. In fact, one public health official stated it
18 wasn't worth even taking family histories due to
19 the expense. "We have to sacrifice some to save
20 the masses" she said.

21 We have a newsflash. Lynch Syndrome is
22 not rare, but it is severely under diagnosed. We

1 don't get the attention of those with breast
2 cancer, nor the resources or services. We don't
3 get the legislation. Often we feel like the
4 redheaded stepchildren of hereditary cancers who
5 sit in the shadows of those with hereditary breast
6 cancer.

7 In regard to genetic testing, of over
8 4,000 affected individuals with whom we've been in
9 contact, we know of nobody who has requested a
10 second opinion for a positive test. All testing
11 companies run a second blind test to ensure that
12 there is no error when a positive is discovered.

13 However, in the event of a negative
14 test, many companies are willing to confirm a
15 test. However, the consumer needs to be aware,
16 because each testing company is different and it's
17 difficult to determine the capabilities of the
18 company and whether they are lesser or better than
19 the original testing company. None are equal.
20 Each offers different services based upon their
21 capabilities and limitations. Some are better,
22 some are worse, some offer more variants, some

1 offer less, some may not get a valid confirmation.
2 Some don't offer large rearrangements. In our
3 case, for some of the more unusual variants, such
4 as the EPCAM deletion, the use of multiple testing
5 companies is often used as very few companies have
6 the technology to test for it.

7 It complicates matters and increases the
8 cost of diagnosis. Last year we assisted two
9 patients with mutation testing, single mutation
10 testing, choosing a lesser expensive company to
11 perform the test. Unfortunately, they couldn't
12 confirm the variant as it wasn't within their
13 database. They requested thousands of dollars
14 more for full sequencing and we determined, no,
15 we're going to have them test at the original
16 company. One was positive, the other was
17 negative. It was a long, emotional ordeal taking
18 months.

19 Within our scenario, we can envision the
20 cost of genetic testing would possibly double with
21 confirmatory testing due to the existing
22 circumstances and multiple patents and licensees.

1 Our experience with open licensing is,
2 even with competition, the cost of genetic testing
3 has been primarily unaffected without great
4 reductions. The same problems exist for us as for
5 those with hereditary breast cancer. We have to
6 utilize resources for paying co-pays. For those
7 without insurance, we refer individuals to Myriad
8 Laboratories which provides the test at little or
9 no cost if they qualify.

10 Thankfully, both Ambry and Myriad
11 provide a payment plan for those families with an
12 ability to pay and it helps us with our
13 underserved populations.

14 Major changes in technology of genetic
15 testing have occurred. However, this has confused
16 physicians, requiring more services of genetic
17 counselors, as the testing process has become too
18 complicated. Many insurance companies are
19 mandating genetic counseling as a prerequisite to
20 obtaining genetic testing.

21 There are delays from three weeks up to
22 six months in obtaining appointments for some genetic

1 counselors which affects decision making for patients
2 pending surgeries for cancer treatment.
3 Genetic counseling is ordinarily paid for by insurance
4 and fears of discrimination from insurance companies
5 are a major barrier deterring individuals from
6 testing, especially in light of reporting health
7 conditions to a nationwide insurance database,
8 which can also be accessed by the life insurance
9 industry.

10 Advocacy efforts are greatly hampered.
11 The donor base is so small it's difficult to get
12 money and to operate without funding, even for an
13 all-volunteer operation such as ours with low
14 operational cost. We recently learned from
15 experience even the thought of possibly needing
16 confirmatory tests creates confusion, anxiety,
17 uncertainty, and fear for those affected by Lynch
18 Syndrome.

19 Complicated procedures require genetic
20 counseling. We are advocates of genetic

1 counseling. We think that genetic counselors are
2 great, but they don't need to be used in every
3 procedure and in every circumstance. Mandated
4 genetic counseling creates a barrier for
5 individuals, especially men, in addition to
6 additional cost.

7 Genetic counseling should be a choice,
8 not a requirement. It adds a form of
9 discrimination and it has negative connotations,
10 as the only other required counseling most people
11 think about is ordinarily court appointed.

12 Most insurance companies provide
13 coverage of genetic testing. Federal standards
14 for insurance coverage for Social Security,
15 Medicare, Tricare, the VA, and insurances which
16 follow their underwriting guidelines, don't
17 provide for genetic testing for those who do not
18 have a cancer.

19 We see the same problem within most
20 public health departments not providing genetic
21 testing. Many are now just simply providing FIT
22 Tests, which tests for cancer through the feces.

1 Government health organizations don't
2 support genetic testing in the manner they should,
3 and as a result, our families are dying. The
4 majority of funding, legislation, awareness, and
5 resources, have gone into hereditary breast
6 cancer. We haven't been provided the federal
7 legislative protections of those with breast
8 cancer.

9 The recent healthcare act recently
10 defined preventative and diagnostic test cost,
11 increasing the cost for survivors and providers
12 with required co-pays for annual screening tests.
13 And our biggest fear is that a gene therapy or a
14 treatment may be discovered, since we have
15 neither, and without a patent, it won't become
16 available to our families, they may not learn
17 about it, as what is occurring with genetic
18 testing at this time. Our biggest fear is there
19 will be no significant research without a patent
20 as corporations will step back and move into
21 different health areas.

22 With the HCA, we fear there will be

1 reductions in screening tests and accessibilities
2 to genetic testing, as what exists with the
3 federal insurances today.

4 So, we urge the PTO to think very
5 cautiously of the affects upon the public and to
6 focus on only those issues which jeopardize lives.
7 We believe this may create another barrier toward
8 genetic testing and insurers may not cover it due
9 to the increased cost.

10 The state of genetics evolves with rapid
11 technology. Legislation can become antiquated in
12 a day, a week, or a month, with the rapid changes,
13 and what currently occurs with us, will occur with
14 others.

15 The key to survival is to not get
16 oneself into something one can't get out of, and
17 we fear this may happen with this type of
18 legislation, which affects so many different
19 conditions and not simply hereditary cancers. We
20 urge the PTO to explore the views of those with
21 other genetic conditions and exercise caution with
22 all new technology. The government should be

1 prudent in respect to testing for genetic
2 conditions and support it, making certain all
3 interests are represented, not just those of one
4 particular cancer community. And we believe
5 Congress needs to invest in genetic testing, as it
6 is the future.

7 Many of us with Lynch Syndrome wish
8 there had been a patent in place for us. It would
9 have protected us and perhaps protected the lives
10 of our loved ones. Thank you.

11 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Bruzzone.
12 Our next participant is Karen Canady on behalf of
13 the American Intellectual Property Law
14 Association.

15 DR. CANADY: Good afternoon. My name is
16 Karen Canady and I am pleased to be here today as
17 a member of the American Intellectual Property Law
18 Association, or AIPLA.

19 I'm also a patent attorney in private
20 practice in California with my own practice,
21 Canady and Lortz. I have a PhD in neuroscience
22 and I represent clients before the Patent Office.

1 Most of my clients are universities or start up
2 companies so I see firsthand how critical patent
3 protection is to move biomedical technology
4 forward.

5 I'm a past chair of AIPLA's
6 biotechnology committee and I'm currently co-chair
7 of its subcommittee on diagnostic and gene
8 patents. AIPLA appreciates this opportunity to
9 participate in today's roundtable and its
10 membership shares the underlying concern about
11 facilitating development and availability of
12 confirmatory genetic tests.

13 I would like to begin by acknowledging
14 that all of us, regardless of our views on gene
15 patents, we all share the goal of ensuring patient
16 access to genetic tests and we all want to
17 facilitate the development and availability of
18 these tests. While the goal is a shared one, we
19 realize that the opinions differ widely on how
20 best to achieve that goal.

21 We appreciate Congresswoman Wasserman
22 Schultz's willingness to share her decisions from

1 her own personal story that exemplifies the
2 difficulties an individual faces when making
3 crucial medical decisions that depend on a
4 patented genetic test.

5 AIPLA is as concerned as you are and we
6 are willing and eager to work together with you
7 and everyone here to arrive at an effective
8 solution that addresses any need for increased
9 access to confirmatory tests without interfering
10 with the incentives for innovation and
11 commercialization in genetic diagnostic medicine.

12 A substantial amount of study data and
13 anecdotal evidence has already been presented in
14 both oral testimony and written comments, so we're
15 not going to repeat that now, but we refer to the
16 citations and summary and information that's been
17 provided in the written comments that were
18 submitted in March of 2012.

19 The data indicate that, for the most
20 part, patents do not impede scientific research,
21 nor do they harm access to genetic tests. In
22 fact, the promise of a temporary period of

1 exclusivity that patents provide has played a
2 pivotal role in enabling the investment in
3 development and commercialization of new
4 diagnostic tests. More clear from the evidence,
5 gene patents do not block, for example, whole
6 genome sequencing or at least it appears to be the
7 case as more evidence comes in, contrary to what
8 many had previously claimed in public discourse on
9 the topic.

10 AIPLA, however, recognizes and
11 understands the sensitivity and importance of the
12 testimony presenting examples of a few situations
13 in which researchers and pathologists have felt
14 hindered by patents, as well as examples of
15 patients who have been frustrated by a lack of
16 access to confirmatory testing, either in a first
17 instance or for confirmation of initial results.

18 While much of these problems can be
19 attributed to issues that arise independent of the
20 patent system, at least some of the problem
21 appears to arise from misinformation and
22 misconceptions about patents including how the

1 patent system works, what acts constitute
2 infringement, how to analyze the scope of a patent
3 claim, and the difference between patent claims
4 that merely recite DNA sequences and what we
5 really mean when we're talking about gene patents.

6 I think what I'd like to do, though, is
7 instead of going over these problems, let's get
8 right to addressing the question that we've been
9 asked to address, which is, what actions Congress
10 can and should take to increase the availability
11 of confirmatory genetic diagnostic tests while
12 protecting the incentives for innovation and
13 commercialization in genetic diagnostic medicine.

14 After reviewing all the studies and
15 reports on this topic, AIPLA has not found
16 evidence that patents pose a significant problem
17 for access to genetic tests, nor does AIPLA find
18 any practical solutions achieved through changes
19 to the patent rights in such tests.

20 But to the extent that considerations
21 are being given to actions that Congress might
22 take to address these things, I'd like to clarify

1 that it appears there are two types of concerns,
2 one is about research and the ability of research
3 to continue in these areas where there might be
4 patents involved, and the second being, patient
5 access to confirmatory tests.

6 With regard to the first concern, AIPLA
7 is willing to work with others on developing a
8 clarified experimental use exception to patent
9 infringement. Regarding patient access or whether
10 anything needs to be done to ensure access to
11 confirmatory tests, in the written comments that
12 were submitted in March 2012, near the end, there
13 are eight points that we presented that lay out
14 the concerns that we think are very important that
15 have to be take in into account if any action is
16 taken so that we can ensure that we don't
17 interfere with the system of innovation and the
18 incentives for commercialization and development
19 of these tests.

20 AIPLA believes the patent system is
21 working well, doing its job. Let's work together
22 to make sure that whatever changes are made, do

1 not impede the incentives that keep biomedical
2 technology moving forward so that we all have
3 access to the future generations of genetic tests.
4 Thank you.

5 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Canady.
6 Our next participant is Lori Pressman on behalf of
7 the Association of University Technology Managers.

8 MS. PRESSMAN: AUTM thanks the USPTO for
9 the opportunity to speak at this roundtable.

10 AUTM members want first opinion, better
11 opinion, and different opinion diagnostic tests
12 available to as many people as possible as soon as
13 possible. We believe skilled licensing aligns
14 interest and fulfills the promise of personalized
15 medicine. AUTM's view on this matter is described
16 in detail in point nine of the Association's nine
17 points.

18 These objectives, AUTM believes, are all
19 possible now under the Bayh-Dole Act, which
20 provides universities needed flexibility to
21 license technologies on terms that encourage
22 prompt commercialization making federally funded

1 inventions available to protect public health and
2 welfare.

3 Rushing to enact additional legislation
4 can do more harm than good, particularly if it is
5 designed to solve a poorly defined problem. It
6 would also be a serious mistake to pressure
7 agencies to invoke march in rights provisions
8 against companies who have fully complied with the
9 terms of their licenses. Such change in the rules
10 at the end of the game would undermine industry
11 confidence in universities and federal
12 laboratories as reliable research partners. The
13 resulting damage to our economy would far outweigh
14 any short- term benefits.

15 Before focusing on possible legislative
16 remedies, we should first understand the issue at
17 hand, patient access. The terms nucleic acid,
18 gene patent, and diagnostic patent, are
19 misleading. Patents simply don't map particularly
20 well to diagnostic tests. Some biomarkers are
21 completely unrelated to nucleic acids and some are
22 not even biochemical. Thus, rules and policies

1 directed to this ill-defined object, the
2 diagnostic patent, will be blunt, confusing,
3 costly, and ineffective.

4 The data in appendix two of the SACGHS
5 report and the March 2012 BNA study show that the
6 field of use of the license is a far superior
7 predictor of the type of product a patent will
8 cover than is the patent itself.

9 Very recent scientific advances, the
10 June 2012 Human Microbiome Project publication and
11 the September 2012 revelations on the importance
12 of Dark DNA illustrate the remarkable and
13 plentiful design around and design better
14 opportunities for innovators in personalized
15 medicine. The future is happily, predictably
16 unforeseeable and the best diagnostics are yet to
17 be.

18 AUTM notes that the sole alternative to
19 patents is not open source, it is also proprietary
20 forever databases unrelated to patents. Some
21 companies, such as the crowd- funded µbiome
22 and bioinformatic 23andMe, collect tissue samples

1 and other personal information and create
2 proprietary forever biomarker databases, - forever
3 in that there is no requirement for the company
4 to share the collected information.

5 In contrast, patents incentivize
6 disclosure by granting time-limited monopolies to
7 innovators. Robust application of the written
8 description and enablement requirements serve the
9 public interest via a requirement to disclose and
10 describe the invention. Licenses can also
11 incentivize disclosure in the public interest.
12 License diligence can include a contractual
13 requirement to publish data or to permit
14 confirmatory laboratory testing by a provider
15 other than the licensee.

16 This type of diligence requirement,
17 however, is typically present only in licenses
18 with exclusivity.

19 On insurance, we previously noted that
20 the sales of OncotypeDx appeared to increase
21 following favorable insurance reimbursement
22 decisions. We suggest that Figure 6B and Table 2

1 in the BNA paper also reflect the influence of
2 insurance companies and their willingness to pay
3 only for actionable diagnoses. This reminds us
4 that patient benefit is a very important part of
5 our conversation on patient access.

6 The importance of flexibility to grant
7 patent licenses with exclusivity, particularly for
8 innovators, has been well documented in the AUTM
9 surveys, in the Better World report, in the 2006
10 Nature Biotech paper, Appendix 2 of the 2010
11 SACGHS Report, and most recently in the 2012 BNA
12 paper.

13 The accumulated evidence on the
14 incentives and benefits created by skilled
15 licensing, including the flexibility to negotiate
16 exclusivity and diligence of patented and thus
17 expiring proprietary rights, supports broad patent
18 eligibility, skillful patent examination, and
19 skillful patent licensing as the best means of
20 advancing patient access to diagnostic tests and
21 personalized medicine. Thank you.

22 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Pressman.

1 Our next participant is Hans Sauer on behalf of
2 Biotechnology Industry Organization.

3 DR. SAUER: Good afternoon. Thank you
4 for having us here to testify again on the matter
5 of the roundtable. We incorporated, if I'm
6 allowed to use a patent law term, our previous
7 testimony by reference, and so that allows us to
8 not repeat ourselves, you know, that would be a
9 bad thing in a setting like this.

10 When we first testified on this matter
11 11 months ago, we noted that, you know, there
12 seemed to be at the time an insufficient empirical
13 basis for recommending legislative action on the
14 subject of confirmatory genetic testing where
15 so-called gene patents and exclusive licensing
16 exists.

17 Bio does understand, to be sure, right,
18 Bio does understand that the America Invents Act
19 directs the Office to provide legislative options
20 to Congress, but today, as then, developing such
21 options -- legislative options, in doing so, the
22 Office owes it to the Congress to develop also a

1 solid empirical basis that clearly frames the
2 problems that are to be addressed. Anything less,
3 we think, would invite legislation on the basis of
4 assumptions and unstated beliefs.

5 So, to be clear, I think, you know, then
6 as now, Bio does not really believe that the
7 problem has been sufficiently framed or to the
8 extent it's been framed, it's sufficiently
9 substantiated. Is Congress concerned about
10 patients' rights? Is Congress concerned, perhaps,
11 about test reliability? These are different
12 questions and addressing them involves different
13 considerations.

14 It appears, in public discourse, their
15 calls for second opinion tests are most often
16 couched in terms of patients' rights.

17 Bio was told quite consistently in
18 consultations with clinical practitioners that
19 patients, you know, at the provider/patient level,
20 only very infrequently actually ask for such
21 repeat tests. The result comes in and the patient
22 spontaneously says, I don't trust this, I would

1 like to have this repeated.

2 But none the less, you know, however
3 uncommon such requests may be today, if respect
4 for patient autonomy is accepted as a fundamental
5 principle for ethical medical decision making,
6 then surely a patient's expressed and informed
7 desire for a confirmatory test cannot simply be
8 dismissed or ignored. It is important, however,
9 that second opinion testing, if you want to call
10 it such, be more than the bare exercise of it
11 right. Ideally, it should be a patient benefit or
12 at least not cause more harm than good.

13 So, when faced with such requests, it
14 would therefore be the obligation of the clinical
15 practitioner to manage unrealistic hopes and to
16 inform the patient's decision. It would have to
17 be understood, for example, that a retest will
18 likely not be reimbursed -- we heard this today --
19 and that the result will almost certainly not
20 change.

21 Prolonged anxiety and uncertainty,
22 out-of-pocket expenses, and the risk that comes

1 from deferring treatment decisions likewise would
2 have to be factored in as potential down sides.

3 Moreover, in our desire to do the right
4 thing, we should also be mindful of potentially
5 creating other dilemmas that follow down the road.
6 So, for example, if second opinion tests are not
7 reimbursed because they're not considered
8 medically necessary, would we be comfortable
9 leaving poor patients without that option because
10 they cannot afford to pay for such tests so that
11 it becomes the privilege of some and not all to
12 seek such confirmation?

13 Moreover, would raising the option of
14 second opinion testing with patients in itself
15 create doubt where there was none before, an
16 unwarranted suspicion in the minds of patients
17 that genetic test results perhaps cannot be
18 trusted?

19 Such considerations have not really been
20 part of this debate. We're only beginning to hear
21 them aired today in prior testimony. I think we
22 should give much closer attention to such

1 considerations. To the extent Congress is
2 concerned it's driven by doubts over the quality
3 and reliability of genetic diagnostic testing
4 services, it may actually be useful for the PTO to
5 survey available data about the known analytic
6 performance of different genetic diagnostic tests.

7 Known or extrapolated error rates of
8 currently used tests may provide at least a
9 ballpark idea of how often confirmatory testing
10 would at least seem to be necessary from a quality
11 standpoint. So, for example, the sensitivity and
12 specificity of mutation testing for cystic
13 fibrosis or hereditary hemochromatosis and some
14 comparable tests is reported in proficiency
15 testing studies as ranging from lows around 98
16 percent to well over 99 percent.

17 So, these are some tests. We don't have
18 these data for all tests, of course, but
19 nonetheless, you know, let's assume as a working
20 hypothesis that laboratory performance is fairly
21 high and that errors are infrequent when we look
22 at analytic validity.

1 So, while this indicates high analytic
2 performance, it's also known empirically that the
3 majority of so-called laboratory errors actually
4 don't occur in the laboratory. This has been
5 extensively studied and is pretty well
6 established. Reported estimates indicate that 60
7 to 70 percent of errors happen in the pre-analytic
8 phase, that is, at the hospital or drawing
9 station, or during shipment as a result of
10 sampling error, mislabeling, sample preparation,
11 degradation, or switching, and that another 10 to
12 15 percent of errors occur in the post-analytic
13 phase, when the results come back out of the
14 laboratory and when, then, there are errors in
15 reporting, matching results to patients, and the
16 like. Errors are unavoidable.

17 So, even if one assumes as a working
18 hypothesis that the actual lab work is very
19 accurate, mistakes will nonetheless occur and, you
20 know, can't completely be eradicated because they
21 happen at other parts of the system.

22 In the first instance, either way, it

1 must always fall to the clinical practitioner to
2 identify the circumstances under which any given
3 test result would need to be confirmed through
4 retesting. Whether or not such retesting should
5 actually be done at an independent third party
6 laboratory, however, is a very different question.
7 Only analytical errors would be detectable by
8 sending a sample to a different lab. The sources
9 of pre- and post-analytic errors remain the same.
10 It's still the same hospital, it still has the
11 same error sources, it's still shipment, sampling
12 errors might happen, and the like.

13 So, in other words, if only 10 to 20
14 percent of all laboratory error is actually the
15 laboratory's fault, insisting on independent
16 confirmation testing at independent laboratories
17 will actually only capture a minority of lab
18 errors that we're worried about.

19 Because so little is gained from
20 legislating in this area, and because so little of
21 this has anything to do with patents at all, the
22 offices legislative recommendations should follow

1 the do no harm principle. The risks for harm and
2 unintended consequences are great as has been
3 testified today and previously. Any legislative
4 recommendation would have to be narrowly targeted
5 to confirmatory diagnostic testing. Interference
6 with existing contracts, with beneficial licensing
7 practices, and with incentives for innovation and
8 commercialization must be avoided. This is no
9 simple task, but maybe the wheel does not really
10 need to be reinvented. We had reference before to
11 Congresswoman Wasserman-Schultz's predecessor
12 provision to Section 27 of the America Invents
13 Act. Congresswoman Wasserman-Schultz had
14 developed a detailed, narrowly targeted provision
15 that would have created a limitation on remedies
16 for infringement in instances where a so-called
17 gene patent would be infringed by a confirmatory
18 test akin to that found at Section 287C of the
19 current patent act relating to surgical method
20 patents.

21 The basic preposition was, of that
22 provision, that if a first test is indeed done by

1 a licensed provider or the patentee, then
2 permitting an independent confirmation test of
3 that result for that patient is unlikely to cause
4 the patentee much harm. At the time, Mrs.
5 Wasserman Schultz's proposal was widely circulated
6 and it was detailed and it was obvious that a lot
7 of thought had gone into it, and it could have, in
8 our view, been developed for further productive
9 discussion. Well, it's not part of the America
10 Invents Act, but at least it's a proposal out
11 there has undergone some form of vetting.

12 And I encourage the Patent Office to
13 look back through the records of when the America
14 Invents Act actually went to the House floor where
15 that provision was included in Chairman Smith's
16 Managers Amendment.

17 Contrasting proposals involving the
18 creation of blanket exemptions from infringement,
19 the issuance of compulsory licenses, mandatory
20 non-exclusive licensing or changes to the
21 Bayh-Dole Statute, on the other hand, would be
22 highly problematic. They would be much more

1 likely to interfere with broader incentives for
2 innovation and would be much less likely to
3 achieve consensus. Thank you very much.

4 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Sauer. Our
5 next participant is Roger Klein on behalf of the
6 Association for Molecular Pathology.

7 DR. KLEIN: Hi. I'm Roger Klein. I'm a
8 practicing molecular pathologist here on behalf of
9 the Association for Molecular Pathology, often
10 referred to affectionately by the acronym AMP.

11 So, we just wanted to make a few
12 comments. First, gene patents cannot be used to
13 prevent physicians from examining their patients'
14 DNA sequences. In *Mayo v. Prometheus*, the
15 Supreme Court remained true to prior precedents
16 and reaffirmed the patent ineligibility of natural
17 law, such as those claimed by the BRCA 1 and BRCA
18 2 gene patents. These patents have value to
19 Myriad Genetics precisely because, in practice,
20 they claim relationships between variants in these
21 genes and their biological consequences.

22 Second, the sequence, and therefore,

1 informational content of a native DNA is not
2 changed during genetic testing. If this
3 fundamental property were altered, the DNA would
4 lose its usefulness for medical testing.

5 Third, gene patents inhibit the
6 acquisition of new knowledge and represent a
7 barrier to the application of new molecular
8 technologies. Others have mentioned the
9 revolution in gene sequencing that is transpiring
10 that will allow us soon to sequence virtually all
11 of the patients, 20- to 30,000 genes
12 simultaneously for \$1,000.

13 As Judge Bryson recognized, patents on
14 individual genes potentially represent a
15 substantial impediment to the full realization of
16 the promise of these astounding technologies.
17 Further, gene patents have impeded systematic
18 acquisition and publication of data regarding the
19 medical meaning of individual genetic changes
20 identified in patients. Others have brought this
21 up. Gene patent holders and exclusive licensees
22 have great incentives to keep these data

1 proprietary.

2 Robert Cook-Deegan was too modest to
3 mention his paper published in The European
4 Journal of Human Genetics this fall, but he
5 demonstrates that Myriad does this to great
6 effect.

7 Fourth, gene patents increase costs of
8 and decrease access to genetic testing. My mother
9 was afflicted with an inherited neurologic
10 disorder. When I sought to obtain genetic testing
11 on this patented gene, my choices were the
12 hospital that had discovered the gene, but which
13 had retained genetic testing rights, and a private
14 company that had an exclusive license. The cost
15 of obtaining the test from the hospital was
16 slightly over \$200. The cost of purchasing the
17 test from the company was about \$800. This
18 substantial difference would have been multiplied
19 several fold had other family members required
20 testing.

21 I couldn't test myself without
22 infringing the patent.

1 Fifth, insurance reform is unlikely to
2 guaranty that all patients have access to genetic
3 testing of patented genes. In the case of BRCA 1
4 and BRCA 2, a single provider of testing sets all
5 the rules -- test construct, methods the
6 mutation's detected and in which order, the price,
7 and the insurance that is acceptable. The
8 Affordable Care Act was enacted to ensure patient
9 access to essential healthcare services, including
10 diagnostic testing. Yet there is still no

11 guaranty that all Americans will have access to
12 BRCA 1, BRCA 2, and other genetic testing.

13 Six, gene patents are not necessary to
14 incentivize the discovery of genetic relationships
15 or to encourage the provision of genetic testing
16 services. Most genes used, as mentioned
17 previously, in genetic testing, have been
18 discovered by academic physicians and scientists
19 in the normal course of their work, the
20 traditional academic currencies of publications
21 and research grants, as well as scientific
22 curiosity and, importantly, the dedication to the

1 welfare of our patients provide ample
2 encouragement for these physicians and scientists.

3 Genetic testing can be performed using
4 routine and justifiably patented molecular
5 biologic tools and techniques. The cost of
6 developing, validating, and providing genetic
7 tests are modest, and well within the reach of the
8 typical practitioner when reasonable test volumes
9 and reimbursement can be assured.

10 Yet gene patents typically could cause
11 multiple providers to discontinue or not offer
12 these vital elements of patient care, and Dr.
13 Leonard has published on this. Thus, gene patents
14 violate the usual rule that patents advance
15 discovery and provide greater options for
16 consumers in society.

17 Finally, confirmatory genetic testing
18 does not solve the problems posed by gene patents.
19 In theory, statutorily guarantying confirmatory
20 genetic testing on patented genes could restore
21 the rights of BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 positive women
22 undergoing surgical removal of their breasts

1 and/or ovaries to second opinion testing.

2 However, compulsory licensing is an
3 impractical solution, and Dr. Leonard explained
4 why. For BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 tests in which
5 mutations were not detected, a provider would need
6 to offer patients assays for which Myriad likely
7 charges in the range of \$3,000 with, as we've
8 heard, little prospect for reimbursement.

9 Even if a small number of providers did
10 choose to engage in confirmatory testing, patients
11 would still be deprived of the right to have the
12 pathologist or geneticist of their choice perform
13 their DNA examination. We heard about differences
14 in reporting of variants of unknown significance.
15 The way I draft my reports, particularly when I'm
16 not sure of the meaning of a particular variant,
17 differs from others and it's considered in the
18 light of the medical importance of the result. It
19 does matter who does your testing.

20 Most important, the issue of
21 confirmatory testing is a red herring that
22 distracts from the multitude of other problems

1 gene patents cause for patients and providers. We
2 are optimistic the Supreme Court will resolve the
3 gene patent issue in favor of our patients.
4 However, in light of the preceding, any
5 recommendations by the USPTO for compulsory
6 licensing should not be confined to second
7 opinions. Rather, such recommendations should
8 mandate compulsory licensing of gene patents at
9 reasonable rates or reasonable fees for all
10 genetic testing.

11 Thank you very much.

12 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Klein. Our
13 next participant is Kristin Neumann on behalf of
14 MPEG LA.

15 MS. NEUMANN: Hello and thank you to the
16 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for hosting this
17 roundtable and to the efforts of the esteemed
18 committee in organizing and facilitating it.

19 I am the executive director of
20 Librassay, the patent licensing supermarket for
21 molecular diagnostics. Librassay is owned and
22 operated by MPEG LA, the world's leading

1 independent provider of alternative patent
2 licensing solutions.

3 Librassay is unique in these proceedings
4 because we are the only entity offering a private
5 sector solution to the issues concerning patent
6 licensing in the context of second opinion
7 diagnostic test availability, and, indeed, all
8 diagnostic test availability.

9 On one side, we have those who call for
10 a ban on gene patents or legislative infringement
11 exemptions or compulsory licensing, none of which
12 exist in the law today, and in all likelihood,
13 would unleash a raft of unintended consequences
14 and produce more harm than good.

15 On the other side, we have those who
16 justifiably make the case that the patent system
17 is working as it should to protect and reward
18 innovation and investment and that patents are not
19 the culprit in the second opinion test problem, if
20 there even is such a problem.

21 Librassay, however, occupies the middle
22 ground by recognizing the indispensability of

1 patents to the development and commercialization
2 of new healthcare innovations while at the same
3 time addressing inefficiencies in bilateral patent
4 licensing transactions that hold back the supply
5 of new products and tests in the field of
6 molecular diagnostics.

7 The good news is that Librassay is a
8 reality, it is up and running right now, it is
9 fully funded, and it leaves our government free to
10 turn its attention to the many other issues facing
11 our country for which no private sector solution
12 is at hand.

13 So, here are the details of the
14 Librassay patent licensing supermarket. It's a
15 one-stop shop for the nonexclusive licensing of
16 molecular diagnostic patent rights to any and all
17 test providers and product developers who desire
18 such a license on fair, reasonable, and
19 cost-effective terms. Librassay balances the
20 interests of test providers and product developers
21 with the interests of patent holders and investors
22 who rely heavily on patents as an inducement for

1 taking on investment risk necessary to fund
2 development efforts, regulatory approvals where
3 required, and marketplace acceptance and adoption.

4 In the absence of patent protection and
5 its quid pro quo of public disclosure, at best
6 innovations will become locked up in corporate
7 vaults as trade secrets, which will choke off the
8 rapid dissemination of innovations in this
9 important field, and at worst, they will not be
10 developed at all.

11 The Librassay patent licensing
12 supermarket opened for business in September of
13 this year with the support of eight anchoring
14 institutions including preeminent research and
15 healthcare institutions such as the National
16 Institutes of Health, the Ludwig Institute for
17 Cancer Research, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer
18 Center, and Partners Healthcare of Boston, and
19 world class universities such as Johns Hopkins,
20 Stanford, the University of Pennsylvania, and the
21 University of California San Francisco. That is
22 our anchoring group of institutions in the

1 Librassay patent license supermarket today with
2 their patents available for nonexclusive licensing
3 to everyone.

4 We presently have nearly 400 patents in
5 the portfolio. They are all available on a
6 nonexclusive basis to any and all medical
7 practitioners, labs, and companies wishing to use
8 them, and we expect to add many more institutions
9 and patents to the program in the coming year.

10 Answering the call for unencumbered
11 research in the field, Librassay provides a
12 royalty-free license under all patents in the
13 portfolio for basic research and educational
14 purposes. The Librassay website provides an
15 online storefront for searching, downloading, and
16 viewing the patents available for licensing plus a
17 summary of the key terms and conditions for the
18 license and invite you all to visit the store at
19 www.librassay.com.

20 We have plans to advance Librassay as
21 fast as is humanly possible. In addition to
22 growing the portfolio, we are hard at work

1 cultivating from the portfolio patents that lend
2 themselves to being licensed in bundles that will
3 assist companies and labs in their effort to
4 obtain freedom to operate with respect to new test
5 services and product offerings. And further, we
6 are open to working with other entities having the
7 common mission of further knowledge and technology
8 dissemination in this field, such as the NIH's
9 genetic test registry and ClinVar Resources.

10 So, the advantage of Librassay over any
11 of the other solutions proposed in the course of
12 these proceedings is that it fits squarely within
13 our country's established leadership role in
14 healthcare innovation and within our legal system
15 as it exists right now. Librassay requires no
16 legislative, regulatory or other measures having
17 any unintended consequences.

18 In Librassay, patents retain their full
19 stature and continue to perform the role
20 envisioned by our Founding Fathers in the
21 Constitution and we are confident that Librassay
22 will work because a similar solution was put into

1 play by MPEG LA 15 years ago to solve the problem
2 of blocking patent issues in the consumer
3 electronics field, and it led to the tremendous
4 success of the MPEG standard in digital video
5 transmission and to the rise of that popular
6 industry.

7 Thank you very much.

8 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Neumann.
9 Our next participant is Leonard Svensson on behalf
10 of BIOCOM.

11 MR. SVENSSON: Good afternoon. My name
12 is Leonard Svensson. I'm a patent attorney with
13 intellectual property law firm Birch Steward
14 Kolasch & Birch in San Diego, but today I'm here
15 on behalf of BIOCOM to provide some comments from
16 the view of industry companies, many of which are
17 patent owners in the diagnostic and biotechnology
18 industries. All of these companies depend upon
19 strong patent protection and value.

20 In previous testimony this past March in
21 San Diego, I explained BIOCOM's concerns about the
22 economic impact of weakening patent protection in

1 this field. Today my comments will focus on
2 questions one and two raised in Section 27 of AIA,
3 but first I'd like to give a few comments about
4 BIOCOM and its members.

5 BIOCOM is a regional life science
6 association representing more than 580 members in
7 Southern California including bio pharmaceutical,
8 medical device, diagnostic, and other life science
9 companies, and patients groups, approximately 60
10 of which companies are developing gene based
11 diagnostics.

12 Southern California is home to some
13 97,000 people who are directly employed in about
14 3,500 life science companies. The life science
15 industry in Southern California indirectly
16 generates a total of 248,000 jobs and pays over
17 \$17 billion in wages and produces a total of \$57
18 billion of economic activity in the region.

19 Without robust patent protection or the
20 ability to control licensing of innovations, most
21 BIOCOM members and companies would never be able
22 to financially recoup their upfront costs and this

1 would greatly inhibit their ability to attract
2 vital investment money. This lack of capital will
3 cause promising discoveries to go undeveloped into
4 therapies and diagnostics legislation that
5 undermines the patentability of innovations where
6 the strength of the valid patents would no doubt
7 result in the further diversion of investment
8 capital away from biotechnology, the outcome of
9 which would be detrimental to both the financial
10 and public health of our nation.

11 It's our understanding that the
12 underlying assumption behind the requirement in
13 the AIA for the USPTO to provide a report on
14 genetic diagnostic testing is a belief that
15 patients need and are unable to obtain a second
16 diagnostic opinion because of patents that are not
17 being licensed to provide an alternative source
18 for a given test. Now, concerning questions one
19 and two raised in the AIA section, first of all,
20 question one seeks input on the impact that the
21 current lack of independent second opinion testing
22 has had on the ability to provide the highest

1 level of medical care to patients.

2 Frankly, we're not aware of any
3 objective or empirical studies that in any way
4 establish that there really is any medical
5 benefit, which would result from the repetition of
6 genetic tests by a second entity distinct from
7 that which performed the initial test. Genetic
8 diagnostic companies perform rigorous quality
9 control procedures on each sample tested to ensure
10 that there are no technical deficiencies in their
11 analysis and that their results are accurate.

12 We're not even aware of any significant
13 testimony by patients or medical practitioners to
14 establish that the quality of medical care would
15 be improved by the repetition of a genetic test at
16 a second facility or that patients or medical
17 practitioners are actually unsuccessfully seeking
18 such second opinion testing by a different
19 laboratory.

20 Absent such evidence, there simply is no
21 valid basis for weakening the value of the patents
22 that our member companies depend upon to protect

1 their valuable innovations and products. So, we
2 understand that the natural response may be a
3 request for objective evidence in the other
4 direction, namely evidence that there's no medical
5 need for second opinion tests.

6 Some of our member companies have
7 actually tried to obtain some actual evidence
8 regarding the frequency of requests for repetition
9 of a genetic test by physicians or patients, but
10 obtaining testimony or evidence from medical
11 practitioners has, frankly, been difficult,
12 apparently in part because of medical privacy
13 concerns. So, we appear to be in a situation
14 where there's no objective evidence on either side
15 of this issue, but we submit that before laws are
16 changed or validly obtained patent property rights
17 are weakened, the burden must be on those who
18 propose such changes to provide some objective
19 basis for the need for such changes.

20 A second important point raised to
21 question one that we believe has not been
22 addressed or recognized at all in this debate is

1 that the proposed solution to the perceived need
2 for second opinion testing would not actually
3 provide for good and valid testing and could do
4 more harm than good. Simply providing with a
5 second company or laboratory with a license or
6 some other freedom under a genetic test patent
7 would not give that company all the tools needed
8 to perform a valid test.

9 Good quality tests and result
10 interpretation require additional information from
11 proprietary databases or other know-how, which may
12 not be easily obtained by the second testing
13 facility.

14 In addition, technical expertise gained
15 by performance of many, many tests and high-level
16 quality controls on measurements and
17 interpretation, are also required. Without these
18 additional features, tests run by a second opinion
19 laboratory would actually be less reliable than
20 those run by the patent owner or patent owner
21 licensed laboratories.

22 Less reliable results would certainly

1 not be good for patients and could lead to
2 negative attitudes about the test by medical
3 personnel that could lead to patients actually
4 receiving less quality medical care.

5 Question two of Section 27 of the AIA
6 seeks comments on the effect that providing
7 independent second opinion genetic testing would
8 have on existing patent and license holders. In
9 addition to any short-term effects, we believe the
10 discussion needs to look beyond the current debate
11 that seems to be largely focused on breast cancer
12 testing and needs to consider what any proposed
13 weakening of the patent protection right means to
14 future innovations in medical care.

15 If life science and diagnostic companies
16 cannot depend upon the value of their patent
17 portfolio to protect their huge investments they
18 need to make to develop new products or methods,
19 then who will make the investments to discover and
20 develop the next important products? Do we really
21 want to encourage more and more investment money
22 to go towards developing new video games and

1 entertainment products instead of new medical
2 advances? Now, that's not simply hyperbole.
3 That's the natural, predictable consequence of
4 making it less possible for biotech and diagnostic
5 companies to protect and recover their investments
6 they need to make to continue to develop the life
7 saving innovations that we all want to see.

8 Finally, we're aware that the USPTO is
9 seeking some suggestions for specific
10 recommendations regarding possible legislative
11 action. BIOCOM's position is that any patent
12 concerns so far raised in this debate or any
13 patient concerns so far raised in this debate are
14 not really patent related, but that require some
15 sort of patent related solution. The concerns
16 that we have heard are actually insurance coverage
17 issues, so any proposed solutions should be
18 focused on understanding and solving those
19 problems.

20 We strongly urge you to carefully
21 consider the broader implications of any proposals
22 to place limitations or compulsory licensing

1 requirements related to the scientific
2 advancements. BIOCOM and its members would be
3 happy to work with you on ways to address the real
4 concerns over the patenting of genetic-based
5 diagnostics while also avoiding potential
6 detrimental effects on the U.S. biotechnology
7 industry, which relies on intellectual property
8 protection and patents in order to fund the
9 development and innovative life science diagnostic
10 and therapies that we all want to see in the
11 future.

12 Thank you for listening to our concerns.

13 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Mr. Svensson.
14 Our next participant is Richard Marsh on behalf of
15 Myriad Genetics.

16 MR. MARSH: Good afternoon. Myriad
17 Genetics would like to thank the USPTO for this
18 opportunity to come and participate in this
19 roundtable discussion. I'm Richard Marsh. I'm
20 the executive vice-president, general counsel, and
21 secretary at Myriad Genetics.

22 As we're all aware, there has been much

1 discussion concerning this topic of confirmatory
2 genetic diagnostic testing. We've heard a "myriad",
3 pun intended, of views on this matter. And I'd
4 love to take the opportunity to address each and
5 every one of them. Myriad is very proud of what
6 it has been able to accomplish with respect to
7 hereditary breast and ovarian cancer testing.
8 Unfortunately, time would not permit that, and in
9 that regard, I'd refer you back to Myriad's prior
10 testimony back in San Diego where we shared
11 Myriad's belief and our experience that the BRCA
12 patents have incentivized research, have driven
13 research and development of hereditary breast and
14 ovarian cancer testing, has resulted in broad and
15 accessible testing for women, has resulted in
16 affordable testing through insurance reimbursement
17 to the point that I don't think anyone would
18 contest that today we in the United States are --
19 lead the world in hereditary cancer testing.

20 I think the patent system works. It is
21 just as our Founding Fathers had envisioned in the
22 Constitution. We've seen great promotion or

1 progress of the sciences as a result of the patent
2 system.

3 Now, Myriad understands that today the
4 USPTO is more interested in gathering some
5 empirical evidence or data with respect to the
6 questions being posed rather than a rehash of the
7 issues that we've heard before, and so I'm going
8 to limit my remarks to one specific area, and
9 that's Myriad's experience with insurance
10 reimbursement, particularly dealing with payers
11 and the medical policies that they have, and to
12 try and provide some further information to the
13 USPTO.

14 Now, in that regard, Myriad has now
15 tested approximately a million individuals for
16 hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. We're
17 reimbursed by all major insurance providers.
18 We're reimbursed by Medicare and by most Medicaid
19 state plans, and so we have a great breadth and
20 scope of experience with respect to insurance
21 reimbursement.

22 As genetic testing has now become

1 mainstream within the medical society, we have
2 found that the insurance companies
3 now will reimburse for genetic testing, but they
4 will only do so when they make a determination
5 that it is medically necessary, so they have
6 drafted written policies or guidelines of when
7 they will or when they will not reimburse for
8 genetic testing.

9 We've provided a short list, a sampling,
10 if you will, of some of those provider policies.
11 We'll provide those with Internet links to the
12 USPTO along with our written comments later. But
13 we believe it's a representative sampling of the
14 policies and the practice. It's not exhaustive,
15 there are obviously many others, but it's
16 indicative of the insurance payors' practice to
17 not reimburse for a second confirmatory test. In
18 our review, some of the policies even said --
19 Bruce Quinn referred to it earlier -- having once
20 in a lifetime limitations in them.

21 But I won't take the time to go through
22 them specifically. The policies speak for

1 themselves. You can review them in that regard.

2 But now let me speak a little bit more
3 specific with respect to Myriad's experience,
4 first with respect to BRCA analysis testing.

5 Now, candidly, Myriad may not be the
6 best example or entity or company to look to with
7 respect to confirmatory testing because we are the
8 principle entity that does the testing in the
9 first instance. Accordingly, I do not think that
10 someone would seek out Myriad to do a second
11 confirmatory test if they had done the first one
12 at our facility.

13 So, having said that, though, we have
14 not seen any measurable number of inquiries being
15 made or requests being made to identify other labs
16 where that testing could be done. By way of
17 example, which kind of supports our belief that --
18 or the statement that the insurance companies
19 don't reimburse is, some of the other policies
20 that they have -- so, for example, with respect to
21 negative test results and ensuing reflex testing, many times
22 when an individual receives a negative test result

1 they'll be reflexed to broader testing to
2 see if there are some other conditions that may be
3 causative.

4 Let me give you the example of an
5 individual who would have -- of an Ashkenazi
6 Jewish background -- who tested negative for the
7 triple site panel might be reflexed to a broader
8 full BRCA panel.

9 Insurance companies, many times, will
10 deny that second test for reimbursement because
11 they'll see that the blood draw date is the same
12 because it emanates from the original sample, and
13 we'll have to go into the insurance company and
14 tell them, no, this is for a much broader -- it's
15 a different test, in which case they'll then
16 reimburse, but it's indicative of the point that
17 if they see a test being done again, for the same
18 indication, they won't reimburse it.

19 The other area that we would -- that
20 probably would be insightful is with respect to
21 our Colaris testing or colorectal testing on our
22 Colaris product. There we are not the only

1 provider of that testing. There are various
2 others, both commercial and nonprofit, and so you
3 would think that we'd be able to have a little bit
4 more input (inaudible), if you will, with respect
5 to that testing, but unfortunately, we haven't.
6 Once again, unless a doctor specifically
7 requests or reaches out to indicate the purpose of
8 the testing, we don't know. Our test request form
9 is not structured in a manner that we collect
10 that. The doctor typically does not identify that
11 information, and so once again we don't have much
12 specific information or data that we've gathered
13 other than to make the observation that with a
14 rarity do we ever receive any inquiries with
15 respect to where one may go to have a test done
16 a second time.

17 Finally, I think the third major area is
18 in the Medicare reimbursement area. Again, Bruce
19 Quinn has spoken to that and I think rather than
20 take the time, we would just echo our
21 experience is the same in that regard on the
22 Medicare reimbursement side of things.

1 So, in summary, it's been Myriad's
2 experience that hereditary cancer testing is now
3 widely available and is reimbursable by insurance
4 companies, but that the insurers have decided on
5 their own, through their own policymaking, that
6 they will not reimburse for a second test. Myriad
7 will continue to evaluate and gather as much data
8 and information it can in this regard and we'll
9 append to the written comments that we'll make
10 hereafter. Thank you.

11 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Mr. Marsh. Our
12 last participant on our prescheduled list is Lisa
13 Schlager with Facing Our Risk Of Cancer Empowered.

14 MS. SCHLAGER: Thank you. Good
15 afternoon. As she said, my name is Lisa Schlager
16 and I'm the vice-president of community affairs
17 and public policy for FORCE, which is an acronym
18 for Facing Our Risk of Cancer Empowered. We're a
19 national nonprofit that represents nearly a
20 million people affected by hereditary breast and
21 ovarian cancer. The majority of our
22 constituents are BRCA positive, although we also

1 serve individuals who maybe test negative for a
2 family mutation, but have a hereditary pattern
3 that's recognized.

4 We appreciate the opportunity to speak
5 on behalf of the high-risk community today.

6 In response to this committee's request
7 for quantitative data, we've gathered quite a bit
8 of information from sources including healthcare
9 providers, high-risk patient community, respected
10 institutions such as the Cancer Legal Resource
11 Center, and the Michigan Department of Community
12 Health.

13 Of the four key questions presented in
14 Section 27 of the America Invents Act, we're best
15 qualified to address the issues surrounding the
16 role that cost and insurance play in access to
17 genetic testing and the desire for confirmatory or
18 second opinion testing in the patient community.

19 In 2005, the U.S. Preventative Services
20 Taskforce, or USPSTF released a grade B
21 recommendation statement entitled Genetic Risk
22 Assessment and BRCA Mutation Testing for Breast

1 and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility, and they
2 indicated that fair evidence was found that the
3 service improves health outcomes. So basically,
4 something with a grade B recommendation is
5 generally recommended-- the risks are not
6 significant, and the benefits outweigh the harms.

7 They specifically stated that women
8 whose family history is associated with an
9 increased risk for a deleterious mutation in the
10 BRCA 1 or BRCA 2 gene, should be referred for
11 genetic counseling and testing.

12 The National Comprehensive Cancer
13 Network has published guidelines for BRCA
14 counseling and testing for men and women with a
15 personal history of breast cancer, women with a
16 personal history of ovarian cancer, and
17 individuals with a relative with a known genetic
18 mutation. It should also be noted that NCCN has
19 guidelines for cancer risk management services for
20 women who test positive for a BRCA mutation.

21 Unfortunately, based on the data from
22 the Michigan Department of Community Health,

1 nearly half of the health insurers do not follow
2 these testing guidelines, and our research
3 indicates that two-thirds of the insurers have not
4 adopted NCCN guidelines for risk management
5 services.

6 My testimony to this committee in
7 February 2012 noted that approximately nine
8 million people did not have access to genetic
9 testing or BRCA testing because Tricare had
10 discontinued coverage of this test. Nine
11 million people, they didn't have access to this
12 critical genetic test for nearly nine months.

13 Tricare has reinstated coverage for BRCA
14 testing as of August. This isn't always the case.
15 Again, the Michigan Department of Community
16 Health, which is a leader in the utilization of
17 genetic information to provide statewide public
18 health benefits, has a cancer genomics program
19 that has done extensive work to increase the
20 availability of cancer-related genetic information
21 in order to decrease barriers to risk appropriate
22 services.

1 After significant efforts to get
2 insurers on board with the written policies, only
3 14 out of 25 major Michigan health plans have
4 written policies that are aligned with the USPSTF
5 recommendations. That's slightly more than half, and
6 there are now only seven plans aligned with the NCCN
7 recommendations for cancer risk management
8 services for BRCA women. That's less than a
9 third.
10

11 Despite some earlier comments that
12 Medicare is a good place to look to, it is not a
13 glowing example for patient-focused,
14 personalized medicine. Medicare only covers BRCA
15 testing for women who have had a cancer diagnosis.
16 It doesn't cover BRCA testing for men, and it also
17 doesn't cover BRCA testing for anyone who is
18 unaffected or who has not had cancer themselves,
19 so tens of thousands of high-risk people over age
20 65 cannot get BRCA testing through Medicare, and
21 many can't afford to pay out-of-pocket. This has
22 a significant impact on these individuals and their

1 families who are trying to determine if there is a
2 genetic mutation in the family, and what side of
3 the family it may come from.

4 Cost and insurance coverage, or lack
5 thereof, place a significant financial burden on
6 the patient population. In the Michigan
7 Department study conducted between 2007 and 2011,
8 of almost 2,000 patients who had genetic
9 counseling and did not receive BRCA testing,
10 nearly 15 percent cited inadequate insurance
11 coverage as the reason for not receiving genetic
12 testing. This data demonstrates the importance of
13 inadequate insurance coverage as a barrier for
14 many patients who might benefit from such testing.

15 In an effort to confirm this number and
16 collect data on some of the other questions, FORCE
17 developed an online survey--I believe you all have
18 received handouts--which was promoted widely to
19 the patient and healthcare professional
20 communities. We gathered over 500 responses to
21 the survey over three days.

22 Of the 38 individuals who responded that

1 they did not undergo genetic testing -- and we
2 recognize this is a small number -- but of those
3 38 individuals, 26 percent indicated that health
4 insurance had denied coverage and that was why
5 they didn't get testing, because they couldn't pay
6 out-of-pocket.

7 Five percent stated that they were
8 uninsured and unable to pay out-of-pocket as the
9 reason they didn't undergo testing.

10 Of those who did have genetic testing, 7
11 percent indicated that insurance initially denied
12 and they had to appeal, and approximately 7
13 percent experienced denial of coverage by their health
14 plan but they paid
15 out-of-pocket, and then 1.5 percent
16 didn't have health insurance but they were able to
17 pay out-of-pocket.

18 Given the cost of some genetic tests,
19 this is a significant burden on the patient
20 community.

21 We also queried the healthcare community
22 about their experiences with the impact of cost

1 and health insurance on the patients who meet
2 nationally published guidelines on BRCA testing.
3 A summary of that information is included in your
4 handouts and we're happy to make more detailed information
5 available to the committee at a later time, but of the 115
6 healthcare providers who answered a particular
7 question, 22 percent indicated that their patients
8 often experience difficulty in getting health
9 insurance to pay for genetic testing, and 64
10 percent said occasionally.

11 Over half of the healthcare providers
12 indicated that at least 80 percent of their
13 uninsured or underinsured patients are unable to
14 access genetic testing through other means, such
15 as participation in research or via financial aid.

16 On the topic of lack of independent
17 second opinion testing, Medicare, in at least 11
18 states, currently mandates coverage of some form of
19 second medical opinions. The majority of these
20 laws allow for patients to visit a second
21 physician. While they don't explicitly mention
22 genetic test results, it's important to

1 acknowledge that there's a trend and a value to
2 second opinions as a cost saving measure for
3 insurance companies, and a right for patients
4 before making life changing medical decisions.

5 On the question of demand for second
6 opinion testing, the FORCE survey indicated 60
7 percent of healthcare professionals and 34 percent
8 of patients who tested positive for a gene
9 mutation would like the option of a second opinion
10 or a verification test.

11 Comprehensive information on the impact
12 of insurance and cost on access to genetic
13 counseling and testing, as well as other
14 information, is provided in the surveys that we
15 have handed out and we've also provided some
16 personal accounts on the impact of these issues on
17 the overburdened patient community, as well as the
18 healthcare providers that serve them.

19 In closing, I want to emphasize again
20 that cost and health insurance coverage are
21 often key factors in patient access to genetic
22 counseling, testing, and preventive services. I

1 also want to bring attention to the fact that as
2 has been stated, Myriad's "comprehensive panel"
3 has been shown to be less than comprehensive. The
4 Bart rearrangement panel is evidence of this and
5 even Bart misses some arrangements. In fact,
6 research presented at the San Antonio Breast
7 Cancer Symposium in December suggested that the
8 BRCA testing currently being done is not inclusive
9 of all BRCA mutations. Thus, it's difficult to
10 claim that they have comprehensive testing. It's
11 a misleading statement.

12 Thank you for your time.

13 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Ms. Schlager.
14 I want to encourage you, when you submit your
15 written remarks to follow up, to please give us
16 more information about the survey that you've
17 handed out. We'd like to know more about the
18 methodology so we can understand the data a little
19 bit better, so if you could please include that
20 with the written remarks.

21 Now, I know we have one member of our
22 audience who would like to share commentary, so

1 I'll begin with him. We're going to also open the
2 floor for other members who -- for anybody else
3 who would like to share commentary, we'll invite
4 you to come forward. So, would Mr. Jaydee Hanson,
5 on behalf of the International Center for
6 Technology Assessment, please come forward?

7 MR. HANSON: Thank you. Happy to be
8 here today. One of the reasons I asked to -- or I
9 was asked to speak is we submitted comments to the
10 docket back in March. One example of how
11 technology may not always work, the
12 regulations.gov office said our comments were
13 accepted and the Patent Office didn't get them.
14 So, now the Patent Office does have them.

15 We also -- these comments are on behalf
16 of both my organization, the International Center
17 for Technology Assessment, and Friends of the
18 Earth.

19 We also contacted the Patent Office
20 suggesting that this roundtable be delayed until
21 after the Supreme Court makes its determination.
22 I do know that there was a deadline set by

1 Congress, but this won't be the first time a
2 Congressionally mandated deadline has been missed,
3 and I do seriously recommend that given that this
4 assignment landed in your lap, mostly because of a
5 kind of politics that doesn't always happen in
6 Washington, DC, there were people in the
7 Democratic side of the aisle that were of two
8 minds on the Wasserman- Schultz issue and there
9 are people on the Republican side of the aisle
10 that were of two minds on the issue, and the way
11 to avoid a debate that would have slowed the whole
12 patent bill was to punt to the patent office to do
13 this study.

14 Glad you have it. You helped a lot at
15 the time that the Section 27 was given to you.
16 Again, our recommendation is that you wait a bit
17 longer for your report, so the Supreme Court may
18 do half of your job for you, and there will still
19 be issues that you'll have to address probably
20 after the Supreme Court, but it -- your report
21 will be more useful if you wait until after the
22 Court says what happens.

1 That said, we do think that there are
2 serious issues that need to be addressed by you
3 and there will probably, as I say, some left. We
4 believe that the access to independent second
5 opinion diagnostic tests is limited by patents on
6 human genes and on other naturally occurring DNA
7 sequences. And those other naturally DNA
8 sequences will become clearer the more we
9 understand about the genetics of everything that
10 is there, even Francis Collins is now calling
11 things that aren't genes "non-coding genes", so
12 we've -- we keep changing the definitions
13 scientifically, and so we hope that you'll look at
14 not just things that are now called the human
15 genome, but that other 98 percent as well, when
16 you look at your recommendations.

17 Basically, we think that DNA sequences
18 are facts of nature and simply should not be
19 patentable. This is the 403rd anniversary of
20 Galileo discovering the moons of Jupiter, or the
21 first four moons of Jupiter. We would hope that
22 if that were happening now, the Patent Office

1 would not grant him a patent on the moons of
2 Jupiter, but rather grant him a patent on his much
3 improved telescope with which he found the moons
4 of Jupiter.

5 I would think you could also grant him a
6 patent on how he used the moons of Jupiter to
7 determine longitude. It didn't work very well,
8 but it was original.

9 That's not in our -- this is my interest
10 in history of science, it's not in our written
11 comments, I apologize.

12 We also note that there are a number of
13 issues dealt with in the Prometheus decision that
14 should instruct you even before the Supreme Court
15 makes its Myriad decision, and in that decision,
16 the Supreme Court, in a 9-0 decision, made clear
17 that patent holders should not have been granted
18 patents on inventions that "consist of
19 well-understood, routine, conventional activity
20 already engaged in by the scientific community".

21 We would suggest that a test that used
22 genetic material for diagnosis should be called

1 into question by the ruling.

2 I will skip, because you have and you
3 will post on your docket all the comments.

4 I would note that the cost of sequencing
5 the whole human genome is falling rapidly and
6 while we can debate, you know, how rapidly that's
7 going to fall or whether it will -- patenting will
8 impact that sequencing, if we weren't patenting
9 genes, we wouldn't have to worry about it.

10 So, even if the PTO decides not to
11 revisit the question of gene patents until ordered
12 by courts or by Congress, numerous studies have
13 shown that patents on genes and DNA sequences have
14 limited patients' access to independent opinion
15 and I would point you to the studies that Dr.
16 Leonard, who's left for the day already, but she
17 has some very good studies and I would, you know,
18 have you look again at her testimony from CAP.

19 I will wrap up. But before I wrap up, I
20 think it's very dangerous to assume that things
21 won't change. My family used to be slave owners.
22 They argued that that was their property and they

1 should not give it up. They don't own slaves
2 anymore. They lost that property. Some things
3 are wrong in the first place. The Patent Office
4 was wrong to grant patents on genes in the first
5 place, just as we were wrong to start slavery in
6 1670 in Virginia where I live now.

7 So, again, my personal opinion, not the
8 opinion of the International Center for Technology
9 Assessment, though it probably is, actually, but
10 not in our testimony.

11 So, the final step, really, is to stop
12 patenting all genes so that medical scientists can
13 develop any new test they need for any genes or
14 any DNA sequence. We think halfway measures, such
15 as compulsory licensing, should not be used to
16 address this problem of confirmatory genetic
17 tests. Compulsory licensing could still require a
18 testing facility to get approval of the patent
19 holder. The patent holder could easily slow down
20 even mandatory licensing processes and be able to
21 set the fees of the license, thus preventing the
22 development of cheaper, more accessible tests.

1 Thank you for your patience at the end
2 of the day.

3 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Mr. Hanson.
4 Now I'd like to open it for other members of our
5 audience who would like to come forward to share
6 any remarks, commentary.

7 No? Questions or items of discussion
8 from really the panelists or anyone in the room?
9 Like to share any questions? Commentary?

10 DR. KLEIN: I would make one comment,
11 because the issue of whole genome or next
12 generation sequencing has come up and with today's
13 -- the status of today's current technologies,
14 it's recommended that all mutations be confirmed.
15 So, irrespective of -- be confirmed by Sanger
16 sequencing, so irrespective of how the debate
17 about the utilization of these tools and with
18 respect to infringement comes out, there's still a
19 requirement to use Sanger sequencing to do second
20 -- to do a confirmation on the result, and that's
21 probably going to continue for a while.

22 MS. GONGOLA: Thank you, Dr. Klein. If

1 you do have a commentary, for our court reporter,
2 please mention your name first.

3 Other comments? Questions?

4 DR. ELLIOTT: I have one. George
5 Elliott from the Patent Office. I wanted to ask
6 Beth Peshkin if she has any experience, from your
7 genetic counseling experience, that can -- that
8 would allow you to give us an idea of the
9 importance of a confirmatory test to the people
10 that you work with.

11 MS. PESHKIN: Thank you for the
12 question. I think there are two types of results
13 that we need to think about confirming -- well,
14 three types really, the first is a positive test
15 result, a deleterious mutation is identified and
16 we -- and consequential medical decisions may be
17 based on that.

18 The reality is that when we have good
19 sample and quality control, we know that the
20 likelihood that a deleterious mutation,
21 particularly one that we've seen before such as
22 the common mutations, the likelihood of a false

1 positive is very low.

2 However, I'm a proponent of patient
3 autonomy and understanding that life altering
4 decisions are made on that basis, I would
5 certainly like the opportunity for patients to be
6 able to confirm those test results in an
7 alternative lab if they would like, and that can
8 be done now because Myriad, I believe, does
9 license that aspect and a laboratory can test for
10 a single mutation.

11 I think the bigger issue comes with
12 negative test results, in other words, a \$3,000
13 test is run and no mutation is identified, or an
14 extensive test is done and a variant is
15 identified, and as has been brought up before, I
16 think it is patients -- that is the most common
17 result that we get in a clinical setting and it's
18 the most problematic, and we know that if another
19 laboratory or another method was able to do more
20 comprehensive testing, we could give a more
21 complete result to those patients, and that
22 question does come up quite a lot.

1 DR. ELLIOTT: Okay, just to add on to
2 that, can you give us an idea of how many of your
3 patients with positive results ask for a
4 confirmatory test?

5 MS. PESHKIN: Very few.

6 DR. ELLIOTT: Very few?

7 MS. PESHKIN: Very few.

8 DR. ELLIOTT: Okay. Thank you.

9 MS. GONGOLA: Yes, Sara.

10 MS. SCHLAGER: I'm sorry. Can I jump
11 in? Lisa Schlager with FORCE. I do think that in
12 the high risk community there is common knowledge
13 that Myriad's the only company that does this
14 testing, so most people don't ask for a second
15 test because there's knowledge that only one
16 company does the testing, so it's not broadly
17 known that there is an option to have a
18 confirmatory test, as Ms. Peshkin just noted.
19 Thank you.

20 MR. VISHNUBHAKAT: So, I have a question
21 for Dr. Klein. This is something that I believe
22 was in the 2010 report of the Secretary's Advisory

1 Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society, and
2 it's something you reiterated as well, that
3 insurance reform won't be enough because the
4 patent holders would remain free to decline any
5 insurance payer that they wanted to, and I was
6 just wondering, from an economic perspective, what
7 incentive a patent holder would have to decline a
8 payer -- to refuse to work with an insurance
9 payer?

10 DR. KLEIN: I think the -- I guess the
11 question's probably best directed to people who
12 are the ones declining to work with certain
13 insurance companies. And that does happen.

14 I suspect it's the reimbursement levels,
15 so that if you have exclusive rights to perform a
16 test or service, and you do not want to perform
17 that service below a certain price, you may be
18 inclined to refuse to do it and that, I think,
19 would probably be the reason. I mean, you see
20 this in -- look, you see this in all sorts of
21 economic life where if reimbursement offered is
22 below that which the provider is willing to do the

1 work for, they're free to choose not to do it.

2 MR. VISHNUBHAKAT: Thank you.

3 MS. GONGOLA: Mr. Hanson?

4 MR. HANSON: Yeah, this is a suggestion
5 for an area that you're not really directed to
6 respond to, but one of the things that is in the
7 Patent Reform Act is a process for people outside
8 the Patent Office to request review of patents,
9 and if the Supreme Court doesn't just strike down
10 patents, it would be very interesting to know how
11 you will deal with reviews of gene patents in
12 particular and challenges to it. I ask because
13 our organization has challenged some other patents
14 and you did overturn a rabbit patent that we had
15 asked that you re-look at, but we haven't asked
16 you to look at gene patents and it would be
17 interesting to know how you intend to do that in
18 the future under the new law.

19 DR. ELLIOTT: I may start this -- this
20 is George Elliott again -- but I might turn it
21 over to Deputy Director Rea, who can also fill in.

22 Essentially you're asking how we would

1 handle a request for a third-party review or a
2 third-party request for a review of a patent
3 that's already issued?

4 MR. HANSON: I know you handled them
5 under the old law. I'm just asking where, under
6 the new law, how you're going to be handling that?
7 I mean, it seems that one of the issues is that
8 companies that had an interest in this or other
9 researchers that had an interest in a patent not
10 being granted could challenge the granting of it
11 under the new law. Or am I reading it wrong?

12 DR. ELLIOTT: I believe under the new
13 law anybody can challenge. There is a threshold
14 level of showing that you have to make -- that
15 there is a question of a reasonable likelihood,
16 actually, I think, that you would succeed in
17 challenging something.

18 There is also, under the new law, a
19 provision that makes it somewhat easier to present
20 evidence during the examination process itself so
21 that if you were aware, through the publication of
22 applications, that there was an application that

1 you were concerned about, there is a mechanism,
2 again, with some restrictions, but for providing
3 evidence that you think would impact the decision
4 on patent-ability, but essentially the third-party
5 requested review is fairly similar, I believe, to
6 what used to be -- although the criteria for
7 determining that the review goes forward is
8 slightly different and the decisions now are made
9 by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board rather than
10 going back to an examiner.

11 Does that help?

12 MR. HANSON: Thank you.

13 MS. GONGOLA: Do we have additional
14 commentary or questions about our conversation
15 today? Well, we have received a tremendous amount
16 of feedback and we thank everyone for attending
17 and participating in the conversation. A
18 transcript of today's event will be available very
19 shortly.

20 Additionally, for those of you who did
21 provide remarks to us, we're asking you to submit
22 your written statements within 30 days of this

1 hearing. From that we will go on to develop our
2 report that we will be submitting to Congress.

3 So, thank you, again, for your
4 participation and have a very good evening.

5 (Whereupon, the PROCEEDINGS were
6 adjourned.)

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I, Stephen K. Garland, notary public in
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