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OCT 0 2 2006

OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of	:	
Massimo Massa	:	
Application No. 08/062,577	:	
Patent No. 5,422,934	:	
Filed: May 17, 1993	:	DECISION ON RENEWED PETITION
Issue Date: June 6, 1995	:	UNDER 37 C.F.R. §1.378(E)
Attorney Docket Number: 93108	:	
Title: CORDLESS RANGE EXTENSION	:	
ACCESSORY APPARATUS FOR RADIO	:	
TELEPHONES	:	

This is a decision on the renewed petition filed March 31, 2006, under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e), requesting reconsideration of a prior decision pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b)¹, which refused to accept the delayed payment of a maintenance fee for the above-referenced patent.

The Office regrets the period of delay in issuing this decision.

¹ Any petition to accept an unavoidably delayed payment of a maintenance fee filed under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b) must include:

- (1) The required maintenance fee set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.20 (e) through (g);
- (2) The surcharge set forth in 37 C.F.R. §1.20(i)(1), and;
- (3) A showing that the delay was unavoidable since reasonable care was taken to ensure that the maintenance fee would be paid timely and that the petition was filed promptly after the patentee was notified of, or otherwise became aware of, the expiration of the patent. The showing must enumerate the steps taken to ensure timely payment of the maintenance fee, the date and the manner in which patentee became aware of the expiration of the patent, and the steps taken to file the petition promptly.

The request to accept the delayed payment of the maintenance fee is DENIED².

A discussion follows.

Procedural history

The patent issued on June 6, 1995. The grace period for paying the 7-½ year maintenance fee provided in 37 C.F.R 1.362(e) expired at midnight on June 6, 2003, with no payment received. Accordingly, the patent expired on June 6, 2003.

The original petition was submitted on January 3, 2006, and was dismissed via the mailing of a decision on February 2, 2006, for failure to establish that the entire period of delay was unavoidable.

With the present petition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e), Petitioner has submitted the fee associated with the filing of a petition under this section of the C.F.R. as well as a statement of facts.

The standard

35 U.S.C. §41(c)(1) states:

The Director may accept the payment of any maintenance fee... after the six-month grace period if the delay³ is shown to the satisfaction of the Director to have been unavoidable.

§1.378(b)(3) is at issue in this case. Acceptance of a late maintenance fee under the unavoidable delay standard is considered under a very stringent standard. Decisions on reviving abandoned applications on the basis of "unavoidable" delay have adopted the reasonably prudent person standard in determining if the delay was unavoidable:

The word 'unavoidable' ... is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and

² This decision may be regarded as a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. §704 for the purposes of seeking judicial review. See MPEP 1002.02.

³ This delay includes the entire period between the due date for the fee and the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b).

observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business⁴.

In addition, decisions are made on a "case-by-case basis, taking all the facts and circumstances into account."⁵ Nonetheless, a petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable."⁶

A delay caused by an applicant's lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice, or the MPEP is not rendered "unavoidable" due to either the applicant's reliance upon oral advice from USPTO employees or the USPTO's failure to advise the applicant to take corrective action⁷.

Presuming for the purposes of discussion that it was an act/omission of Counsel that contributed to any of the delay herein, the act(s) or omissions of the attorney/agent are imputed wholly to the applicant/client⁸ in the absence of evidence that the attorney/agent has acted to deceive the client.⁹

The Office must rely on the actions or inactions of duly authorized and voluntarily chosen representatives of the applicant, and the applicant is bound by the consequences

⁴ In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 U.S.P.Q. 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 U.S.P.Q. 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913).

⁵ Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d at 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. at 982.

⁶ Haines v. Quigg, 5 USPQ2d 1130 (N.D. Ind. 1987), 673 F. Supp. at 316-17, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1131-32.

⁷ See In re Sivertz, 227 USPQ 255, 256 (Comm'r Pat. 1985).

⁸ The actions or inactions of the attorney/agent must be imputed to the petitioners, who hired the attorney/agent to represent them. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-634, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390-91 (1962). The failure of a party's attorney to take a required action or to notify the party of its rights does not create an extraordinary situation. Moreover, the neglect of a party's attorney is imputed to that party and the party is bound by the consequences. See Huston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 23 USPQ2d 1910 (Fed Cir. 1992); Herman Rosenberg and Parker Kalon Corp. v. Carr Fastener Co., 10 USPQ 106 (2d Cir. 1931).

⁹ When an attorney intentionally conceals a mistake he has made, thus depriving the client of a viable opportunity to cure the consequences of the attorney's error, the situation is not governed by the stated rule in Link for charging the attorney's mistake to his client. In re Lonardo, 17 USPQ2d 1455 (Comm'r. Pat. 1990).

of those actions or inactions¹⁰. Specifically, Petitioner's delay caused by the mistakes of negligence of his voluntarily chosen representative does not constitute unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 USC 133¹¹. The actions of the attorney are imputed to the client, for when a Petitioner voluntarily chooses an attorney to represent him, the petitioner cannot later avoid the repercussions of the actions or inactions of this selected representative, for clients are bound by the acts of their lawyers/agents, and constructively possess "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney¹²."

Courts hesitate to punish a client for its lawyer's gross negligence, especially when the lawyer affirmatively misled the client," but "if the client freely chooses counsel, it should be bound to counsel's actions¹³."

Docketing error

A delay resulting from an error (e.g., a docketing error) on the part of an employee in the performance of a clerical function may provide the basis for a showing of "unavoidable" delay.

Such a showing should identify the specific error¹⁴, the individual who made the error, and the business routine in place for performing the action which resulted in the error. The showing must establish that the individual who erred was sufficiently trained and experienced with regard to the function and routine for its performance that reliance upon such employee represented the exercise of due care. The showing should include information regarding the training provided to the personnel responsible for the docketing error, degree of

10 Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 633-634 (1962).

11 Haines, 673 F.Supp. at 316-17, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1131-32; Smith v. Diamond, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); Potter v. Dann, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); Ex parte Murray, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 103, 131 (Comm'r Pat. 1891).

12 Link at 633-634.

13 Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co., Inc., 708 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983). See also, Wei v. State of Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985); LeBlanc v. I.N.S., 715 F.2d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1983).

14 Petitioner must identify the error which caused the delay. If the specific error cannot be identified, the petitioner must identify any and all possible causes and prove that any of them, if they were the true cause, constitute unavoidable delay. A full and complete discussion for each possible error must be presented. Petitioner is reminded that petitioner has the burden of proof.

supervision of their work, examples of other work functions carried out, and checks on the described work which were used to assure proper execution of assigned tasks.

A delay resulting from an error (e.g., a docketing error) on the part of an employee in the performance of a clerical function may provide the basis for a showing of "unavoidable" delay, provided it is shown that:

- (1) the error was the cause of the delay at issue,
- (2) a business routine was in place for performing the clerical function that could reasonably be relied upon to avoid errors in its performance, and;
- (3) the employee was sufficiently trained and experienced with regard to the function and routine for its performance that reliance upon such employee represented the exercise of due care.

See MPEP 711.03(c)(III)(C)(2).

An adequate showing should include (when relevant):

- (1) statements by all persons with direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the delay, setting forth the facts as they know them;
- (2) a thorough explanation of the docketing and call-up system in use;
- (3) identification of the type of records kept;
- (4) identification of the persons responsible for the maintenance of the system;
- (5) copies of mail ledger, docket sheets, filewrappers and such other records as may exist which would substantiate an error in docketing;
- (6) include an indication as to why the system failed in this instance, and;
- (7) information regarding the training provided to the personnel responsible for the docketing error, degree of supervision of their work, examples of other work functions carried out, and checks on the described work which were used to assure proper execution of assigned tasks.

The portions of the MPEP relevant to the facts as presented

2504 Patents Subject to Maintenance Fees

37 CFR 1.362. Time for payment of maintenance fees.

(a) Maintenance fees as set forth in §§ 1.20(e) through (g) are required to be paid in all patents based on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980, except as noted in paragraph (b) of this section, to maintain a patent in force beyond 4, 8 and 12 years after the date of grant.

(b) Maintenance fees are not required for any plant patents or for any design patents. Maintenance fees are not required for a reissue patent if the patent being reissued did not require maintenance fees.

(c) The application filing dates for purposes of payment of maintenance fees are as follows:

(1) For an application not claiming benefit of an earlier application, the actual United States filing date of the application.

(2) For an application claiming benefit of an earlier foreign application under 35 U.S.C. 119, the United States filing date of the application.

(3) For a continuing (continuation, division, continuation-in-part) application claiming the benefit of a prior patent application under 35 U.S.C. 120, the actual United States filing date of the continuing application.

(4) For a reissue application, including a continuing reissue application claiming the benefit of a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. 120, the United States filing date of the original non-reissue application on which the patent reissued is based.

(5) For an international application which has entered the United States as a Designated Office under 35 U.S.C. 371, the international filing date granted under Article 11(1) of the Patent Cooperation Treaty which is considered to be the United States filing date under 35 U.S.C. 363.

(d) Maintenance fees may be paid in patents without surcharge during the periods extending respectively from:

(1) 3 years through 3 years and 6 months after grant for the first maintenance fee,

(2) 7 years through 7 years and 6 months after grant for the second maintenance fee, and

(3) 11 years through 11 years and 6 months after grant for the third maintenance fee.

(e) Maintenance fees may be paid with the surcharge set forth in § 1.20(h) during the respective grace periods after:

(1) 3 years and 6 months and through the day of the 4th anniversary of the grant for the first maintenance fee.

(2) 7 years and 6 months and through the day of the 8th anniversary of the grant for the second maintenance fee, and

(3) 11 years and 6 months and through the day of the 12th anniversary of the grant for the third maintenance fee.

(f) If the last day for paying a maintenance fee without surcharge set forth in paragraph (d) of this section, or the last day for paying a maintenance fee with surcharge set forth in paragraph (e) of this section, falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a federal holiday within the District of Columbia, the maintenance fee and any necessary surcharge may be paid under paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) respectively on the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday.

(g) Unless the maintenance fee and any applicable surcharge is paid within the time periods set forth in paragraphs (d), (e) or (f) of this section, the patent will expire as of the end of the grace period set forth in paragraph (e) of this section. A patent which expires for the failure to pay the maintenance fee will expire at the end of the same date (anniversary date) **the patent was granted in the 4th, 8th, or 12th year after grant.**

(h) The periods specified in §§ 1.362 (d) and (e) with respect to a reissue application, including a continuing reissue application thereof, are counted from the date of grant of the original non-reissue application on which the reissued patent is based.

Maintenance fees are required to be paid on all patents based on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980, except for plant patents and design patents. Furthermore, maintenance fees are not required for a reissue patent if the patent being reissued did not require maintenance fees. Application filing dates for purposes of determining whether a patent is subject to payment of maintenance fees are as follows:

(A) For an application not claiming benefit of an earlier application, the actual United States filing date of the application.

(B) For an application claiming benefit of an earlier foreign application under 35 U.S.C. 119(a)-(d), the actual United States filing date of the application.

(C) For a continuing (continuation, division, continuation-in-part) application claiming the benefit of a prior patent application under 35 U.S.C. 120, the actual United States filing date of the continuing application.

(D) For a reissue application, including a continuing reissue application claiming the benefit of a reissue application under 35 U.S.C. 120, the United States filing date of the original nonreissue application on which the patent reissued is based.

(E) For an international application that has entered the United States as a Designated Office under 35 U.S.C. 371, the international filing date granted under Article 11(1) of the Patent Cooperation Treaty which is considered to be the United States filing date under 35 U.S.C. 363.

2506 Times for Submitting Maintenance Fee Payments

37 CFR 1.362(d) sets forth the time periods when the maintenance fees for a utility patent can be paid without surcharge. Those periods, referred to generally as the "window period," are the 6-month periods preceding each due date. The "due dates" are defined in 35 U.S.C. 41(b). The window periods are (1) 3 years to 3 1/2 years after the date of issue for the first maintenance fee payment, (2) 7 years to 7 1/2 years after the date of issue for the second maintenance fee payment, and (3) 11 years to 11 1/2 years after the date of issue for the third and final maintenance fee payment. A maintenance fee paid on the last day of a window period can be paid without surcharge. The last day of a window period is the same day of the month the patent was granted 3 years and 6 months, 7 years and 6 months, or 11 years and 6 months after grant of the patent. 37 CFR 1.362(e) sets forth the time periods when the maintenance fees for a utility patent can be paid with surcharge. Those periods, referred to generally as the "grace period," are the 6-month periods immediately following each due date. The grace periods are (1) 3 1/2 years and through the day of the 4th anniversary of the grant of the patent, (2) 7 1/2 years and through the day of the 8th anniversary of the grant of the patent and, (3) 11 1/2 years and through the day of the 12th anniversary of the grant of the patent. A maintenance fee may be paid with the surcharge on the same date (anniversary date) the patent was granted in the 4th, 8th, or 12th year after grant to prevent the patent from expiring. Maintenance fees for a reissue patent are due based upon the schedule established for the original utility patent. The filing of a request for ex parte or inter partes

reexamination and/or the publication of a reexamination certificate does not alter the schedule of maintenance fee payments of the original patent. If the day for paying a maintenance fee falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia, the maintenance fee may be paid on the next succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday. For example, if the window period for paying a maintenance fee without a surcharge ended on a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia, the maintenance fee can be paid without surcharge on the next succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia. Likewise, if the grace period for paying a maintenance fee with a surcharge ended on a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia, the maintenance fee can be paid with surcharge on the next succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia. In the latter situation, the failure to pay the maintenance fee and surcharge on the next succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a Federal holiday within the District of Columbia will result in the patent expiring on a date (4, 8, or 12 years after the date of grant) earlier than the last date on which the maintenance fee and surcharge could be paid. This situation results from the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 21, but those provisions do not extend the expiration date of the patent if the maintenance fee and any required surcharge are not paid when required. For example, if the grace period for paying a maintenance fee with a surcharge ended on a Saturday, the maintenance fee and surcharge could be paid on the next succeeding business day, e.g., Monday, but the patent will have expired at midnight on Saturday if the maintenance fee and surcharge were not paid on the following Monday. Therefore, if the maintenance fee and any applicable surcharge are not paid, the patent will expire as of the end of the grace period as listed above. A patent that expires for failure of payment will expire on the anniversary date the patent was granted in the 4th, 8th, or 12th year after the grant.

2542 Change of Correspondence Address

Unless a fee address has been designated, all notices, receipts, refunds, and other communications relating to the patent will be directed to the correspondence address (37 CFR 1.33) used during the prosecution of the application. Practitioners of record when the patent issues who do not wish to receive correspondence relating to maintenance fees must change the correspondence address in the patented file or provide a fee address to which such correspondence should be sent. It is not required that a practitioner file a request for permission to withdraw pursuant to 37 CFR 1.36 solely for the purpose of changing the correspondence address in a patented file.

The correspondence address should be updated or changed as necessary to ensure that all communications are received in a timely manner. A change of correspondence address may be made as provided in 37 CFR 1.33(a). The correspondence address may be changed as provided in 37 CFR 1.33(a)(1) prior to the filing of an oath or declaration. After an oath or declaration has been executed and filed by at least one inventor, the correspondence address may be changed as provided in 37 CFR 1.33(a)(2). Requests for a change of the correspondence address may be sent to the Office of Public Records, Document Services Division, Special Handling Branch during the enforceable life of the patent. To ensure accuracy and to expedite requests for change to the correspondence address, it is suggested that the request include both the

patent number and the application number. Form PTO/SB/122 may be used to request a change of correspondence address in a patent application. Form PTO/SB/123 may be used to request a change of correspondence address for an issued patent.

Application of the standard to the current facts and circumstances

Petitioner has submitted a declaration of facts from Ms. Martia D. Portch, the Firm Wide IP Practice Support Manager. It has been asserted that this firm was responsible for ensuring that maintenance fees for this patent are properly submitted. Petitioner has set forth that the firm utilizes a docketing system, however it has been determined that information pertaining to this patent was never entered into the docketing system.

Petitioner's explanation of the delay has been considered, and it has been determined that it fails to meet the standard for acceptance of a late payment of the maintenance fee and surcharge, as set by 35 U.S.C. 41(c) and 37 C.F.R. 1.378(b)(3). The period for paying the 7-½ year maintenance fee without the surcharge extended from June 6, 2002 to December 6, 2002 and for paying with the surcharge from December 7, 2002 to June 6, 2003. Thus, the delay in paying the 7-½ year maintenance fee extended from June 6, 2003 at midnight to the filing of the present petition on March 31, 2006.

Petitioner has identified the error which was the cause of the delay at issue¹⁵. The deficiencies in Petitioner's showing will be addressed below.

1. Petitioner has failed to identify the persons responsible for the maintenance of the system.

Petitioner has identified one Lloyd Knight as being the partner responsible for "overall policies and procedures of the docket department" during the relevant time period¹⁶. Petitioner has further identified one Margaret Jackson as being the supervisor of the docketing department during the relevant time period¹⁷. However, Petitioner has not identified the

¹⁵ Poratch declaration of facts, paragraph 9.

¹⁶ Id. at 6.

¹⁷ Id. at 7.

individual who should have entered this information into the docketing system.

2. Petitioner has not submitted statements by all persons with direct knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the delay, setting forth the facts as they know them.

A statement has not been provided from either Mr. Knight, Ms. Jackson, or the individual who should have entered this information into the docketing system.

3. Petitioner has not included an indication as to why the information for the present patent was not entered into the system.
4. Petitioner has failed to provide a showing which would establish that the docketing personnel were sufficiently trained and experienced with regard to the function and routine for its performance that reliance upon such employee represented the exercise of due care.

Ms. Portch has explained that she is "not familiar with the training provided to the docket department staff...not familiar with the degree of supervision of the docketing staff, examples of other work functions carried out, or checks on the described work which were used to assure proper execution of tasks...[she is] unaware of any person currently at [the firm] who would be familiar with this information¹⁸."

As such, it does not appear that Petitioner is in a position to provide any of this crucial information.

Ms. Portch has further explained that the docketing system "did not notify users if an entry was incomplete or inaccurate and, absent discretionary proactive review of entries, it was possible for incorrect entries to escape detection at the time of entry¹⁹."

Petitioner has not provided a thorough explanation of the docketing and call-up system in use - it cannot be determined if anyone was reviewing the work product of the docketing personnel and ensuring that all patents were

18 Id. at 19.

19 Id. at 10.

properly entered into the docketing system, and it is not clear if any checks performed on the described work were used to assure proper execution of assigned tasks. As such, Petitioner has not established that reliance on this docketing system was reasonable. If these checks were not made, and if docketing personnel were free to mis-enter information, or omit patents altogether, it does not appear that the firm had in place a business routine which could reasonably be relied upon to avoid errors in its performance.

Consequently, Petitioner will not be able to establish that the entire period of delay was unavoidable.


CONCLUSION

The prior decision which refused to accept, under 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b), the delayed payment of a maintenance fee for the above-identified patent, has been reconsidered. For the above stated reasons, the delay in this case cannot be regarded as unavoidable within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. §41(c)(1) and 37 C.F.R. §1.378(b).

Since this patent will not be reinstated, the petitioner is entitled to a refund of the surcharge and the 7-½ year maintenance fee, but not the \$400 associated with the filing of this petition. Petitioner's Deposit Account will be credited in due course.

As stated in 37 C.F.R. §1.378(e), no further reconsideration or review of this matter will be undertaken. Telephone inquiries should be directed to Senior Attorney Paul Shanowski at (571) 272-3225.

The Revocation of Power of Attorney and Change of Correspondence Address have been entered and made of record. The Fee Address has not been updated however, as this patent will not be reinstated.



Charles Pearson
Director
Office of Petitions
United States Patent and Trademark Office