From: Warren Woessner [e-mail address redacted] Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2014 3:19 PM To: myriad-mayo_2014 Cc: Warren Woessner Subject: Feedback re: Examination Guidelines - Subject Matter Eligibility of Claims Reciting Or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena & Natural Products The Guidelines Contravene Decisions of the Fed. Cir./CCPA That Should Guide the Patenting of “Natural Products” The extension of the Myriad Supreme Court decision barring patents on fragments of DNA isolated from the human genome did not require the formulation of PTO Guidelines barring patents on “Natural Products” unless they are structurally altered from their condition in nature (e.g., in their natural source). In re Bergy and In re Bergstrom make it clear that isolation alone can impart s. 101 novelty to natural products that are isolated and purified from their natural sources. (Bergy is precedential, Judge Lourie’s opinion notwithstanding, as can been ascertained from the description of the history of the Bergy and Chakrabarty cases as it is reproduced in Chakrabarty. What the Office should be “measuring” in the extent in change in physical properites and/or practical utility that results from the isolation/purification. A gold nugget may be minimally changed from its physical properties and/or practical utility when it is panned out of a stream. However, the microorganisms in question in Bergy and the prostaglandins in Bergstrom were of no practical use in their natural state, but became valuable biofactories or drugs following extraction and purification. (The ACLU also conceded that the isolation of a drug that occurred in a very low concentration in a tree could render it patentable, since a controlled dosage could be given.) There is Nothing in Recent Jurisprudence that requires Claims to “Simple” Diagnostic Assays to Recite Additional Inventive Features. In the area of medical diagnostics, there was no reason for the Office to rule that a claim reciting a diagnostic conclusion based on a natural correlation is not patent-eligible unless there is some inventive aspect to the claim apart from the “If A, then B” recitation. Mayo (Prometheus) did not involve a diagnostic claim of this type – the Court simply believed that patentee had claimed the known correlation “too much drug – bad; too little drug – bad” that was known for 6-TP producing drugs like AZA. In fact, at the end of Mayo, the Court writes: “We need not determine here whether from a policy perspective, increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.” The Intema decision, that involved the use of two or more “old” diagnostic tests to improve the diagnosis, is nonprecedential. The Fed. Cir. Myriad decision invalidated one broad diagnostic claim as an “abstract idea” but the Guidelines do not purport to rely on that exception to patentability. Finally, the Guidelines state that they are not applicable to “Medical Procedures”. This term occurs in 35 USC 287(c)(1) and clearly was intended to include diagnostic testing, so long as it did not cause infringement of the enumerated types of patents. There is simply no reason for the Office to strip simple diagnostic assays from the ambit of “Medical Procedures”. This is particularly true since the Guidelines do not apply to new uses for known compounds. The Guidelines should be withdrawn for revisions to align them with recent Fed. Cir. and S. Ct. jurisprudence. Leaving them in place will compel millions of dollars to be spent on litigation to reverse the decisions of Examiners who have been misguided by them. Warren D Woessner, J.D. Ph.D. Founding Shareholder Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.